I. Executive Summary
As of January 19, 2026, the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—which controlled much of southern Yemen since 2017—has moved from contested dissolution to formal administrative termination. The Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) has successfully reasserted control over Aden, while STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi remains in exile in Abu Dhabi. This development marks a pivotal moment in Yemen's protracted civil war and exposes fundamental strategic divergences between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, former partners in the Saudi-led coalition.
The STC's December 2025 offensive, code-named "Operation Promising Future," initially seized control of oil-rich Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah governorates. However, Saudi-backed forces launched a swift counteroffensive in early January 2026, recapturing these territories within days. Between January 12-15, PLC forces completed the evacuation of major STC military camps in Aden, including the strategic Jabal Hadid camp, marking the definitive end of STC military presence in the city.
The timing coincides with Israel's recognition of Somaliland on December 26, 2025—the first UN member state to do so—creating a complex geopolitical constellation across the Red Sea basin. These developments have triggered a cascading diplomatic crisis: Somalia has officially canceled all bilateral agreements with the UAE, accusing Abu Dhabi of orchestrating the STC's offensive and the Somaliland-Israel recognition to bypass Mogadishu's sovereignty. A new "Consolidationist Axis" comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Somalia is now actively coordinating to isolate Emirati influence in the Red Sea.
II. The Saudi–UAE Strategic Rupture: From Rivalry to Open Feud
The December Crisis
The STC launched its offensive on December 2, 2025, rapidly advancing through Hadhramaut and seizing control of the Masila oil fields. On January 2, 2026, the STC issued a constitutional declaration for a "State of South Arabia," proposing a two-year transitional period followed by a referendum on independence.
Saudi Arabia's response was decisive. On December 30, 2025, Saudi forces conducted airstrikes on Mukalla port, targeting what Riyadh described as UAE weapons shipments to the STC. The Yemeni government subsequently ordered all UAE forces to withdraw within 24 hours and declared a 90-day state of emergency.
Administrative Takeover and Human Rights Lawfare
Between January 12-15, 2026, PLC forces completed the systematic evacuation of major STC military camps in Aden, including the strategic Jabal Hadid camp. This administrative takeover represents the definitive end of STC military authority in southern Yemen's most important city.
On January 19, Saudi-backed Yemeni officials publicly accused the UAE of operating "secret prisons" at the Riyan airbase. This represents a deliberate move by Riyadh to criminalize the UAE's legacy in Yemen and prevent any return of its proxy forces. The human rights lawfare strategy marks a significant escalation in Saudi efforts to delegitimize UAE influence.
Saudi "Southern Dialogue" Initiative
Riyadh has convened a consultative meeting of southern elders and political figures (January 19) to bypass the STC's former leadership and create a new, Saudi-loyal southern political entity. This initiative aims to co-opt southern political grievances while ensuring they remain within a framework acceptable to Saudi interests.
Divergent Strategic Visions
Saudi officials view the UAE's backing of the STC as undermining Saudi national security, particularly given the proximity of Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah to Saudi borders. Riyadh increasingly assesses Emirati actions not as tactical interventions but as part of a broader pattern of structural reconfiguration across Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.
The UAE's calculus differs fundamentally. Abu Dhabi has pursued an aggressively independent regional policy, carving out port-based influence across the Red Sea through investments in Berbera (Somaliland), Aden, and Socotra. This represents a networked, sub-state approach to influence—directly contrary to Saudi Arabia's preference for state-centric, hierarchical regional order.
Following al-Zubaidi's flight via Somaliland to the UAE, Al Jazeera's correspondent noted that the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has been exposed "like never before," with no sense of compromise or reconciliation. The events of mid-January have only deepened this rupture.
III. Israel's Somaliland Recognition: Strategic Ambition and Regional Fallout
The December 26 Announcement
On December 26, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar signed a declaration recognizing Somaliland, with Netanyahu describing it as "in the spirit of the Abraham Accords." According to Israeli officials, Mossad spent years cultivating relationships in Somaliland to pave the way for diplomatic recognition.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi stated that Somaliland would join the Abraham Accords, with both countries agreeing to open embassies and exchange ambassadors. On January 6, Netanyahu and Somaliland President Abdullahi formalized relations in a follow-up ceremony, cementing the diplomatic breakthrough.
International Condemnation and Somali Retaliation
The recognition triggered swift diplomatic backlash. Somalia condemned Israel's "flagrant assault" on its territorial integrity, with multiple Security Council members warning the move could inflame tensions in the Horn of Africa.
