Strategic Forecast on Horizontal and Vertical Proliferation Risks
Executive Summary: The Post-New START Era
On February 5, 2026, the global nuclear order entered uncharted territory as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) officially expired. For the first time in more than half a century, there are no legally binding limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia—the two nations that together possess approximately 85% of the world's nuclear weapons.
Hours before the treaty's expiration, U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner reportedly negotiated with Russian officials in Abu Dhabi. While sources indicated the U.S. and Russia were closing in on a deal to continue observing New START limits voluntarily, as of February 10, 2026, no official agreement has been announced. UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the expiration represents a "grave moment" for international peace and security.
The absence of bilateral limits, combined with China's rapid triad expansion and North Korea's evolution toward a more aggressive nuclear doctrine, has created the highest risk environment for nuclear proliferation since the mid-20th century. This report analyzes potential "nuclear tipping points" in historically non-nuclear states and provides a five-year forecast informed by Bayesian game theory and current geopolitical developments.
I. Current Status of the Nuclear Nine
The established and de facto nuclear powers are currently undergoing massive vertical proliferation:
United States and Russia: The Post-Treaty Environment
Following the expiration of New START on February 5, 2026, both nations are free to "upload" warheads without legal constraint. Current estimates place U.S. deployed strategic warheads at approximately 1,770 and Russia at 1,718, but thousands more remain in reserve. Russia has modernized roughly 95% of its strategic forces and maintains an estimated 1,500 tactical nuclear weapons.
The immediate concern is the loss of transparency. Since Russia suspended participation in verification measures in February 2023, mutual inspections and data exchanges have ceased, creating an environment where both sides must plan based on worst-case assessments. The U.S. air-based leg could increase from 300 to 780 deployed warheads within weeks, while submarine capacity stands at 2,240 warheads compared to current deployment of around 1,920.
China: Rapid Expansion Toward Parity
China possesses an estimated 600 nuclear warheads as of early 2026—the world's third-largest arsenal and the only one significantly expanding. This represents a doubling since 2019, with Pentagon projections of 750-1,500 warheads by 2035. Beijing is constructing approximately 300 ICBM silos and modernizing its nuclear triad to achieve "world-class" status by 2030.
In September 2025, China publicly unveiled its nuclear triad, showcasing the DF-5C ICBM with range exceeding 12,400 miles and possible fractional orbital bombardment capability. Critically, China rejects trilateral arms control, arguing it is "neither fair nor reasonable" when its arsenal is vastly smaller. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated in February 2026 that China would consider arms control "only when its arsenal matches more closely" that of the U.S. and Russia.
On February 6, 2026, U.S. Under Secretary DiNanno accused China of conducting nuclear explosive tests in 2020, though the CTBT Organization stated its monitoring system detected no such event. The allegation underscores deteriorating trust in nuclear relations.
North Korea: Nuclear Completion
Pyongyang views nuclear weapons as an irreversible component of state power. The September 2022 nuclear law authorizes preemptive strikes if threats to leadership are judged imminent. Experts estimate North Korea may have fissile material for up to 90 warheads with approximately 50 assembled. The anticipated Ninth Party Congress in early 2026 is projected to formalize "nuclear completion," signaling that denuclearization is no longer viable.
For the first time, the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy made no mention of North Korean denuclearization. Russia's Foreign Minister declared it a "closed issue" in September 2024, and China's arms control white paper omitted previous references to a "nuclear-free zone" on the peninsula.
India and Pakistan: Compressed Decision Timelines
In May 2025, India and Pakistan engaged in their most intense fighting in decades following a terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians. The four-day conflict saw missile strikes deep in each country's territory for the first time since 1971, requiring U.S. intervention. This demonstrated that nuclear deterrence cannot prevent miscalculation between nuclear powers.
II. Analysis of Potential New Nuclear Entrants
South Korea: The Highest-Risk Proliferation Scenario
Public support for indigenous nuclear armament reached 76.2% in March 2025—the highest since polling began in 2010. The ROK Forum for Nuclear Strategy published comprehensive volumes in 2025 that reached bestseller lists. In October 2025, President Trump approved South Korea's request to develop nuclear-powered submarines—the first time Washington endorsed such capability for an ally outside the UK.
Assessment: If North Korea conducts a seventh nuclear test without credible U.S. response, the probability of South Korean NPT withdrawal citing "supreme national interests" increases substantially. This could occur as early as 2027.
Japan: Strategic Hedging Under Pressure
Japan possesses 46 metric tons of separated plutonium and advanced space-launch capabilities, making it the world's most advanced "threshold" state. While the nuclear taboo remains strong, Japan may transition from "latent" to "virtual" deterrence if South Korea weaponizes. Assessment: Japan's decision is tied to U.S. alliance credibility and South Korean actions.
Turkey: Strategic Leverage Through Nuclear Ambiguity
Turkey's Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, built by Russia's Rosatom, is expected operational in 2026. The $20 billion project received $9 billion in new Russian financing. Turkey plans 7.2 GW nuclear capacity by 2035 and 20 GW by 2050. While NATO membership constrains weaponization, accumulating nuclear expertise provides latent breakout capability.
