The idea of a "Continental Union"—the absorption, partial incorporation, or political subsumption of Canada into the United States—did not disappear with the closing of the American frontier, nor was it extinguished by the diplomatic stabilization symbolized by the 1871 Treaty of Washington. Rather, annexationist thought entered a post-imperial phase after World War II: quieter, more technocratic, often indirect, yet remarkably persistent. In the post-1945 era, annexation was no longer articulated through manifest destiny or civilizational rhetoric, but through the language of transactionalism, functional integration, security necessity, and crisis management.
What distinguishes postwar annexationist discourse is not its frequency, but its form. Canada is rarely discussed as an object of conquest; instead, it is periodically reframed as a problem to be solved—a balance-sheet liability, a weak link in continental defense, an inefficient federal structure, or a fragmented polity vulnerable to collapse. Across legislative debates, defense planning circles, economic fora, academic theory, trade negotiations, and populist media, a recurring assumption emerges: Canadian sovereignty is respected formally, but treated substantively as conditional.
I. Transactional Annexation and the Postwar Debt Moment: Timothy Sheehan (1952)
The first explicit post-WWII annexationist proposal emerged from the geopolitical wreckage of Europe. In early 1952, U.S. Representative Timothy P. Sheehan of Illinois introduced a congressional resolution calling for the annexation of Canada by the United States. The proposal was framed as a simple transactional solution: with the United Kingdom owing billions to the United States after World War II, Sheehan suggested Britain could settle its debts by transferring Canada to the United States.
The proposal was legally indefensible—Canada had been a sovereign dominion since the Statute of Westminster (1931)—yet its significance lies precisely in this disregard. Canada was treated not as an independent state, but as a residual imperial asset whose fate could be negotiated between great powers. The proposal generated significant controversy, with Canadian politicians calling it "fantastic" and evidence of profound ignorance about Canada's status. The Truman administration quietly dismissed the resolution, but its symbolic importance should not be underestimated.
Sheehan's proposal marked the beginning of a postwar pattern: annexation framed not as conquest, but as accounting logic. Sovereignty itself was rendered negotiable, convertible into debt relief—a theme that would reappear repeatedly in later decades under different guises.
II. Silent Continentalism: Defense Planning and the Subordination of Sovereignty (1945–1960s)
While Sheehan's proposal was overt, far more consequential annexation-adjacent thinking unfolded quietly within U.S. defense and strategic planning institutions. In the early Cold War, Canada increasingly appeared in American military planning not as a foreign ally, but as operational depth for U.S. homeland defense.
The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, constructed beginning in 1954, was a system of radar stations across the Arctic region of Canada, with additional stations in Alaska, designed to detect incoming Soviet bombers and provide early warning. The construction was made possible by a bilateral agreement between Canadian and U.S. governments, with the United States paying full construction costs but requiring Canadian territory for the installations.
The DEW Line treated Canadian territory as a logistical extension of the American defense perimeter, with U.S. operational control over vast stretches of Canadian Arctic territory. The sheer magnitude and unprecedented expense of the project, coupled with Canada's inability and disinclination to contribute financially, was widely seen as presenting a challenge to Canadian Arctic sovereignty. In 1958, the line became a cornerstone of the new North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) organization of joint continental air defense, with installations flying both Canadian and U.S. flags.
No formal annexation was proposed, yet the logic was unmistakable: in existential emergencies, Canadian sovereignty was implicitly provisional. This normalization of functional subordination laid the groundwork for later annexationist arguments by eroding the conceptual boundary between cooperation and control.
III. Economic Integration and Corporate Continentalism (1960s–1980s)
Parallel to defense planning, annexationist logic flourished in economic and corporate fora, albeit in softer language. In postwar discussions within elite policy circles, Canada was increasingly portrayed as economically indistinguishable from the United States.
The 1965 Canada-United States Automotive Products Agreement (Auto Pact), signed by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson and President Lyndon B. Johnson, eliminated tariffs on automobiles and automotive parts between the two countries. The agreement resulted in far fewer car models being produced in Canada; instead, larger branch plants producing only one model for all of North America were constructed, leading to substantial integration of the continental automotive industry.
The Auto Pact was frequently cited as proof that political borders no longer aligned with economic reality. In debates surrounding resource extraction, energy security, and manufacturing integration, some questioned whether Canada's separate political institutions remained economically rational. In these discussions, annexation was rarely named, yet often implied: political union would merely formalize an already integrated continental economy.
This strain of thought reframed annexation as inevitability rather than ambition, a natural endpoint of market forces rather than a political act.