Egypt's foreign ministry, along with Turkey, Somalia, and Djibouti, condemned the recognition, warning it posed a threat to international peace and security. The African Union rejected any recognition of Somaliland, reaffirming its commitment to Somalia's territorial integrity.
Somalia's response escalated dramatically in January 2026. On January 9, Mogadishu denied overflight permission to all Emirati military and cargo aircraft. On January 12, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) canceled all bilateral agreements with the UAE, legally annulling Emirati access to ports and military bases in Puntland and Somaliland. These measures represent Somalia's most assertive pushback against perceived UAE interference in its territorial integrity.
Notably, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco—signatories to the Abraham Accords—did not sign a joint statement condemning the recognition, suggesting nuanced Persian Gulf Arab states positions on the matter.
Strategic Logic and Israeli Footprint
Israel's recognition reflects Red Sea security imperatives amid Houthi maritime disruptions. Reports from October 2024 indicated discussions between Israel and Somaliland about establishing an Israeli military base, allegedly mediated and funded by the UAE.
Intelligence reports suggest Israel is moving forward with plans for a "surveillance platform" in Hargeisa to monitor Houthi activity, which Cairo and Mogadishu view as a direct threat to the Arab League's Red Sea monopoly. This development has intensified regional opposition to the Israel-Somaliland alignment.
However, the collapse of the STC fundamentally undermines any complementary "Red Sea pincer" strategy. Without a stable, cooperative South Yemen, Somaliland remains diplomatically isolated, and Israeli influence projection becomes more tenuous.
IV. The Horn of Africa Nexus: The Egypt-Somalia Military Surge
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU
In January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding granting Ethiopia a 50-year lease on coastline for naval access in exchange for potential Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has described Red Sea access as an "existential issue" for landlocked Ethiopia.
Following Turkish-brokered talks, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed in December 2024 to end their dispute through the "Ankara Declaration," with Ethiopia pursuing sea access "under Somalia's sovereignty." However, the current Israeli-Somaliland-UAE alignment has effectively frozen implementation of that deal.
Egyptian Strategic Deployment
Egypt has accelerated the deployment of its 10,000-strong peacekeeping force to Somalia. Cairo's defense minister arrived in Mogadishu on January 12 to finalize the establishment of Egyptian military bases near the Ethiopian border. This deployment reflects Egypt's determination to counter Ethiopian maritime ambitions while securing leverage in Nile negotiations related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
Egypt interprets Ethiopian Red Sea penetration through the lens of the GERD dispute—viewing both as challenges to Cairo's water security and regional influence. The military deployment signals Cairo's willingness to project power beyond traditional spheres to protect vital national interests.
The Ankara-Riyadh Axis
While Turkey successfully mediated the Ankara Declaration in late 2024, Saudi Arabia is now reportedly in talks to fund a tripartite military coalition with Somalia and Egypt. This represents a significant evolution in regional alignments, with Riyadh seeking to create a coordinated containment mechanism against perceived Ethiopian-Israeli-UAE alignment.
V. Emerging Regional Alignments
The post-STC environment reveals two competing but asymmetrical configurations:
Consolidationist Axis
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Somalia, Turkey, and Qatar prioritize:
- Territorial integrity and state sovereignty
- Rejection of unilateral recognition of breakaway regions
- Managed diplomatic processes through multilateral frameworks
- Active coordination to isolate Emirati influence in the Red Sea
Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman described the STC dissolution as a "courageous step" that would pave the way for inclusive southern dialogue under Saudi sponsorship. The January 19 southern consultative meeting represents the operationalization of this vision.
Flexibility-Oriented Network
UAE, Israel, and potentially Ethiopia prefer:
- Port-centric, networked influence
- Partnerships with de facto authorities
- Maneuverability in contested spaces without full state commitments
The UAE's position has become increasingly isolated. While Abu Dhabi denied that shipments to Yemen contained weapons, it subsequently announced voluntary withdrawal of forces following Saudi strikes. Somalia's cancellation of bilateral agreements and denial of overflight permissions represents a significant setback to UAE regional strategy.
VI. The Southern Question: From Organization to Insurgency
On January 10, 2026, thousands of protesters rallied in Aden in support of the STC, chanting slogans against Saudi Arabia and waving flags of former South Yemen. Protester Yacoub al-Safyani stated: "we want an independent state," underscoring that organizational collapse does not equate to political surrender.
As of January 19, STC hardliners in Al-Dhale and Lahj have refused to surrender arms, signaling a potential shift to guerrilla tactics. While the STC as a coherent military organization has been dismantled, hardcore supporters who have not been co-opted may sow the seeds for a potential insurgency.
