The Cost of American Maritime Hegemony and the Strategic Dividends of Chinese Geoeconomic Expansion
The United States as the World's Policeman versus China as the World's Market-Maker
The Strait of Hormuz, Military Expenditure, Industrial Interdependence, Knowledge Formation, and the Changing Architecture of Global Power
A Strategic Economic and Geopolitical Assessment Prepared for the G7
Executive Assessment
The prolonged American military commitment in the Persian Gulf, particularly the deployment of substantial naval and air assets to the Strait of Hormuz during the 2026 conflict with Iran, raises a fundamental question about the changing economics of international leadership. The United States continues to provide much of the military infrastructure underpinning international maritime security. However, the financial, logistical and opportunity costs of maintaining this position are becoming increasingly apparent. At the same time, China is expanding its influence through a different mechanism: the development of industrial ecosystems, global production networks, infrastructure, technological capabilities, commercial relationships and increasingly important positions within international supply chains.
The distinction between these two approaches is more consequential than a conventional comparison of military expenditure and trade volumes suggests.
The United States exercises geostrategic influence through its ability to protect maritime routes, maintain military alliances, deter hostile actors and provide security guarantees. Its influence is therefore substantially connected to the provision of strategic public goods, although these goods are not distributed without conditions or geopolitical expectations. American naval power helps sustain the international commercial environment within which global trade takes place. Nevertheless, the maintenance of this security architecture requires continuous expenditure, military readiness, technological superiority and political willingness to accept risks on behalf of other economies.
China's expanding geoeconomic influence operates through a different institutional and commercial mechanism. Its manufacturing capacity, infrastructure investment, technological development, industrial financing and integration into global production networks generate repeated economic interactions. These relationships can create commercial familiarity, specialized expertise, technical cooperation, managerial experience and accumulated institutional knowledge. Such capabilities can become embedded in the economic organization of participating countries, making the relationship more durable than a conventional diplomatic or military agreement.
The distinction is particularly important when examining what may be called organic interdependence: a relationship in which participating economies acquire productive capabilities, develop complementary expertise, establish recurring commercial relationships and become increasingly familiar with one another's institutional and technological environments. This form of interdependence is not simply a matter of buying and selling goods. It involves the development of capabilities that make continued cooperation economically useful to both parties.
Recent OECD research provides significant empirical support for the increasing importance of this phenomenon. Its November 6, 2026, assessment of global production networks finds that China had become the largest producer of manufacturing value-added in 14 of 18 manufacturing industries by 2024, compared with none in 2000. China also emerged as the largest foreign supplier in approximately 40 percent of the country-industry relationships examined, compared with approximately 4 percent in 2000. These figures demonstrate a profound structural transformation in the geography of international production.
However, they also reveal a strategic vulnerability: all 79 partner economies examined in the OECD study depended more heavily on Chinese manufacturing value-added than China depended on their respective contributions. Consequently, the expansion of Chinese economic interdependence should not automatically be interpreted as the creation of balanced or mutually advantageous relationships.
The central argument of this report is that China's geoeconomic strategy has a greater capacity to create continuous, embedded and capability-generating interdependence, whereas America's geostrategic strategy remains indispensable for protecting the security environment in which much of that interdependence operates. Neither approach is sufficient by itself. The strategic challenge for the G7 is to preserve the benefits of American-led maritime security while developing a more productive, technologically sophisticated and institutionally reciprocal economic architecture.
The Hormuz conflict provides a particularly revealing illustration of the distinction. Washington is bearing substantial military and fiscal costs to maintain strategic leverage over a critical maritime corridor. Beijing, meanwhile, has opportunities to expand its commercial and diplomatic relationships with economies seeking diversified markets, infrastructure, industrial investment and technological cooperation. Yet China's own dependence on energy imports and international shipping means that it is not immune to the consequences of instability in the Persian Gulf,.
The resulting strategic competition is therefore not a simple contest between American military power and Chinese commercial expansion. It concerns which model of international influence creates the more sustainable institutional relationships, productive capabilities and political agency over the longer term.
I. The Strait of Hormuz: The Economics of Maintaining the Role of World Policeman
1. The strategic importance of the maritime corridor
The Strait of Hormuz occupies an exceptional position in the international political economy. It connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea and provides a critical route for international petroleum and liquefied natural gas shipments.
Its importance extends beyond the immediate interests of Iran,the Persian Gulf monarchies and the United States. Major Asian manufacturing economies, European energy consumers and international commodity markets are exposed to disruptions in this narrow maritime passage.
Consequently, the ability to maintain navigational security has implications for global inflation, industrial production, transportation costs, insurance premiums, sovereign fiscal balances and the stability of international financial markets.
The American naval presence in the region has historically provided an important element of this security architecture. However, the 2026 conflict has demonstrated that maintaining maritime access under conditions of sustained missile, drone and mine threats is considerably more demanding than maintaining a peacetime naval presence.
The American commitment is no longer simply a matter of deploying warships to demonstrate military superiority. It requires the continuous coordination of naval forces, air defence systems, intelligence networks, surveillance aircraft, logistics vessels, tanker aircraft, maintenance facilities and ammunition supplies.
These activities impose both direct financial costs and less visible opportunity costs.
2. The logistical vulnerability of the American naval deployment
One of the most consequential developments has been the damage inflicted on the American military infrastructure in Bahrain.
The United States Naval Support Activity Bahrain has historically served as the principal logistical and command centre for the Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces Central Command. Iranian missile and drone attacks during the opening phase of the conflict damaged command facilities, satellite communications infrastructure, warehouses and other buildings.
The Congressional Research Service reported on September 23, 2026, that preliminary estimates placed the damage to American facilities at a minimum of approximately US$400 million. The Chief of Naval Operations subsequently indicated that a return to the previous operating arrangements would not occur in the immediate future.
