The Ascendance of Türkiye and Shifting Regional Security Paradigm: A Geopolitical Realignment in the Middle East
Abstract
This essay analyzes the significant geopolitical realignment that has accelerated in the Middle East following the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024, examining Türkiye's emergence as an increasingly assertive regional power. Drawing upon the latest economic and strategic data available through November 2025, it argues that Türkiye's economic resilience, particularly its autonomous and export-driven defense industry, provides the foundation for an assertive foreign policy that has substantially altered the security environment for Israel and other regional actors. The analysis focuses on Türkiye's economic and military engagement with the evolving Syrian political order, its expanding influence in Libya and Iraq, and its strategic diplomatic positioning following the 2023-2024 Gaza conflict. The essay concludes that while Türkiye faces significant structural vulnerabilities, its pursuit of strategic autonomy is creating escalating friction with Israel and demanding careful reassessment by Western allies of their regional engagement strategies.
I. Introduction: The Post-Assad Realignment and Türkiye's Regional Assertiveness
The Middle East is experiencing a geopolitical transformation of considerable magnitude. The overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024, achieved by a rebel alliance led primarily by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and facilitated by decisive shifts in regional power dynamics, marked the end of the post-2011 civil war status quo. Into this vacuum has stepped Türkiye, a nation of approximately 85 million people asserting itself as an increasingly influential regional actor.
The balance of evidence suggests that this development represents more than transient opportunism. Türkiye's economic fundamentals, particularly in the defense sector, and its strategic positioning in Syria indicate a systematic effort to expand its sphere of influence. This trajectory is fundamentally altering Israel's traditional freedom of action in the Levant, creating what many security analysts characterize as Israel's most complex strategic environment in decades. However, any assessment must acknowledge both Türkiye's genuine capabilities and its significant structural constraints, avoiding both alarmist overstatement and dismissive underestimation.
II. The Economic Foundations of Strategic Power
Türkiye's capacity to project regional influence rests upon economic foundations that, despite persistent volatility, demonstrate considerable resilience and growing sophistication in specific sectors.
II.i. Macroeconomic Performance and Disinflation Efforts
Türkiye's economy continues to exhibit robust growth, though this performance occurs within a context of ongoing macroeconomic challenges. The World Bank projects GDP growth of approximately 3.5 percent for 2025, while the Turkish government's Medium-Term Economic Programme targets 3.3 percent growth. Economic data from the second quarter of 2025 showed quarter-on-quarter growth accelerating to 1.6 percent, driven primarily by investment and private consumption, even as tight monetary conditions moderately constrained private spending.
The most significant macroeconomic narrative concerns inflation dynamics. Following the adoption of orthodox monetary policy under Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek, who returned to his position in June 2023, Türkiye has pursued aggressive disinflation. Annual inflation, which peaked at approximately 75 percent in May 2024, declined to roughly 52 percent by October 2024. While specific August 2025 figures require verification through current data, the government's Medium-Term Economic Programme targets year-end 2025 inflation of 28.5 percent, representing substantial progress though remaining elevated by international standards.
This disinflation trajectory, while slower than initially projected by policymakers, has restored a degree of credibility to Turkish economic management among international financial institutions. The World Bank and OECD maintain projections positioning Türkiye among the faster-growing major economies over the coming decade, though such forecasts necessarily incorporate significant uncertainty given historical volatility in Turkish economic policy. The government anticipates continued strength in tourism revenues, which have been a bright spot in the current account, and projects a narrowing current account deficit, factors that would enhance fiscal space for foreign policy initiatives.
Nevertheless, it stands to reason that persistent inflation, even if declining, imposes real constraints on living standards for ordinary Turkish citizens and creates ongoing political vulnerabilities for the government. The sustainability of current growth rates depends substantially on maintaining policy orthodoxy, which may prove challenging given domestic political pressures.
II.ii. Defense Industrial Development and Export Growth
The defense and aerospace sector represents the clearest manifestation of Türkiye's strategic economic policy, having successfully transformed from import dependence toward an increasingly autonomous and export-oriented industrial ecosystem. Turkish defense and aerospace exports reached approximately $6 billion in 2023 and are reported to have grown to $7.154 billion in 2024, representing a 29 percent year-on-year increase. Industry reports suggest that exports in the first half of 2025 continued this growth trajectory, though specific figures require verification.