Brazil: The Submarine Loophole
Brazil's SN-BR nuclear submarine program requires highly enriched uranium, creating potential safeguards loopholes. While commitment to the Treaty of Tlatelolco remains firm, technical foundations being established provide a latent hedge if regional dynamics deteriorate.
III. Five-Year Forecast (2026-2031): Strategic Scenarios
Scenario I: Reinforced Deterrence (40% Probability)
U.S.-Russia informal agreement to observe NEW START limits while pursuing successor treaty. Enhanced Pacific nuclear consultation through "Nuclear Planning Group" satisfies ROK and Japanese security demands without indigenous weapons. Horizontal proliferation deferred.
Scenario II: The East Asian Domino (35% Probability)
North Korea tests seventh nuclear device; U.S. response viewed as inadequate. South Korea declares intent to withdraw from NPT by 2027-2028. Japan moves from "latent" to "virtual" deterrence, creating de facto nuclear Northeast Asia.
Scenario III: Global Norm Collapse (15% Probability)
Russia employs tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine or Iran achieves breakout. Global normative barrier shatters. Turkey and Saudi Arabia pursue enrichment. Brazil accelerates submarine program toward "safeguard denial." NPT legitimacy erodes precipitously.
Scenario IV: Strategic Retreat (10% Probability)
U.S. adopts neo-isolationist policy or explicitly encourages allied proliferation. By 2031, 3-5 new nuclear states emerge. International system transitions to unstable "N-player" game with dramatically increased risk of accidental launch or unauthorized use.
IV. Recommendations for G7 Policymakers
Formalize Post-NEW START Arrangements
Formalize informal agreement into legally binding one-year extension with basic transparency measures. Announce successor treaty negotiations with goal of agreement before 2027 G20 summit.
Institutionalize Pacific Nuclear Consultation
Create "Pacific Nuclear Planning Group" giving South Korea, Japan, and Australia meaningful participation in U.S. nuclear planning without weapons transfer. Condition ROK nuclear submarines on enhanced IAEA safeguards and NPT commitment.
Address the Submarine Loophole
Establish IAEA verification protocols for naval propulsion to prevent HEU diversion. Limit enrichment levels for naval fuel where feasible. Mandate separation of naval fuel production from civilian programs.
Establish Risk Reduction with China
Create crisis communication protocols, missile test notifications, and dialogue on emerging technologies even without formal arms control. Establish direct hotlines among nuclear command authorities.
Counter Friendly Proliferation Narrative
Explicitly reject allied proliferation as acceptable alternative to extended deterrence. Clarify that ROK nuclear submarines are for conventional defense, not weaponization pathway.
V. The 2026 NPT Review Conference: A Critical Juncture
The NPT Review Conference scheduled for spring 2026 occurs at maximum stress for the nonproliferation regime. The third preparatory session in 2025 failed to produce consensus, following 2015 and 2020 conferences that ended without agreed outcome documents.
Three challenges will dominate: (1) The "two-nuclear-peer" environment created by China's expansion; (2) The "submarine loophole" from Brazil and Australia's naval programs; (3) Growing traction of "friendly proliferation" concepts. While consensus document unlikely, the conference must generate political pressure to restart U.S.-Russia negotiations and establish dialogue with China.
Conclusion: Managing the Transition
The expiration of NEW START marks the end of an era beginning with SALT I in 1969. The five-year period from 2026 to 2031 will determine whether the nonproliferation regime adapts or fragments. What makes this moment particularly dangerous is the convergence of multiple proliferation pathways—South Korea with record public support and technical capability; Japan with advanced latent status; Turkey building nuclear expertise; Brazil creating safeguards precedents.
Alliance credibility and proliferation restraint are inextricably linked. States pursue nuclear weapons when they conclude alternative security arrangements are unreliable. The most effective nonproliferation policy is therefore foreign policy that makes allies genuinely confident in collective defense. The margin for error is narrow and consequences of failure severe, but the path to managed adaptation remains viable with urgent, strategic action.
Strategic Indicators Summary (February 2026)
NEW START Status: Expired February 5, 2026. No legally binding limits for first time in 50+ years.
U.S. Deployed Warheads: ~1,770 (capacity to upload to 2,500+ within weeks)
Russia Deployed Warheads: ~1,718 (thousands in reserve; ~1,500 tactical)
China Nuclear Arsenal: ~600 (2025); projected 750-1,500 by 2035; ~300 silos under construction
North Korea: 50+ assembled; material for 90; seventh test postured; Hwasong-19 operational
South Korea: 76.2% support for nuclear armament; nuclear submarine program approved Oct 2025
Japan: 46 metric tons plutonium; advanced space-launch capability
Turkey: Akkuyu Unit 1 operational mid-2026; plans for 7.2 GW by 2035
2026 NPT RevCon: Spring 2026; deep Article VI divisions expected
No comments:
Post a Comment