This development has forced the United States to reconsider the geography of its regional logistics network. Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, has assumed greater importance as a supporting facility for replenishment and logistics operations. The resulting supply route is approximately 2,200 miles, substantially longer than the short regional connections previously available.
The significance of this development is not limited to additional transportation expenditure. Longer supply routes increase fuel consumption, reduce the flexibility of replenishment schedules and place additional pressure on a finite fleet of combat logistics vessels.
They also complicate the coordination of ammunition, food, maintenance materials, aircraft components and other supplies required to sustain an extended deployment.
The vulnerability of the Bahrain logistics network therefore illustrates an important weakness in military systems designed around concentrated forward facilities. A strategically valuable base can simultaneously become a high-value target whose destruction or temporary incapacitation imposes costs throughout the wider operational network.
The United States retains considerable logistical capacity, and the relocation of supply activities does not demonstrate an inability to sustain operations. Nevertheless, the loss of a nearby regional hub increases the resources required to maintain the same operational presence.
3. The financial and opportunity costs of the conflict
The most authoritative public assessment of the financial burden is the Congressional Budget Office report of September 15, 2026, entitled Estimating the Cost of Combat Operations Against Iran.
The CBO estimated that the Department of Defense had incurred approximately US$38 billion in operational, logistical and sustainment costs by August 1, 2026.
This estimate includes the replacement of expended munitions and equipment lost in combat, increased flying hours, additional operations and higher fuel expenditure. It does not include all costs borne by other federal agencies or military operating expenses already incorporated into the ordinary federal budget.
The CBO estimated that the conflict would generate an additional US$2 billion per month if the level of violence remained relatively low, rising to approximately US$3 billion per month if operations returned to the intensity experienced in July.
A separate Pentagon estimate reported to Congress placed the cost at approximately US$43.6 billion through September 3, with subsequent reporting indicating an additional US$1.5 billion in fuel expenditure. These estimates should not be added together: they refer to different reporting dates and accounting presentations.
The composition of the expenditure is particularly important. The CBO identified approximately US$21.7 billion in munitions replacement costs, including a substantial expenditure on missile-defence interceptors. Increased flying hours accounted for approximately US$10.4 billion, while additional fuel expenditure accounted for approximately US$2.7 billion. Equipment losses represented approximately US$1.9 billion.
The greatest strategic concern, however, is not necessarily the immediate financial expenditure. It is the reduction in the availability of certain advanced military capabilities.
The CBO assessed that the United States had consumed between approximately one-half and two-thirds of its combined inventory of selected Patriot, THAAD, SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors since June 2025. It warned that replenishing these inventories could take five years or longer, even if production rates increased.
The importance of this assessment becomes apparent when considering the Western Pacific. A future military confrontation involving China could require substantial quantities of precisely these categories of defensive weapons.
The United States is therefore facing an opportunity-cost problem: resources employed in one strategic theatre are not simultaneously available for other contingencies.
This does not establish that American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific has collapsed. It does, however, demonstrate that the simultaneous management of several high-intensity strategic commitments can expose limitations in the defence industrial base.
The distinction between military expenditure and military opportunity cost is fundamental. The former measures resources already consumed; the latter measures strategic capabilities that cannot be deployed elsewhere because they have been committed, expended or placed under operational strain.
For a G7 assessment, this second category deserves particular attention.
4. The changing operational situation on November 16
The conflict has not reached a stable resolution.
As of November 16, the arrival of the USS Theodore Roosevelt in the CENTCOM area has brought the number of American aircraft carriers operating in the broader Middle Eastern theatre to three, according to reporting by the Associated Press.
The November 15 assessment by the Institute for National Security Studies described a regional posture of approximately two carriers, 13 destroyers and one cruiser, with additional destroyers operating under the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, while the third carrier group was approaching.
At the same time, maritime traffic through Hormuz remains severely disrupted. Reuters reporting on November 16, based on Kpler shipping data, indicated that only five commodity vessels had transited on Saturday, while none were registered on Sunday, compared with 31 during the preceding weekend.
These figures illustrate the continuing disruption of international shipping. They should not be interpreted as a complete measure of all vessel movements, particularly where ships operate with their automatic identification systems disabled.
The current situation also demonstrates the limitations of interpreting naval superiority as equivalent to the restoration of commercial confidence. A navy may retain the ability to escort vessels, conduct surveillance and threaten hostile forces without immediately restoring the willingness of commercial operators, insurers and energy companies to resume ordinary operations.
Commercial navigation depends on a wider institutional environment involving predictable rules, credible security guarantees, insurance availability, port infrastructure and confidence in the continuity of maritime passage.
The difference between military control and commercial normalization is therefore strategically important.
A naval force may establish considerable tactical control while the broader economic system remains impaired.
II. China's Geoeconomic Strategy: From Manufacturing Power to Global Market-Maker
1. A different architecture of international influence
Whereas American geostrategic influence is substantially exercised through security guarantees and military capabilities, China's international influence increasingly derives from its position within the production and distribution systems of the global economy.
The expression world market-maker is used here as an analytical description rather than an official Chinese policy designation.
It refers to an economy that increasingly influences the availability, cost, technological direction and organization of goods, services, industrial inputs and infrastructure across international markets.
China's influence is no longer adequately described by its role as a low-cost manufacturing centre. Its industrial development has progressively extended into electric vehicles, batteries, solar technologies, telecommunications equipment, machinery, shipbuilding, advanced materials and several other technologically sophisticated sectors.
This transformation has involved a combination of public investment, industrial planning, private entrepreneurship, economies of scale, infrastructure development, research and development, supply-chain integration and access to a vast domestic market.