The Yemeni government faces a fundamental challenge: demonstrating that its authority rests on political legitimacy and governance capacity, not solely on Saudi military strength. The success of the Saudi-led "Southern Dialogue" in addressing genuine grievances will determine whether political inclusion succeeds or whether fragmentation persists through new organizational forms.
VII. Revised Strategic Scenarios and Current Status (January 19, 2026)
Scenario 1: Managed Federal Transition
Current Status: Moderate Probability
Saudi Arabia consolidates control through the Presidential Leadership Council while promising southern autonomy within a federal framework. The January 19 Riyadh-hosted southern consultative meeting represents a critical test of this approach.
Key Indicator: The Saudi-led "Southern Dialogue" is active but faces grassroots rejection in Aden, as evidenced by continuing protests and the refusal of some STC factions to disarm.
Risks: Political inclusion efforts may be perceived as Saudi-imposed rather than genuinely representative, undermining legitimacy.
Scenario 2: Proxy Insurgency
Current Status: High Probability
STC hardliners in Al-Dhale and Lahj have refused to surrender arms, signaling a shift to guerrilla tactics. Failure of political inclusion generates localized southern insurgencies distinct from both Houthis and PLC. The UAE maintains indirect influence through economic networks and private security channels.
Key Indicators: Armed resistance continuing in Al-Dhale and Lahj; potential for attacks on government facilities; emergence of new southern armed factions distinct from STC leadership in exile.
Implications: Chronic instability disrupts oil production and creates opportunities for external exploitation, particularly by Houthi forces.
Scenario 3: Red Sea Naval Blockade
Current Status: Moderate Probability
Somalia's cancellation of UAE port deals creates a legal pretext for Saudi or Egyptian naval interdiction of UAE shipments. Maritime incidents or proxy clashes raise insurance premiums and disrupt trade flows.
Key Indicators: Somalia's January 12 cancellation of bilateral agreements; potential Egyptian naval operations in coordination with Somalia; escalation of rhetoric around maritime access.
Implications: Rising insurance costs for Red Sea transit; potential for naval incidents between Saudi-Egyptian forces and UAE-aligned actors.
Scenario 4: Houthi Strategic Opportunism
Current Status: Critical Probability
UN aid officials warn (January 19) that political chaos has triggered a "food-security catastrophe," which Houthis are using to recruit and advance toward the Masila oil fields. The group capitalizes on southern disarray and Saudi-UAE friction to project power toward oil infrastructure and expand maritime disruption capabilities.
Key Indicators: UN warnings of imminent famine; Houthi recruitment surge; potential advances toward southern oil fields; intensified Red Sea attacks; diplomatic overtures positioning Houthis as stability broker.
Implications: Houthis re-frame themselves as the only coherent Yemeni authority, forcing renewed international engagement on their terms.
VIII. Policy Recommendations for G7 Leaders
1. Mediate the Saudi-UAE Divorce
The rift has moved beyond Yemen into a competition for the entire Red Sea basin. The human rights accusations, military confrontations, and competing proxy strategies represent a fundamental breakdown in Persian Gulf Cooperation Council unity. G7 members should facilitate a de-confliction mechanism to prevent maritime incidents between the Saudi-Egypt axis and UAE-aligned de facto authorities.
2. Establish a Humanitarian Buffer
The UN warns of imminent famine as of January 19. The G7 must ensure the PLC-STC transition doesn't paralyze the port of Aden, which remains critical for humanitarian access. Decouple the collapse of the STC from aid delivery to prevent a food-security catastrophe from becoming a recruitment tool for extremist groups.
3. Address the Somaliland Status Question
While Israel has broken the status quo through recognition, G7 members should maintain the "One Somalia" policy to avoid a legal "domino effect" that could destabilize other secessionist regions in Africa. Simultaneously, practical engagement with Somaliland on maritime security and humanitarian issues may be necessary without formal recognition.
4. Prevent Red Sea Militarization
The convergence of Israeli surveillance platforms, Egyptian military bases, and competing naval access claims threatens to militarize critical maritime corridors. International stakeholders should promote multilateral Red Sea security frameworks rather than allowing unilateral military deployments to become normalized.
IX. Policy Implications for Key Actors
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh must demonstrate that its Yemen strategy produces genuine political legitimacy, not just military dominance. The January 19 "Southern Dialogue" represents a crucial test: if perceived as merely installing Saudi-loyal figures rather than addressing substantive grievances around autonomy, resource sharing, and political representation, it will reproduce fragmentation under different organizational labels.