The sector's development has been driven by several factors, including periodic Western arms embargoes following Turkish military operations in Syria and the 2019 acquisition of Russian S-400 air defense systems, which triggered U.S. sanctions including expulsion from the F-35 program. These restrictions, rather than constraining Turkish capabilities, appear to have accelerated indigenous development programs. The domestic localization rate in defense production reportedly exceeds 75 percent, with research and development investment approaching $3 billion annually.
Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles have emerged as the sector's flagship products. Baykar, the company led by Selçuk Bayraktar, whose prominence is enhanced by his marriage to President Erdoğan's daughter, has achieved significant commercial success with its Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones. These systems have been combat-proven in conflicts including Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine, establishing Turkish UAVs as credible, affordable alternatives to American, Chinese, and Israeli platforms. Baykar reports exporting to more than 30 countries, with interest expressed by many others.
Türkiye is simultaneously pursuing advanced capabilities that signal long-term strategic ambitions. The National Combat Aircraft project, known as KAAN, represents an attempt to develop an indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft, with optimistic timelines suggesting potential initial deliveries by 2028, though such ambitious aerospace programs frequently encounter delays. Additional programs include the ANKA-3 stealth unmanned combat aerial vehicle, hypersonic missile development, and naval platforms such as the TCG Anadolu, a short take-off and vertical landing capable amphibious assault ship commissioned in 2023.
The strategic significance of this defense industrial development extends beyond military capability. Defense exports generate diplomatic access and influence, with Turkish systems now present in approximately 180 countries through various defense relationships. Each defense contract creates dependencies and incentives for political alignment, transforming Türkiye's defense industry into an instrument of statecraft that operates independently of traditional Western alliance structures.
III. Converting Economic Capacity into Strategic Influence
Türkiye's economic resources and industrial capabilities are being systematically deployed to expand its strategic influence across multiple regional theaters, with varying degrees of success and sustainability.
III.i. Syria: Positioning for Influence in the Post-Assad Order
The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the establishment of a transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa provided Türkiye with its most significant strategic opportunity in years. Ankara emerged as the best-positioned external actor due to years of investment in Syrian opposition groups, maintenance of a substantial military presence in northern Syria (particularly in Idlib province and areas of Aleppo), and reported intelligence cooperation with the rebel offensive that toppled Assad.
The balance of available evidence suggests that Türkiye is actively seeking to institutionalize its influence in the new Syrian order, though the precise nature and extent of this engagement remains partially opaque. Multiple reports indicate that Turkish military advisors are training elements of the new Syrian military, though Ankara has denied direct command-and-control relationships. Turkish security assistance appears focused on professionalizing Syrian security forces and establishing coherent command structures, activities that create dependencies favoring long-term Turkish influence.
Economic statecraft represents Türkiye's most durable mechanism for establishing indispensability in Syria. Turkish goods are rapidly gaining market share in Syria, facilitated by geographic proximity, established trade networks from the civil war period, and preferential access negotiated with the new government. Most significantly, Türkiye is positioning itself as essential to Syrian reconstruction, estimated by various sources to require between $200 billion and $400 billion over the coming decade.
Turkish involvement in Syrian energy infrastructure appears particularly strategic. The proposed Kilis-Aleppo natural gas pipeline, intended to channel Azerbaijani gas to Syria, would create structural energy dependence on Turkish transit infrastructure. Similarly, Turkish commitments to supply electricity to power-starved Syrian cities establish immediate dependencies while positioning Turkish firms for longer-term power generation contracts. Turkish construction conglomerates are actively pursuing reconstruction projects, with major contracts anticipated in housing, infrastructure, and industrial facilities.
From a geopolitical perspective, every power plant, road, and factory established under Turkish auspices creates economic interests that generate pressure for sustained Turkish military and political presence to protect those investments. This dynamic recalls historical patterns of economic penetration creating justifications for security guarantees, potentially locking in Turkish influence regardless of future Syrian government preferences.
For Israel, this development represents a fundamental alteration of the strategic environment. Throughout the Syrian civil war, Israel maintained largely unchallenged air superiority over Syrian airspace, conducting hundreds of strikes against Iranian military infrastructure and weapons transfers to Hezbollah. A stable, Turkish-aligned Syrian government potentially equipped with Turkish air defense systems and hosting Turkish military installations would substantially complicate Israeli operational freedom. While it remains uncertain whether the new Syrian government will permit such deployments, the balance of probabilities suggests that Türkiye will seek to establish air defense coverage that protects its personnel and investments, necessarily constraining Israeli freedom of action.