The resulting economic relationships are qualitatively different from conventional security arrangements.
A country that purchases a military security guarantee develops a relationship with the provider of that guarantee. A country that participates in a Chinese-supported industrial ecosystem may develop relationships involving engineers, manufacturers, suppliers, technicians, financial institutions, logistics operators, universities, regulators and commercial enterprises.
These relationships generate repeated interactions and opportunities for learning.
They can also create long-term institutional familiarity, as firms and public agencies become accustomed to working with particular technical standards, production methods, financing arrangements and commercial practices.
It is this accumulation of productive and organizational knowledge that gives geoeconomic interdependence its potentially organic character.
2. The empirical transformation of global manufacturing
The OECD's November 6, 2026, policy brief, Economic Security in Global Production: Dependencies and Vulnerabilities in Global Value Chains, offers particularly important evidence.
Its analysis of international input-output relationships demonstrates that China's position in global manufacturing has changed substantially over the past two decades.
By 2024, China had become the largest producer of manufacturing value-added in 14 of the 18 industries examined by the OECD. It was also the largest producer by gross output in 17 industries.
The transformation is especially pronounced in electrical equipment, textiles and apparel, non-ferrous metals, basic iron and steel, and other non-metallic mineral products.
In five manufacturing industries, China's share of world value-added had reached approximately 37 to 49 percent, compared with approximately 8 to 13 percent in 2000.
The OECD also found that China's share of foreign value-added embodied in world exports increased from approximately 3 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2024.
Perhaps more revealing is the transformation of international supplier relationships. China became the largest foreign supplier in approximately 40 percent of the country-industry relationships examined in 2024, compared with approximately 4 percent in 2000.
These findings are significant because they reveal that China's influence extends beyond direct bilateral trade.
Chinese components and intermediate goods may enter the production process of one country, be incorporated into products manufactured in another, and ultimately reach consumers in a third economy.
Consequently, conventional bilateral trade statistics can substantially underestimate the degree of economic integration.
The OECD's input-output approach captures these indirect relationships by tracing the value created at different stages of production.
This is precisely the kind of interdependence that can generate institutional familiarity, accumulated production knowledge and specialized expertise.
However, the same OECD research identifies an important asymmetry: all 79 partner economies examined depended more heavily on Chinese manufacturing value-added than China depended on their respective contributions.
The result is a system that creates extensive interdependence but does not necessarily distribute bargaining power equally.
3. Industrial ecosystems and the accumulation of expertise
The most consequential dimension of China's geoeconomic strategy may be its capacity to create industrial ecosystems rather than simply export finished products.
An industrial ecosystem connects suppliers, manufacturers, research institutions, technical education, logistics infrastructure, financial services, government agencies and final markets.
Once these elements become established, the resulting economic relationships can generate cumulative advantages.
For example, a country participating in an electric-vehicle production network may acquire experience in battery assembly, quality control, electronic systems, power management, industrial safety, component certification and logistics management.
As local firms gain experience, they may develop the ability to supply additional components, undertake maintenance, improve production processes and eventually participate in product development.
Such activities can create a cumulative learning process in which commercial participation generates technical knowledge, and technical knowledge subsequently creates new commercial opportunities.
This is more durable than a relationship based solely on the purchase of imported finished goods.
The same process may occur in telecommunications, renewable energy, port management, railway systems, industrial machinery and digital infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the development of local expertise is not automatic. It depends on the structure of investment agreements, the participation of domestic firms, training arrangements, technology licensing, access to intellectual property, local procurement policies and the willingness of foreign investors to develop local capabilities.
A Chinese-financed industrial facility that employs imported technicians, imports most components and retains its engineering functions abroad may generate employment without producing substantial domestic technological autonomy.
The relevant question is therefore not simply how much China invests abroad, but how much productive knowledge and managerial capacity remain in the recipient economy.
4. The importance of standards, technical familiarity and institutional learning
An additional source of Chinese influence is the growing international presence of Chinese industrial and technical standards.
Standards are economically important because they establish the specifications, compatibility requirements, testing procedures and certification practices through which products and services can enter markets.
A manufacturer that designs its products around a particular technical standard becomes familiar with the associated testing laboratories, software, engineering requirements, maintenance systems and regulatory procedures.
Over time, this familiarity can reduce transaction costs and increase the attractiveness of continuing relationships with suppliers and institutions operating within the same technical environment.
China has increasingly sought to participate in international standard-setting activities, particularly in renewable energy, electric vehicles, telecommunications and industrial technologies.
Official Chinese reporting indicates that the country led the formulation and issuance of 285 international standards under ISO and IEC in 2025. Such figures should be treated as official administrative reporting rather than as independent evidence of Chinese control over international standards.
Indeed, a July 2026 study by Alex He of the Centre for International Governance Innovation provides an important qualification. It finds that China's influence in international digital standard-setting remains uneven, particularly in emerging technologies, where established international institutions and other countries retain considerable agenda-setting influence.
Thus, China's expanding industrial presence should not be confused with comprehensive control over global technical governance.
Nevertheless, the broader strategic significance remains substantial. Technical familiarity, certification capacity and participation in standards organizations can create institutional relationships that endure beyond individual investment projects.
5. Trade, investment and the limits of reciprocal interdependence
The expansion of China's manufacturing influence has not necessarily generated balanced trade relationships.
A March 2026 Federal Reserve research note by François de Soyres and co-authors examined China's growing trade dominance and the role of industrial policies.
The researchers reported that China's trade surplus reached approximately US$1.2 trillion in 2025, exceeding 6 percent of GDP.
They found that Chinese export expansion had occurred across a broad range of manufacturing sectors, including both lower-value-added products and increasingly sophisticated manufactured goods.