For the UAE
Abu Dhabi faces a strategic inflection point. The cancellation of Somali bilateral agreements, the loss of the STC proxy, and increasing Saudi hostility represent significant setbacks. The UAE must decide whether to accept diminished influence in Yemen and the Horn or risk deeper confrontation with an emerging Saudi-Egyptian-Somali axis. The current retrenchment suggests pragmatic hedging, but underlying strategic divergences remain unresolved.
For Egypt
Cairo must balance GERD concerns with Red Sea security imperatives while avoiding overextension in Somalia. The January 12 announcement of military bases near the Ethiopian border signals serious commitment, but Egypt's credibility depends on demonstrating that its Somalia engagement produces stabilization, not merely anti-Ethiopian positioning.
For Somalia
Mogadishu has taken its most assertive stance in years through canceling UAE agreements and denying overflight permissions. However, Somalia must ensure these measures don't alienate other Persian Gulf states or compromise economic development partnerships. The challenge is maintaining territorial integrity claims while managing practical governance limitations in Somaliland and Puntland.
For the United States
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed concern at "recent events in southeastern Yemen" and urged continued diplomacy. Washington faces competing imperatives: maintaining relations with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE while ensuring Red Sea freedom of navigation. The Biden administration's approach of treating Gulf partners as a unified bloc is no longer tenable given the Saudi-UAE rupture.
For China and Maritime Powers
Continued instability threatens critical trade routes. Insurance costs for Red Sea transit may rise if southern Yemen becomes an ungoverned space or if Houthi capabilities expand. China's interests in maintaining open maritime corridors may require more active diplomatic engagement in Yemen peace processes.
X. Conclusion: The January Reckoning and Beyond
The period from January 10-19, 2026 represents not merely the organizational defeat of the STC but a fundamental reordering of Red Sea geopolitics. Three critical dynamics will shape outcomes:
1. Saudi-UAE Relations: From Friction to Feud
The progression from military strikes to human rights accusations to competing proxy networks demonstrates that tactical friction has escalated into structural competition. Whether this moderates into managed coexistence or deepens into sustained rivalry will profoundly affect regional stability. The current trajectory suggests the latter.
2. Southern Yemeni Politics: Organization vs. Movement
The organizational defeat of the STC does not resolve southern grievances. The refusal of fighters in Al-Dhale and Lahj to surrender arms, combined with continuing protests in Aden, indicates that southern separatism persists as a political movement even after the collapse of its primary organizational vehicle. Without credible political inclusion that addresses autonomy, resource sharing, and historical marginalization, fragmentation will continue through different forms—potentially more violent and less controllable than the STC.
3. Red Sea Security Architecture: Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism
The intersection of Yemen instability, Horn of Africa tensions, and great power competition creates compounding risks. Unilateral moves—Israeli recognition of Somaliland, Ethiopian naval basing negotiations, Egyptian military deployments, Saudi-backed political engineering—risk triggering cascading crises in one of the world's most strategically vital waterways.
The Path Forward
For policymakers, the central challenge is constructing durable frameworks that address legitimate national interests—Ethiopian sea access, southern Yemeni autonomy, Israeli security concerns, Saudi regional stability—without fragmenting already fragile states or militarizing critical maritime corridors.
The "January Reckoning" demonstrates that in the contemporary Middle East and Horn of Africa, military victories without political legitimacy produce pyrrhic outcomes. The PLC's recapture of Aden means little if it cannot demonstrate governance capacity and political inclusion. Saudi Arabia's military superiority is insufficient if it cannot translate into legitimate political authority. The UAE's port-based influence networks are vulnerable if they lack state-level partnerships.
The question is whether regional and international actors can translate this moment into sustainable political architecture—or whether it merely represents a tactical pause before renewed fragmentation. The warning signs are ominous: UN famine alerts, armed holdouts refusing to disarm, deepening Gulf rivalries, and Houthi forces positioned to exploit the chaos.
What happens in the coming weeks in Riyadh's "Southern Dialogue," in the mountains of Al-Dhale, in the corridors of Mogadishu and Cairo, and in the waters of the Red Sea will determine whether January 2026 marks the beginning of stabilization or the prelude to a wider regional crisis.
Note on Sources: This analysis is based on reporting current as of January 19, 2026, from Reuters, Al Jazeera, Associated Press, CNN, The Times of Israel, and specialized regional analysis from The Soufan Center, Chatham House, and other institutions. Situations remain fluid and assessments should be updated as events develop.
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