Moreover, Türkiye's position as the primary external security partner to Damascus creates diplomatic complications for Israeli operations. Any Israeli strike that inadvertently targets Turkish personnel or equipment would create a crisis involving a NATO member, potentially forcing uncomfortable American mediation and imposing political costs that might cause Israeli planners to exercise greater restraint.
III.ii. Expanding Influence in Critical Corridors
Türkiye's strategic expansion extends beyond Syria into other critical regional corridors, though with varying degrees of success and significant ongoing challenges.
In Iraq, Ankara has worked to recalibrate its relationship from one characterized by military tensions over Kurdish insurgent operations to a more structured strategic partnership centered on trade, energy, and security cooperation. The two countries signed a defense industry cooperation agreement in May 2025, signaling improved bilateral relations. Both governments continue to advance the Development Road Project, an ambitious initiative designed to create a transportation and trade corridor connecting the Persian Gulf to Europe via Iraq and Türkiye, potentially establishing Ankara as an indispensable regional logistics hub.
However, significant obstacles remain. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which carried Iraqi Kurdish oil exports through Türkiye, has remained shut since March 2023 following an international arbitration ruling against Ankara. While various reports have suggested imminent restarts, including references to September 2025 timelines, the pipeline remained non-operational as of late 2025, representing a substantial loss of revenue for Iraqi Kurdistan and transit fees for Türkiye. The resolution of this dispute remains contingent on complex negotiations between Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil regarding revenue-sharing and control mechanisms. The Development Road Project similarly faces substantial implementation challenges, including security concerns in southern Iraq, funding gaps, and competing regional corridor initiatives.
In Libya, Türkiye has pursued a pragmatic dual-track strategy aimed at solidifying long-term influence in a fractured state. While maintaining its primary relationship with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity, Ankara has also engaged with elements based in eastern Libya, including limited outreach to forces aligned with Khalifa Haftar. A defense cooperation agreement signed in July 2025 with the Tripoli government aims to rebuild Libyan military capabilities, positioning Turkish firms to supply equipment and training. Turkish economic engagement focuses on reconstruction contracts and energy sector participation, creating economic dependencies similar to those being established in Syria.
Türkiye's Libyan engagement serves multiple strategic purposes, but most significantly aims to solidify Ankara's expansive maritime jurisdiction claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. The controversial 2019 maritime boundary agreement with the Tripoli-based government, which claims overlapping exclusive economic zones that disregard the Greek islands of Crete and Rhodes, remains a central source of tension with Greece and Cyprus. Turkish influence in Libya provides political support for these claims, though they remain widely rejected by other Mediterranean states and lack support in international law.
Türkiye also maintains a long-standing military presence in Somalia, including a substantial base near Mogadishu established in 2017, coupled with investments in port infrastructure. This presence secures Turkish access to the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, strategically significant both for maritime trade routes and as a counterbalance to Gulf Arab influence in the region. However, Türkiye's capacity to substantially shape outcomes in the Horn of Africa remains limited compared to its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Levant.
IV. The Gaza War and Shifting Regional Dynamics
The 2023-2024 Gaza conflict has served as a significant catalyst for Türkiye's diplomatic positioning and Israel's regional isolation, though the long-term implications remain uncertain.
IV.i. Diplomatic Positioning and Legal Pressure
The Gaza conflict effectively ended the brief normalization in Turkish-Israeli relations that had commenced in 2022. While Türkiye has not formally severed all diplomatic ties, the relationship exists in a state of deep crisis characterized by hostile rhetoric and minimal functional cooperation. President Erdoğan's consistent, vocal support for Palestinian rights and his refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization have resonated powerfully across the Muslim world, enhancing Türkiye's soft power credentials in Arab and Islamic capitals that had previously distanced themselves from Ankara during its period of relative regional isolation following the Arab Spring.
A fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas took effect on October 10, 2025, following the implementation of the first phase of President Trump's 20-point Gaza peace plan. On November 17, 2025, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803 by a vote of 13-0, with China and Russia abstaining, endorsing Trump's comprehensive plan and authorizing the establishment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza. Türkiye played a significant role in the diplomatic process leading to this resolution, joining Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Jordan in issuing a joint statement on November 14, 2025, calling for swift adoption of the U.S. resolution. This participation underscores Ankara's enhanced diplomatic standing as a regional actor whose engagement is considered essential for Middle Eastern peace processes.
