I. Executive Summary
As of January 10, 2026, the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—which controlled much of southern Yemen since 2017—has undergone a contested dissolution following a rapid military collapse. This development marks a pivotal moment in Yemen's protracted civil war and exposes fundamental strategic divergences between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, former partners in the Saudi-led coalition.
The STC's December 2025 offensive, code-named "Operation Promising Future," initially seized control of oil-rich Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah governorates. However, Saudi-backed forces launched a swift counteroffensive in early January 2026, recapturing these territories within days. STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi fled to the UAE on January 7, 2026, and on January 9, the organization's dissolution was announced by members in Riyadh, though this was immediately contested by the STC spokesman in Abu Dhabi.
The timing coincides with Israel's recognition of Somaliland on December 26, 2025—the first UN member state to do so—creating a complex geopolitical constellation across the Red Sea basin. These developments reveal competing visions for regional order and expose the limits of proxy-based strategies in an already fractured security environment.
II. The Saudi–UAE Strategic Rupture
The December Crisis
The STC launched its offensive on December 2, 2025, rapidly advancing through Hadhramaut and seizing control of the Masila oil fields. On January 2, 2026, the STC issued a constitutional declaration for a "State of South Arabia," proposing a two-year transitional period followed by a referendum on independence.
Saudi Arabia's response was decisive. On December 30, 2025, Saudi forces conducted airstrikes on Mukalla port, targeting what Riyadh described as UAE weapons shipments to the STC. The Yemeni government subsequently ordered all UAE forces to withdraw within 24 hours and declared a 90-day state of emergency.
Divergent Strategic Visions
Saudi officials view the UAE's backing of the STC as undermining Saudi national security, particularly given the proximity of Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah to Saudi borders. Riyadh increasingly assesses Emirati actions not as tactical interventions but as part of a broader pattern of structural reconfiguration across Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.
The UAE's calculus differs fundamentally. Abu Dhabi has pursued an aggressively independent regional policy, carving out port-based influence across the Red Sea through investments in Berbera (Somaliland), Aden, and Socotra. This represents a networked, sub-state approach to influence—directly contrary to Saudi Arabia's preference for state-centric, hierarchical regional order.
Following al-Zubaidi's flight via Somaliland to the UAE, Al Jazeera's correspondent noted that the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has been exposed "like never before," with no sense of compromise or reconciliation.
III. Israel's Somaliland Recognition: Strategic Ambition and Regional Backlash
The December 26 Announcement
On December 26, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar signed a declaration recognizing Somaliland, with Netanyahu describing it as "in the spirit of the Abraham Accords". According to Israeli officials, Mossad spent years cultivating relationships in Somaliland to pave the way for diplomatic recognition.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi stated that Somaliland would join the Abraham Accords, with both countries agreeing to open embassies and exchange ambassadors.
International Condemnation
The recognition triggered swift diplomatic backlash. Somalia condemned Israel's "flagrant assault" on its territorial integrity, with multiple Security Council members warning the move could inflame tensions in the Horn of Africa.
Egypt's foreign ministry, along with Turkey, Somalia, and Djibouti, condemned the recognition, warning it posed a threat to international peace and security. The African Union rejected any recognition of Somaliland, reaffirming its commitment to Somalia's territorial integrity.
Notably, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco—signatories to the Abraham Accords—did not sign a joint statement condemning the recognition, suggesting nuanced Persian Gulf's Arab states positions on the matter.
Strategic Logic and Limitations
Israel's recognition reflects Red Sea security imperatives amid Houthi maritime disruptions. Reports from October 2024 indicated discussions between Israel and Somaliland about establishing an Israeli military base, allegedly mediated and funded by the UAE.
However, the collapse of the STC fundamentally undermines any complementary "Red Sea pincer" strategy. Without a stable, cooperative South Yemen, Somaliland remains diplomatically isolated, and Israeli influence projection becomes more tenuous.
IV. The Horn of Africa Nexus: Ethiopia, Egypt, and Red Sea Access
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU
In January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding granting Ethiopia a 50-year lease on coastline for naval access in exchange for potential Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has described Red Sea access as an "existential issue" for landlocked Ethiopia.
Following Turkish-brokered talks, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed in December 2024 to end their dispute, with Ethiopia pursuing sea access "under Somalia's sovereignty". However, the deal's implementation remains uncertain.
Egyptian Strategic Concerns
Saudi assessments increasingly link Somaliland developments to broader Red Sea competition, with Israel's recognition viewed as a potential inflection point. Egypt interprets Ethiopian Red Sea penetration through the lens of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute—viewing both as challenges to Cairo's water security and regional influence.
Egypt's decision to deploy peacekeeping forces in Somalia beginning January 2025 reflects its determination to counter Ethiopian maritime ambitions while securing leverage in Nile negotiations.
V. Emerging Regional Alignments
The post-STC environment reveals two competing but asymmetrical configurations:
Consolidationist Axis
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and aligned African states prioritize:
- Territorial integrity and state sovereignty
- Rejection of unilateral recognition of breakaway regions
- Managed diplomatic processes through multilateral frameworks
Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman described the STC dissolution as a "courageous step" that would pave the way for inclusive southern dialogue under Saudi sponsorship.
Flexibility-Oriented Network
UAE, Israel, and potentially Ethiopia prefer:
- Port-centric, networked influence
- Partnerships with de facto authorities
- Maneuverability in contested spaces without full state commitments
The UAE's position is particularly complex. While Abu Dhabi denied that shipments to Yemen contained weapons, it subsequently announced voluntary withdrawal of forces following Saudi strikes, suggesting tactical retreat rather than strategic capitulation.