At the same time, imports of manufactured goods from advanced economies had not increased at a comparable rate. Commodity imports had become more important, accounting for approximately 44 percent of Chinese imports.
This pattern has important implications for the international distribution of economic benefits.
China's manufacturing partners may become increasingly dependent on Chinese intermediate goods and finished products without gaining equivalent access to the Chinese market for their own manufactured output.
For advanced industrial economies, this raises concerns about the erosion of domestic industrial capacity, competitive pressures, trade imbalances and the concentration of strategic production.
The distinction between interdependence and mutual dependence is therefore essential.
A country may become deeply integrated into China's production system while possessing relatively little influence over the decisions governing that system.
Organic interdependence requires more than repeated transactions. It requires the development of complementary capabilities and sufficient reciprocal economic interests to sustain cooperation over time.
III. The Comparative Political Economy of American and Chinese International Influence
1. Security provision versus productive integration
The central difference between the American and Chinese approaches concerns the mechanisms through which international influence is accumulated and reproduced.
American strategic influence is principally supported by the provision of security, deterrence and access to a global network of military facilities. This arrangement creates relationships of considerable institutional depth. Military alliances involve intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, procurement agreements, standardized procedures, officer education, technological cooperation and long-term defence planning.
These relationships can generate substantial expertise and institutional familiarity. NATO, for example, has developed extensive military interoperability through common operational procedures, training, communications systems and defence planning.
It would therefore be incorrect to characterize American geostrategic influence as merely the provision of military protection. Its security partnerships also generate technical knowledge, institutional experience and managerial capabilities.
However, the distribution of these capabilities is often concentrated in defence establishments, military contractors and government institutions. The benefits do not necessarily extend throughout the productive economy of the participating countries.
China's geoeconomic approach has a different potential transmission mechanism. Its commercial relationships can involve a wider range of economic participants, including private enterprises, industrial workers, engineers, logistics companies, research institutions, financial organizations and public-sector administrators.
When these relationships develop into integrated production networks, their effects may extend beyond the immediate transaction. Suppliers acquire knowledge of manufacturing processes, domestic firms become familiar with international quality requirements, employees develop technical expertise, and local institutions acquire experience in regulating and managing increasingly sophisticated industrial activities.
This process can generate a more broadly distributed form of economic familiarity.
The distinction is not absolute. American security partnerships can create substantial civilian technological spillovers, while Chinese industrial partnerships can remain highly centralized and dependent on imported technology and managerial expertise.
Nevertheless, the underlying institutional mechanisms differ.
The American model tends to establish interdependence through security institutions and alliance networks. The Chinese model increasingly establishes interdependence through production, infrastructure, technological systems and commercial relationships.
2. The creation of expertise and institutional familiarity
For the purposes of this assessment, three dimensions of interdependence deserve particular attention.
The first is technical expertise. This concerns the ability of domestic workers, engineers, enterprises and research institutions to operate, maintain, modify and eventually improve the technologies introduced through international cooperation.
The second is institutional familiarity. This involves the accumulated knowledge of regulatory requirements, procurement systems, certification procedures, financial arrangements, commercial practices and organizational expectations.
The third is managerial agency. This concerns the capacity of domestic organizations to make informed decisions, negotiate contracts, manage projects, solve operational problems and adapt imported technologies to local economic conditions.
These dimensions are related but not interchangeable.
A country may possess sophisticated infrastructure without possessing the technical personnel required to maintain it. It may receive foreign investment without acquiring the managerial expertise needed to operate the resulting industrial facilities. It may participate in international trade without developing the domestic institutions required to negotiate more favourable commercial arrangements.
The extent to which an international partnership creates these capabilities determines whether interdependence becomes productive and self-reinforcing.
Consider two hypothetical arrangements.
In the first, a country purchases an advanced military system from a foreign supplier. Its armed forces receive training, maintenance support and access to specialized technology. The relationship generates military expertise and institutional familiarity, but its broader economic spillovers depend on domestic industrial participation.
In the second, a country establishes an industrial partnership involving foreign investment, local suppliers, technical training, engineering cooperation, research facilities and domestic manufacturing. If successfully implemented, the relationship can generate expertise across several layers of the economy.
The second arrangement has greater potential to create broadly distributed productive capabilities. However, it is also more demanding to organize and does not guarantee technology transfer or domestic ownership of knowledge.
The distinction is important for the G7 because international economic leadership should be evaluated not only by the volume of capital deployed or the number of security agreements signed, but also by the productive capabilities created in partner economies.
3. The importance of local agency
A further consideration is whether the recipient country becomes an active participant in the relationship or remains principally a purchaser, borrower or dependent customer.
The development literature has long emphasized the importance of domestic institutional capacity, absorptive capabilities and the ability of governments and enterprises to adapt external knowledge to local circumstances.
Foreign investment can contribute to industrial development, but its effects depend on domestic institutions, human capital, technological capabilities and the structure of relationships between foreign and local enterprises.
This is particularly relevant to China's overseas infrastructure and industrial investment.
A railway project, for example, may improve transportation capacity and reduce logistical costs. But its developmental consequences depend on whether domestic engineers participate in construction and maintenance, whether local suppliers acquire contracts, whether technical education is expanded and whether the recipient country develops the administrative capacity to manage the infrastructure over its entire life cycle.
Similarly, a renewable-energy project may increase electricity generation without necessarily creating domestic expertise in battery management, grid integration, power electronics or equipment manufacturing.
The same distinction applies to American development and security partnerships.
A military base or defence procurement agreement may improve a country's security, but it does not automatically generate independent industrial capacity.
Consequently, the most meaningful criterion of international cooperation is the extent to which external engagement expands the recipient country's capacity to act independently and participate more effectively in international markets.