IV. Academic Functionalism and the Contingency of Sovereignty (1950s–1980s)
American academic discourse further legitimized annexationist assumptions. Functionalist integration theory, influential in the mid-20th century, held that as technical and economic cooperation deepens, political sovereignty erodes organically. Within this framework, Canada was frequently depicted as a post-national polity—stable, prosperous, yet structurally redundant.
Comparative federalism scholars debated whether Canada's constitutional architecture was inherently less resilient than that of the United States, particularly given its regional cleavages and linguistic duality. These debates did not advocate annexation outright, but they subtly reclassified Canadian independence as historically contingent rather than permanent.
Intellectual delegitimization often precedes political challenge.
V. Regional Fragmentation and Western Alienation: Contemporary Expressions (2025)
A distinct strand of annexationist thought targeted Canada not as a whole, but through its internal fractures. In 2025, Maine State Senator Joseph Martin wrote an undated letter to western Canadian politicians proposing that British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba seek admission to the United States as full American states.
Martin argued that millions of people "currently frustrated by central authority, moral decay, and bureaucratic suffocation" would be rewarded by "liberty" if the four provinces were to join the United States. The letter characterized the proposal not as annexation but as "adoption — welcoming home kindred spirits, who were born under a different flag but who desire to live under our Constitution."
The letter drew strong rebukes from Canadian politicians, with British Columbia MLA Brennan Day calling it an attack on Canadian institutions and dismissing Canadian values like the Charter of Rights, parliamentary government, and multiculturalism as "political baggage."
This approach exploits grievances over energy policy, fiscal redistribution, and federal representation. By framing annexation as liberation rather than absorption, these arguments recast territorial expansion as a remedy for federal dysfunction rather than an act of imperial expansion.
VI. Crisis Opportunism and the Logic of State Failure: Pat Buchanan (1990)
The most explicit postwar annexationist reasoning emerged during Canada's constitutional crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1990, Pat Buchanan published a column titled "American Dream: Absorbing most of Canada." Using Canada's constitutional dispute over Quebec as a starting point, Buchanan speculated that America could expand significantly if Canada were to fragment.
Buchanan quoted expansionist arguments suggesting that Canadian accession would bring resources, fresh water, and an educated population into the United States, ending talk of American decline. Buchanan's column concluded by arguing that territorial expansion was the path to American national renewal.
This logic did not rely on conquest, but on necessity. Sovereignty, in this realist framework, is conditional upon functionality. When a state fails, its territory becomes strategically negotiable—what might be termed the "Pick Up the Pieces" doctrine.
VII. Trade Negotiations as Annexation-Adjacent Pressure (1980s–Present)
Trade negotiations provided another recurring forum for annexationist leverage. During the 1988 Canadian federal election campaign focused on the proposed Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, opposition parties contended that the agreement would erode Canadian sovereignty, with Liberal leader John Turner arguing Canada would effectively become the "51st state" of the United States if implemented.
Similar rhetoric resurfaced during NAFTA negotiations and later USMCA, where economic compliance was increasingly framed as a test of political alignment. Under President Trump beginning in 2025, this logic became explicit. References to Canada as a potential "51st state" tied trade imbalances, defense spending, and border security into a single transactional narrative. Annexation functioned as a threatening metaphor, a way to underscore asymmetry and extract concessions.
Historically, this echoed 19th-century tactics—tactics that once helped provoke Canadian Confederation as a defensive response.
VIII. Post-9/11 Security Discourse and the Conditionality of Borders
After September 11, 2001, annexation-adjacent thinking intensified within homeland security circles. Canada was increasingly framed as a potential vulnerability within the U.S. security perimeter. Proposals for a North American security perimeter questioned whether separate sovereignty was compatible with integrated defense.
Once again, the underlying logic was clear: if sovereignty obstructs security, sovereignty becomes negotiable.
Conclusion: Annexation as Barometer, Not Blueprint
Across legislative proposals, defense planning, economic integration, academic theory, trade negotiations, and populist rhetoric, post-World War II annexationist thought toward Canada has never disappeared. Instead, it has functioned as a barometer of imbalance, surfacing during moments of economic stress, political fragmentation, or strategic uncertainty.
Whether framed as debt settlement, regional liberation, crisis stabilization, or transactional leverage, these arguments reveal a persistent American tendency to view Canada not solely as a sovereign equal, but as a latent component of a consolidated North American order. The fact that annexation rarely advances beyond rhetoric does not diminish its significance. Its true function is disciplinary, not declaratory.
The echo persists—quiet, adaptable, and revealing—reminding us that in the strategic imagination of great powers, even the most peaceful borders are never entirely settled.
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