VI. The Southern Question Unresolved
On January 10, 2026, thousands of protesters rallied in Aden in support of the STC, chanting slogans against Saudi Arabia and waving flags of former South Yemen. Protester Yacoub al-Safyani stated: "we want an independent state", underscoring that organizational collapse does not equate to political surrender.
While secession appears off the table under current circumstances, with consensus forming around a federal republic, support for southern independence remains strong in governorates like Al-Dhale. Hardcore STC supporters who have not been coopted may sow the seeds for a potential insurgency.
The Yemeni government faces a fundamental challenge: demonstrating that its authority rests on political legitimacy and governance capacity, not solely on Saudi military strength.
VII. Strategic Scenarios and Implications
Scenario 1: Managed Federal Transition (Most Likely, Near-Term)
Saudi Arabia consolidates control through the Presidential Leadership Council while promising southern autonomy within a federal framework. A Riyadh-hosted conference addresses southern grievances through political inclusion and economic incentives. Violence declines but structural tensions remain unresolved.
Indicators: Successful convening of southern dialogue in Riyadh; defection of STC factions to PLC; absence of sustained insurgent activity.
Scenario 2: Fragmented Low-Intensity Conflict (High Probability, Medium-Term)
Failure of political inclusion generates localized southern insurgencies distinct from both Houthis and PLC. The UAE maintains indirect influence through economic networks and private security channels. Chronic instability disrupts oil production and creates opportunities for external exploitation.
Indicators: Attacks on government facilities in Aden and Al-Dhale; emergence of new southern armed factions; persistent protests and civil disobedience.
Scenario 3: Red Sea Escalation via Horn Entanglement (Moderate Probability)
Ethiopian-Somali tensions over maritime access trigger Egyptian military deployments. Maritime incidents or proxy clashes raise insurance premiums and disrupt trade flows. Saudi Arabia and Egypt coordinate containment measures against perceived Ethiopian-Israeli-UAE alignment.
Indicators: Egyptian troop deployments near Somali-Ethiopian border; naval incidents in Bab al-Mandab; acceleration of Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU implementation.
Scenario 4: Houthi Strategic Opportunism (Moderate-High Probability)
Houthis capitalize on southern disarray and Saudi-UAE friction to project power toward oil infrastructure and expand maritime disruption capabilities. The group re-frames itself as the only coherent Yemeni authority, forcing renewed international engagement on its terms.
Indicators: Houthi advances toward southern oil fields; intensified Red Sea attacks; diplomatic overtures positioning Houthis as stability broker.
VIII. Policy Implications
For Regional Powers
Saudi Arabia must demonstrate that its Yemen strategy produces genuine political legitimacy, not just military dominance. A Riyadh-only solution risks reproducing fragmentation if southern grievances are not substantively addressed through power-sharing and economic development.
UAE faces a strategic inflection point: whether to accept diminished influence in Yemen or risk deeper confrontation with Saudi Arabia. The current retrenchment suggests pragmatic hedging, but underlying strategic divergences remain unresolved.
Egypt must balance GERD concerns with Red Sea security imperatives while avoiding overextension in Somalia. Cairo's credibility depends on demonstrating that its Somalia engagement produces stabilization, not merely anti-Ethiopian positioning.
For Global Stakeholders
United States: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed concern at "recent events in southeastern Yemen" and urged continued diplomacy. Washington faces competing imperatives: maintaining relations with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE while ensuring Red Sea freedom of navigation.
China and Maritime Powers: Continued instability threatens critical trade routes. Insurance costs for Red Sea transit may rise if southern Yemen becomes an ungoverned space or if Houthi capabilities expand.
IX. Conclusion
The STC's collapse is not an endpoint but a catalyst exposing fundamental questions about regional order. It reveals the limits of proxy-driven fragmentation strategies and marks a potential shift from distributed influence networks toward more assertive state-centric power consolidation.
Three critical dynamics will shape outcomes:
Saudi-UAE Relations: Whether tactical friction escalates into structural competition or moderates into managed coexistence will profoundly affect regional stability.
Southern Yemeni Politics: The organizational defeat of the STC does not resolve southern grievances. Without credible political inclusion, fragmentation will persist through different organizational forms.
Red Sea Security Architecture: The intersection of Yemen instability, Horn of Africa tensions, and great power competition creates compounding risks. Unilateral moves—whether Israeli recognition of Somaliland, Ethiopian naval basing, or Egyptian military deployments—risk triggering cascading crises.
For policymakers, the central challenge is constructing durable frameworks that address legitimate national interests (Ethiopian sea access, southern Yemeni autonomy, Israeli security) without fragmenting already fragile states or militarizing critical maritime corridors.
The "January Reckoning" demonstrates that in the contemporary Middle East and Horn of Africa, military victories without political legitimacy produce pyrrhic outcomes. The question is whether regional and international actors can translate this moment into sustainable political architecture—or whether it merely represents a tactical pause before renewed fragmentation.
Note on Sources: This analysis is based on reporting current as of January 10, 2026, from Reuters, Al Jazeera, Associated Press, CNN, The Times of Israel, and specialized regional analysis from The Soufan Center, Chatham House, and other institutions. Situations remain fluid and assessments should be updated as events develop.
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