In this sense, the ultimate measure of productive interdependence is not the persistence of dependence itself. It is the creation of complementary capabilities that make cooperation valuable while preserving the participating country's ability to exercise its own agency.
4. The strategic difference between a security guarantee and an industrial relationship
Security guarantees and industrial relationships also differ in their temporal and political characteristics.
Military protection is a continuing commitment. Its credibility depends on the provider's willingness to maintain capabilities, accept operational risks and honour its political obligations.
When domestic political priorities change, the perceived reliability of a security guarantee may also change.
Industrial relationships, by contrast, can become embedded in fixed capital, production processes, technical training, supply contracts and commercial routines. These arrangements may persist even when political relations become less favourable.
A manufacturing enterprise that depends on specialized components, established suppliers and technical standards cannot necessarily reorganize its entire production system in response to a diplomatic disagreement.
This creates a form of institutional and technological persistence.
However, it also introduces vulnerability. A country that becomes heavily dependent on a single supplier may find it difficult to change production systems without incurring substantial costs.
Thus, the durability of industrial interdependence can be both an economic advantage and a source of strategic exposure.
The G7 should therefore distinguish between productive integration and excessive supplier concentration.
A healthy international economic relationship should generate expertise, investment, technological cooperation and reciprocal opportunities without making the participating economies incapable of adapting when commercial or political circumstances change.
IV. The Strategic Windfall for Beijing: Opportunity Costs and the Redistribution of International Influence.
1. The opportunity cost of American military commitments
The 2026 conflict has created an opportunity for Beijing to benefit from the redistribution of American strategic resources.
The most direct benefit arises from the diversion of military assets and the consumption of advanced munitions that might otherwise contribute to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
The CBO's assessment is particularly important because it identifies the depletion of missile-defence interceptors as a major opportunity cost of the conflict.
A prolonged deployment also requires the United States to maintain carrier rotations, replenish ammunition, allocate intelligence and surveillance capabilities, sustain tanker operations and repair damaged facilities.
These requirements compete with other defence priorities.
The consequences are not necessarily immediate or irreversible. The United States possesses a substantial military-industrial base, extensive alliance networks and considerable capacity to mobilize additional resources.
Nevertheless, industrial production cannot always respond at the same speed as military consumption.
The replacement of sophisticated interceptors involves specialized manufacturing processes, scarce components, testing requirements, skilled personnel and lengthy procurement cycles.
China may therefore obtain a relative strategic advantage without directly confronting the American naval presence.
Its advantage is primarily relative: Washington is devoting additional resources to the Middle East while Beijing can continue developing its economic and technological position in other regions.
2. Why China is not an unqualified beneficiary
It would nevertheless be analytically incorrect to characterize the Hormuz conflict as an unambiguous Chinese strategic windfall.
China is a major importer of energy, and its industrial economy depends on the uninterrupted movement of petroleum, natural gas, industrial inputs and manufactured goods.
Disruption in Hormuz therefore imposes substantial costs on Beijing.
Higher energy prices increase industrial production costs, raise transportation expenses and create additional inflationary pressures. The uncertainty surrounding shipping and insurance can also complicate China's external commercial relationships.
Furthermore, Chinese companies and financial institutions have economic interests in the stability of Persian Gulf, infrastructure and the continuity of international trade.
Beijing therefore has competing strategic incentives.
On one side, prolonged American military commitments can create opportunities for China to strengthen its relative diplomatic and economic position.
On the other, prolonged instability in the Persian Gulf threatens Chinese energy security and the commercial environment required for its export-oriented industrial economy.
This creates a distinction between benefiting from the opportunity costs incurred by a strategic competitor and benefiting from the underlying conflict itself.
China may gain from the first while suffering considerably from the second.
3. The possibility of diplomatic and commercial repositioning
The conflict may also accelerate the efforts of the Persian Gulf economies to diversify their external relationships.
Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman have interests extending beyond military security. They seek investment, industrial diversification, technological modernization, financial integration and access to international markets.
American security relationships remain important to these countries. However, their economic strategies increasingly involve multiple international partners.
China's position as a major manufacturing market, infrastructure provider and purchaser of energy resources gives it significant opportunities to expand these relationships.
This does not mean that the Persian Gulf states will abandon American security arrangements or replace Washington with Beijing.
Rather, they may increasingly separate their security relationships from their commercial and industrial relationships.
Such diversification is consistent with the strategic behaviour of middle powers seeking to preserve their autonomy by avoiding excessive dependence on a single external partner.
The result may be a more complex international system in which the United States retains substantial security influence while China acquires additional economic and technological influence.
4. The erosion of leverage through repeated strategic overextension
A further consideration is the relationship between the exercise of power and the development of alternatives.
In a November 2026 article published in International Affairs, Ramkishen S. Rajan examines how economic coercion can gradually erode the strategic advantages associated with control over critical supply-chain and financial chokepoints.
His analysis suggests that repeated use of economic pressure encourages firms and governments to develop alternative suppliers, payment arrangements, production facilities and intermediary commercial networks.
Although Rajan examines economic statecraft rather than naval deployments, the broader analytical insight is relevant.
The exercise of power may generate incentives for other actors to reduce their exposure to that power.
This process can be observed in several domains.
Repeated sanctions encourage alternative financial arrangements. Export controls encourage domestic technological substitution and investment in alternative supply chains. Maritime insecurity encourages the development of alternative shipping routes, storage arrangements and energy suppliers.
Similarly, a prolonged military commitment can encourage allies and partners to reconsider the extent to which their security and commercial interests should depend on one external provider.
This does not mean that American power necessarily declines every time it is exercised. It means that the durability of strategic influence depends partly on whether its exercise strengthens or weakens the willingness of other countries to participate in the underlying institutional arrangements.