However, Israel has explicitly rejected Turkish participation in the International Stabilization Force itself, with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar stating in October 2025 that no Turkish troops would be permitted in Gaza due to President Erdoğan's hostile stance toward Israel. Despite this exclusion from the security force, Türkiye's central role in the diplomatic negotiations and its position as a co-guarantor of the ceasefire agreement demonstrates its increased leverage in regional diplomacy, even when operating within constraints imposed by Israeli objections and American mediation. The ceasefire itself remains fragile, with ongoing violence resulting in approximately 280 Palestinian deaths according to Gaza's Health Ministry in the first month following its implementation, highlighting the substantial challenges facing any stabilization effort.
Türkiye has also pursued legal pressure against Israeli officials through international mechanisms. President Erdoğan and other Turkish officials have repeatedly accused Israeli leaders of war crimes and genocide, calling for international prosecution. The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in late November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, alongside a Hamas leader, related to alleged crimes during the Gaza conflict. Türkiye has been vocal in supporting such international legal accountability measures, though the practical effect of these warrants on Israeli official travel and diplomatic engagement remains limited given that major powers including the United States do not recognize ICC jurisdiction over Israeli officials.
By adopting the strongest pro-Palestinian position of any major regional power, Türkiye has differentiated itself from Arab states that signed the Abraham Accords and positioned itself as an authentic voice for Palestinian rights. This stance has generated diplomatic dividends across the Muslim world, though it has simultaneously deepened the rupture with Israel and created tensions with Arab governments that maintain relations with Israel or seek to do so.
IV.ii. Implications for Israeli Strategic Calculations
Türkiye's regional ascendance imposes several constraints on Israeli strategic freedom, though the magnitude of these constraints should not be overstated.
First, the potential establishment of a Turkish-backed security architecture in Syria represents the most direct constraint. Israeli military planners have long relied on relative freedom to conduct airstrikes against Iranian and Hezbollah-related targets throughout Syria. The introduction of Turkish military presence and potentially Turkish-supplied air defense systems complicates this calculus significantly. Israeli operations that risk Turkish casualties or that strike Turkish equipment would create a crisis involving a NATO member, potentially forcing American diplomatic intervention and imposing political costs that Israeli decision-makers must weigh against operational benefits. While Israel has demonstrated willingness to accept such costs when core security interests are at stake, the changed environment in Syria does impose meaningful constraints on operational freedom that did not exist during the Assad regime's weakness.
Second, Türkiye increasingly competes with Israel in defense export markets, particularly in the unmanned aerial vehicle sector and in emerging markets across Africa, Central Asia, and parts of Europe. This competition operates on multiple levels: economically, as Turkish systems gain market share previously held by Israeli exports; diplomatically, as defense relationships create incentives for political alignment; and strategically, as countries that rely on Turkish rather than Israeli defense technology become less dependent on maintaining good relations with Jerusalem. While Israel retains significant technological advantages in numerous defense sectors, particularly in sophisticated missile defense, intelligence systems, and cyber capabilities, Turkish competition has intensified notably in the past five years.
Third, Türkiye's expanding influence across multiple theaters—Syria, potential leverage in Gaza through diplomatic channels, Eastern Mediterranean maritime claims, and Red Sea presence through Somalia—creates what some Israeli analysts characterize as a form of strategic encirclement by an overtly hostile regional power. This characterization, while containing elements of strategic reality, also reflects a degree of Israeli threat inflation. Türkiye's actual capacity to threaten core Israeli interests remains limited by geographic distance, the lack of common borders, and Türkiye's continued NATO membership, which constrains direct military confrontation. Nevertheless, the shift from Türkiye as a periodic Israeli partner to Türkiye as a consistent adversary across multiple diplomatic and strategic domains represents a genuine degradation of Israel's regional position.
V. Türkiye's Structural Vulnerabilities and the Western Policy Dilemma
Any rigorous analysis must acknowledge Türkiye's significant structural weaknesses that constrain its hegemonic aspirations and create potential pressure points for Western policy engagement.
Despite progress in disinflation, Türkiye's projected inflation rate of 28.5 percent for late 2025 remains severely elevated by international standards and continues to erode real wages for ordinary Turkish citizens. The Turkish lira remains structurally weak, having depreciated substantially over the past decade despite periodic interventions. While foreign currency reserves have recovered somewhat under orthodox monetary policy, they remain insufficient relative to external financing needs and vulnerable to capital flow reversals. This economic fragility means that any major foreign policy miscalculation or the imposition of sustained economic sanctions could rapidly undermine domestic economic stability, potentially forcing policy retrenchment.