V. A Bayesian Game-Theoretic Assessment of the Competing Strategies
1. The analytical framework
The comparison between the American geostrategic model and the Chinese geoeconomic model is best understood as a repeated strategic interaction under incomplete information.
The United States, China, the Persian Gulf economies, European countries and other middle powers do not possess complete information about one another's intentions, future policy commitments or tolerance for economic and military costs.
Their decisions depend on expectations concerning future behaviour.
For the United States, the principal strategic variables include the credibility of its security commitments, the sustainability of military expenditure, the readiness of its defence industrial base, the political acceptability of prolonged overseas deployments and the willingness of allies to share security responsibilities.
For China, the principal variables include the sustainability of industrial expansion, the ability to maintain access to external markets, energy security, technological independence, the international acceptance of Chinese standards and the willingness of other countries to participate in Chinese-supported economic networks.
For middle powers, the relevant variables include the economic benefits of cooperation, the credibility of security guarantees, the cost of dependence, the availability of alternative suppliers and the domestic political legitimacy of international partnerships.
The strategic outcome therefore depends not simply on the resources possessed by each major power, but on the expectations and decisions of the other participants.
2. The formation of strategic priors
The initial Bayesian assessment begins with two competing hypotheses.
Hypothesis A: Security-centred international leadership remains the more durable foundation of international interdependence.
Under this hypothesis, the American security architecture continues to provide the essential conditions for global commerce. Even if the costs of military operations increase, the United States retains a comparative advantage through its alliances, military technology, intelligence networks, financial institutions and ability to coordinate collective security arrangements.
Hypothesis B: Production-centred international leadership generates increasingly durable forms of interdependence.
Under this hypothesis, China's expanding industrial and technological position creates relationships that become embedded in the daily economic activities of participating countries. The accumulation of technical expertise, commercial familiarity, production knowledge and infrastructure increases the cost of disengagement and strengthens China's long-term international influence.
These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, the most likely outcome is a mixed international architecture in which American security provision and Chinese economic integration coexist, although with increasing strategic competition over the rules and distribution of influence.
3. Updating the assessment through observable signals
The evidence available by November 16 provides several important signals.
The first is the continuing cost of American military operations. The CBO's US$38 billion estimate through August 1, together with the subsequent Pentagon estimate of US$43.6 billion through September 3, indicates that the conflict has imposed a substantial fiscal burden.
The second is the depletion of selected missile-defence inventories. The estimated five-year or longer replenishment period indicates that the opportunity costs may persist well beyond the immediate military operation.
The third is the damage to American forward logistics facilities in Bahrain. This demonstrates that concentrated military infrastructure can become a source of operational vulnerability.
The fourth is the OECD evidence of China's expanding position in global manufacturing. Its findings indicate that Chinese production has become increasingly embedded in the international economy.
The fifth is the evidence of asymmetric dependence. The fact that all 79 partner economies examined in the OECD assessment depended more heavily on Chinese manufacturing value-added than China depended on their respective contributions suggests that China's growing influence is accompanied by structural bargaining advantages.
The sixth is the continued disruption of Hormuz shipping as of November 16. The low recorded number of commercial transits demonstrates that the restoration of maritime confidence remains a significant challenge.
Taken together, these signals strengthen the hypothesis that China's productive and commercial networks are generating increasingly durable international influence, while the American security architecture is facing rising costs associated with maintaining its traditional role.
However, the evidence does not justify concluding that the United States has lost its position as the principal provider of global maritime security.
4. Strategic scenarios through 2032
Scenario One: The continuation of American security primacy with Chinese economic expansion.
This scenario assumes that the United States retains its military superiority and gradually replenishes its munitions inventories while continuing to provide maritime security and alliance protection.
China simultaneously expands its position in global manufacturing, infrastructure and technological systems.
The resulting international economy remains highly interconnected, but its security and productive architectures become increasingly differentiated.
This is a plausible baseline scenario because neither power has a compelling economic or strategic incentive to assume the full costs of replacing the other.
Scenario Two: Accelerated Chinese geoeconomic influence and growing strategic hedging.
Under this scenario, prolonged American military commitments, fiscal pressures and domestic political constraints encourage additional countries to diversify their external relationships.
China benefits from its established industrial networks, infrastructure capabilities and expanding commercial relationships.
The Persian Gulf states, ASEAN economies, African countries and selected Latin American economies pursue more diversified arrangements, seeking to preserve access to American markets and security relationships while expanding commercial and industrial ties with China.
The resulting order is not necessarily dominated by Beijing, but China's influence becomes more deeply embedded in the productive organization of participating economies.
Scenario Three: A fragmented international economy characterized by competing technological and security systems.
In this scenario, geopolitical rivalry produces increasing restrictions on technology transfers, capital movements, industrial cooperation and international trade.
The United States and China develop more distinct production and technological ecosystems.
Middle powers face growing pressure to align with one system or the other.
Although this outcome may reduce certain strategic vulnerabilities, it would also sacrifice important economies of scale, reduce international knowledge exchange and increase the costs of technological development.
Scenario Four: A negotiated strategic equilibrium based on selective interdependence.
This scenario assumes that the major powers recognize the costs of comprehensive confrontation and seek to establish more predictable arrangements governing trade, technology, energy security and maritime access.
The United States retains its principal security commitments, while China continues to participate in international production networks.
G7 economies and middle powers develop mechanisms for diversified sourcing, transparent investment, reciprocal market access and technological cooperation.
This scenario would preserve the benefits of economic interdependence while reducing the vulnerabilities associated with excessive concentration.
5. Comparative Bayesian judgment
The evidence supports a distinction between the relative durability of economic relationships and the relative importance of security guarantees.
China's manufacturing integration creates more continuous opportunities for technical learning, commercial familiarity, organizational adaptation and productive cooperation.
American security arrangements create institutional and technological relationships of their own, but their broader economic effects are more indirect and depend on the extent to which defence cooperation produces civilian industrial participation.
Accordingly, if the criterion is the creation of broad-based productive expertise and repeated commercial interaction, the Chinese geoeconomic model currently has the stronger structural advantage.
If the criterion is the provision of maritime security, deterrence and protection against military coercion, the United States retains a decisive comparative advantage.
The two advantages should not be confused.
The central strategic issue is that the economic influence generated through industrial participation may become increasingly durable even when the military power supporting the international security environment remains concentrated elsewhere.
VI. The Implications for the G7: Aligning Security Leadership With Constructive Interdependence
1. Moving beyond the conventional security-versus-trade distinction
The G7 should reconsider the traditional assumption that international leadership can be maintained principally through military superiority, financial influence and diplomatic coordination.
These instruments remain important, but they do not necessarily generate the productive capabilities required for long-term economic resilience.
The strategic challenge is to develop a model of international cooperation that combines the strengths of American security provision with the capability-generating advantages of industrial and technological partnerships.
This requires a broader understanding of national security.
Energy security, technological security, industrial capacity, logistics, skilled employment, infrastructure and the resilience of financial systems are increasingly interconnected.
The security of a maritime corridor is important, but so is the ability of participating economies to maintain alternative energy supplies, develop domestic storage facilities, improve industrial efficiency and manage supply-chain disruptions.
Similarly, military alliances may provide strategic reassurance, but their long-term credibility can be strengthened when participating countries also possess the industrial capacity to contribute meaningfully to collective security.
The G7 should therefore move from a predominantly protective conception of international leadership towards a more comprehensive model of productive and institutional cooperation.
2. Developing a G7 framework for capability-generating partnerships
A more effective G7 strategy should prioritize partnerships that create measurable domestic capabilities in participating countries.
This requires moving beyond the conventional measurement of international cooperation through investment volumes, trade agreements and infrastructure expenditure.
Projects should also be evaluated according to their contribution to domestic engineering capacity, technical education, research and development, local supplier development, industrial management and technological adaptation.
For example, a G7-supported energy partnership should not be evaluated exclusively according to the amount of electricity generated or the value of equipment exported.
It should also be evaluated according to whether domestic institutions acquire the capacity to manage electricity networks, maintain advanced equipment, integrate renewable energy, develop storage technologies and train qualified engineers.
The same principle should apply to transportation infrastructure, telecommunications, semiconductor production, critical minerals and advanced manufacturing.
The objective should be to transform international investment from a capital-transfer mechanism into a process of cumulative capability development.
3. Reconsidering the organization of defence industrial cooperation
The Hormuz conflict demonstrates the importance of expanding the industrial foundations of collective security.
The G7 and its security partners should develop more effective arrangements for the joint production and replenishment of essential defence materials.
This includes missile-defence interceptors, radar systems, precision components, electronic warfare systems, maintenance equipment and logistics infrastructure.
The objective should not be to duplicate every stage of production in every participating country.
Rather, the G7 should identify complementary industrial capabilities and develop arrangements through which participating economies can specialize while maintaining reliable access to essential components.
Such arrangements would reduce the pressure on individual national inventories and improve the collective capacity to respond to simultaneous strategic contingencies.
They would also create opportunities for technical training, industrial research, joint procurement and the development of specialized manufacturing expertise.
The lesson of Hormuz is that a security architecture cannot remain sustainable if its operational requirements repeatedly exceed the capacity of its supporting industrial system.
4. Strengthening energy resilience and maritime cooperation
The G7 should also reconsider its approach to the protection of strategic maritime corridors.
The experience of Hormuz demonstrates that naval superiority alone cannot guarantee the immediate restoration of commercial shipping.
A comprehensive maritime security strategy requires cooperation among naval forces, commercial shipping companies, port authorities, insurance institutions, energy producers, logistics operators and international organizations.
The G7 should promote more effective arrangements for maritime information-sharing, emergency logistics, commercial risk assessment, energy storage and alternative transportation routes.
It should also strengthen cooperation with the Persian Gulf countries and other energy-producing economies to improve the resilience of global energy markets.
An important objective should be to reduce the economic consequences of temporary maritime disruptions without creating additional geopolitical fragmentation.
Energy diversification, improved storage capacity, alternative supply arrangements and more resilient electricity systems can reduce the extent to which a regional conflict generates worldwide economic instability.
5. Rebuilding the productive foundations of international economic leadership
One of the most important lessons of China's economic development is that industrial competitiveness is not created through isolated investment decisions.
It develops through the interaction of education, infrastructure, research, financial institutions, technological learning, industrial policy and access to markets.
The G7 should therefore develop a more coordinated approach to industrial development.
Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States possess complementary strengths in energy, advanced manufacturing, engineering, finance, aerospace, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and scientific research.
The challenge is to organize these capabilities into more effective international production networks.
Canada, for example, possesses significant opportunities in critical minerals, energy, electricity, advanced materials, artificial intelligence research and industrial innovation. However, the economic value of these resources depends on the development of domestic processing, engineering, manufacturing and research capabilities.
Simply exporting raw materials does not generate the same degree of productive expertise as participating in the subsequent stages of industrial transformation.
The G7 should therefore encourage partnerships that allow smaller and middle-sized economies to participate in higher-value stages of international production.
This would help prevent the emergence of a global division of labour in which some economies remain principally suppliers of commodities while others retain control over advanced manufacturing, technology and commercial standards.
6. Preserving the agency of middle powers
The international economic system should not require countries to choose between American security relationships and Chinese commercial opportunities.