Türkiye's increasingly assertive foreign policy has become deeply personalized under President Erdoğan, now 71 years old. The highly centralized nature of Turkish foreign policy decision-making creates succession uncertainty that could destabilize carefully constructed relationships and commitments. Moreover, domestic political opposition has demonstrated renewed strength, evidenced by the AK Party's losses in major municipal elections in March 2024, including in Istanbul and Ankara. While Erdoğan retains substantial political control through command of state institutions and media, the emergence of credible domestic opposition creates an axis of internal vulnerability that could constrain foreign policy adventurism or, conversely, incentivize nationalist posturing to maintain political support.
Most fundamentally, Türkiye's foreign policy trajectory exists in profound tension with its NATO membership. The acquisition of Russian S-400 air defense systems, open hostility toward Israel, periodic tensions with Greece over Aegean and Mediterranean disputes, obstruction of Swedish and Finnish NATO accession, and complex relationship with Russia all create persistent friction within the alliance. The United States maintains a strong interest in preserving Turkish NATO membership given Türkiye's strategic location, substantial military capabilities, and role in containing Russian influence. However, this creates a pattern wherein Washington continuously manages symptoms of Turkish assertiveness—mediating Greek-Turkish disputes, attempting to prevent Turkish-Israeli escalation, negotiating compromises on various sanctions regimes—rather than addressing the fundamental driver: Türkiye's pursuit of strategic autonomy that frequently conflicts with alliance priorities.
This dynamic presents Western policymakers with an increasingly acute dilemma. Accommodation of Turkish interests risks undermining other regional partnerships, particularly with Israel and Greece, and establishes precedents for other allies to pursue autonomous policies without consequence. However, punitive approaches risk pushing Türkiye into closer alignment with Russia or China, potentially leading to eventual NATO exit, which would represent a catastrophic strategic loss given Türkiye's control of the Turkish Straits, its location bordering Russia and the Middle East, and its substantial military capabilities. The optimal policy approach likely involves sustained diplomatic engagement that acknowledges legitimate Turkish interests while firmly defending core alliance principles and partner security, a balance that has proven extremely difficult to maintain in practice.
VI. Conclusion: Navigating a Complex Regional Transition
The available evidence supports a conclusion that Türkiye is experiencing a period of enhanced regional influence driven by genuine economic capabilities, particularly in defense industrialization, and skillful exploitation of regional power vacuums, most notably in Syria. This trajectory is creating a more constrained strategic environment for Israel, particularly regarding freedom of action in the Levant, and is forcing reassessment of long-established assumptions about regional power distributions.
However, projections of Turkish hegemony require significant qualification. Türkiye faces substantial structural constraints including persistent economic volatility, succession uncertainty, and the fundamental contradiction between its pursuit of strategic autonomy and its NATO membership. Moreover, Türkiye's regional influence expansion faces resistance from multiple quarters: Arab states wary of Turkish neo-Ottoman pretensions, Israel's technological superiority and close American relationship, Iranian opposition to Turkish expansion in Syria and Iraq, and internal Syrian resistance to perceived Turkish domination.
The most probable trajectory involves continued escalating friction across multiple domains. Türkiye can be expected to leverage its economic and defense capabilities to consolidate positions in Syria and pursue influence in Iraq and Libya, while maintaining a hostile diplomatic stance toward Israel. Israel will likely respond through strategic adjustments that emphasize technological advantages, covert operations, and deepening security relationships with other regional actors concerned about Turkish expansion, potentially including tacit cooperation with actors traditionally considered adversaries.
The scenario that demands sustained attention from policymakers involves inadvertent escalation, particularly the risk of Israeli military operations in Syria striking Turkish personnel or assets. Such an incident could rapidly escalate into a crisis involving two American partners, forcing uncomfortable Washington mediation and potentially triggering a broader regional confrontation. This risk necessitates sustained high-level diplomatic communication and crisis management mechanisms that appear currently underdeveloped.
For Western policymakers, particularly in Washington, the central challenge involves managing the strategic contradiction of maintaining alliance relationships with both Türkiye and Israel while these two capable, strong-willed actors pursue increasingly divergent regional visions. The era of unchallenged Israeli supremacy in the northern Levant has indeed concluded, replaced by a more complex, multipolar regional environment in which Türkiye functions as an increasingly autonomous and assertive actor. Whether this transition produces a new stable equilibrium or escalates into sustained confrontation depends substantially on the diplomatic skill and strategic wisdom demonstrated by all parties, qualities that recent regional history suggests may be in limited supply.
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