Many middle powers have legitimate interests in maintaining cooperation with both.
Their economic development depends on access to multiple markets, diversified investment sources, technological cooperation and predictable international rules.
A strategy that forces these countries into exclusive geopolitical alignments could weaken the very economic networks that contribute to global prosperity.
The G7 should therefore recognize the importance of institutional transparency, reciprocal market access, fair competition and the domestic agency of its international partners.
This does not mean disregarding national-security concerns or accepting economic practices that undermine competition.
It means distinguishing between legitimate security safeguards and unnecessarily restrictive policies that prevent beneficial commercial cooperation.
The objective should be to develop an international system in which countries can diversify their economic relationships without becoming exposed to coercive dependence.
7. Introducing a capability-based assessment of international partnerships
The G7 should consider adopting a capability-based framework for evaluating major international investment and cooperation agreements.
Such an assessment would examine six dimensions.
First, the extent to which a project develops domestic technical expertise and qualified personnel.
Second, whether it strengthens local enterprises and creates opportunities for domestic suppliers.
Third, whether it improves the recipient country's ability to manage, maintain and adapt the resulting infrastructure or technology.
Fourth, whether it provides meaningful access to research, technological knowledge and innovation.
Fifth, whether the relationship creates reciprocal commercial opportunities rather than merely increasing dependence on one supplier or market.
Sixth, whether it preserves sufficient institutional and economic autonomy for the participating country to negotiate, diversify and make independent strategic decisions.
This framework would enable the G7 to distinguish between investment that creates genuine development capabilities and investment that primarily establishes long-term commercial dependence.
It would also provide a more meaningful basis for comparing American, Chinese, European, Japanese and other international development partnerships.
VII. Concluding Assessment: The Future of International Leadership
The financial and logistical burden of maintaining the American naval presence in the Strait of Hormuz illustrates a broader transformation in the economics of international power.
The United States continues to possess extraordinary military capabilities and an extensive alliance network. Its role in maintaining maritime security remains important to the international economic system.
However, the 2026 conflict has demonstrated that the exercise of military power can generate substantial financial costs, consume strategically important resources and expose vulnerabilities in the industrial and logistical systems supporting overseas commitments.
The consequences extend beyond the immediate theatre of operations.
The depletion of missile-defence inventories, the damage to forward logistics facilities and the diversion of military resources create opportunity costs that may influence American strategic planning for several years.
China, meanwhile, is expanding its influence through a different mechanism.
Its manufacturing capabilities, technological development, industrial ecosystems, infrastructure investment and integration into international production networks have created relationships that extend deeply into the everyday economic activities of numerous countries.
The OECD's November 2026 findings provide substantial evidence of this transformation.
China's increasing share of global manufacturing value-added and its emergence as a leading supplier across a growing proportion of international production relationships demonstrate that its economic influence is becoming structurally embedded.
The most important distinction concerns the nature of the relationships being created.
Military alliances can generate trust, institutional familiarity, technological cooperation and security expertise. Their importance should not be underestimated.
However, production networks can generate a more continuous process of commercial interaction, technical learning, managerial experience and institutional adaptation across a much broader range of economic participants.
When these relationships create domestic expertise and productive capacity, they can become self-reinforcing.
They create incentives for enterprises to continue cooperating, for educational institutions to develop relevant skills, for governments to improve regulatory systems and for domestic suppliers to participate in increasingly sophisticated production activities.
This is the principal reason why China's geoeconomic strategy has the potential to generate more organic forms of interdependence.
Yet this conclusion requires an important qualification.
An economic relationship is not necessarily organic simply because it is extensive or difficult to abandon. If one country controls critical technology, dominates the supply of essential components, restricts market access or retains exclusive managerial authority, the resulting relationship may be highly asymmetric.
The OECD evidence of China's supplier dominance demonstrates precisely why this distinction matters.
Similarly, the United States should not underestimate the economic and technological relationships generated by its security alliances. Military interoperability, defence research, intelligence-sharing and industrial cooperation can create considerable institutional and technical expertise.
The question is how to extend these benefits beyond the defence establishment and into the wider productive economy.
The central issue is therefore not whether the world needs the American policeman or the Chinese market-maker. It is whether international leadership should be measured primarily by the capacity to protect the existing economic order or by the capacity to help participating economies develop the productive, technological and institutional capabilities required to sustain it.
For the G7, the answer should be a combination of both.
American maritime security remains important because international production and trade cannot function effectively in an environment of persistent military insecurity.
But military protection alone cannot provide the industrial expertise, technological knowledge, managerial capacity and productive opportunities necessary for long-term economic development.
Equally, Chinese manufacturing and infrastructure investment can expand international productive capacity, but they cannot independently guarantee maritime security, political stability or balanced economic relationships.
The most sustainable international order would combine credible security guarantees with open markets, reciprocal industrial cooperation, technological learning and meaningful domestic agency.
It would also recognize that the strategic value of international cooperation is not exhausted by the amount of money invested, the number of military facilities maintained or the volume of goods exchanged.
Its deeper value lies in the knowledge, expertise, institutional competence and productive relationships accumulated by the participating societies.
The United States has historically exercised international leadership through its ability to protect the strategic foundations of the global economy.
China is increasingly exercising international influence through its ability to participate in, organize and reshape the productive foundations of that economy.
The next phase of international competition will therefore be determined not simply by which country possesses more military resources or exports more manufactured goods, but by which system can create the most resilient combination of security, technological advancement, productive capacity, institutional familiarity and reciprocal economic opportunity.
For the G7, the strategic lesson of Hormuz is clear: the sustainability of international leadership requires more than the capacity to defend global commerce. It requires the capacity to strengthen the productive capabilities of the societies that depend upon it.
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