Introduction
In an era marked by global democratic backsliding, concerns about the health of established democracies have intensified across Western nations. From the rise of illiberal populism in Hungary and Poland to democratic erosion in the United States, scholars and practitioners alike are grappling with what Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt term "competitive authoritarianism" and what Larry Diamond calls the "democratic recession." Against this backdrop, Canadian journalist Andrew Coyne's provocative assertion that Canadian democracy exists in "advanced disrepair" demands serious analytical attention.
Coyne's critique emerges at a particularly significant moment. Contemporary democratic theory has evolved beyond simple procedural definitions of democracy to encompass what Robert Dahl termed "polyarchy" and what scholars now recognize as the multidimensional nature of democratic quality. The current global context, characterized by what Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg identify as the "third wave of autocratization," makes questions about democratic institutional performance not merely academic but existentially urgent for liberal democratic societies.
This essay critically examines Coyne's diagnosis of Canadian parliamentary democracy through the lens of contemporary democratic theory, institutional analysis, and comparative political science. While acknowledging legitimate concerns about democratic representation and institutional effectiveness, I argue that Coyne's assessment conflates normal democratic tensions with systemic failure, overlooking both the adaptive capacity of Westminster systems and Canada's relative democratic resilience in comparative perspective. Moreover, his comprehensive reform prescription and pessimistic analysis of reform possibilities reveal fundamental misunderstandings about how democratic change occurs and the comparative performance of alternative institutional arrangements.
Theoretical Framework: Understanding Democratic Quality in the 21st Century
Defining Democratic Health
Contemporary scholarship on democratic quality, exemplified by the work of Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, recognizes that democracy extends far beyond electoral competition. Diamond's framework identifies five key dimensions of democratic quality: freedom, control, equality, participation, and responsiveness. Similarly, V-Dem's approach to measuring democracy encompasses electoral democracy, liberal democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and egalitarian democracy.
Coyne's critique touches on several of these dimensions, particularly responsiveness (the degree to which government policies correspond to citizen preferences) and control (the extent to which citizens can hold government accountable). However, his analysis lacks systematic comparison with alternative democratic models and fails to distinguish between suboptimal performance and democratic breakdown.
Institutional Design and Parliamentary Systems
The Westminster parliamentary system, of which Canada is a variant, represents one of several successful models of democratic governance. Arend Lijphart's seminal work on patterns of democracy distinguishes between majoritarian and consensus models, with Westminster systems typically falling into the former category. These systems prioritize governmental effectiveness and accountability through clear lines of responsibility, while consensus systems emphasize inclusiveness and broad representation.
Coyne's critique essentially argues for moving Canada toward a more consensus-oriented model through electoral reform and enhanced legislative independence. However, this normative preference should be distinguished from empirical claims about democratic breakdown.
Analyzing Coyne's Institutional Critique
Legislative Function and Private Members' Bills
Coyne's concern about the limited number of successful private members' bills (typically 2-3 annually in recent parliamentary sessions, though this can fluctuate) reflects a misunderstanding of parliamentary function within party-based democratic systems. Contemporary research on legislative behavior, including work by John Carey and Matthew Shugart, demonstrates that party discipline serves crucial democratic functions by providing voters with clear policy choices and ensuring governmental coherence.
The emphasis on private members' legislation as a marker of democratic health conflates legislative activity with legislative quality. As regulatory impact analysis literature demonstrates, excessive legislative production can lead to what Jonathan Rauch terms "demosclerosis"—the accumulation of contradictory and outdated regulations that impede effective governance. The quality of legislative oversight through committee work and the government's responsiveness to opposition concerns during the legislative process may be more meaningful indicators of democratic function than the quantity of successful private bills. In the 43rd Parliament (2019-2021), 15 private members' bills received Royal Assent, while the 44th Parliament maintained a similar pace, with several addressing significant policy areas including environmental protection and healthcare access.
Executive Dominance and Parliamentary Oversight
Coyne's critique of omnibus bills and expedited legislative processes touches on a legitimate concern about executive dominance in Westminster systems. This phenomenon, which Donald Savoie terms the "rise of court government," has been observed across Westminster democracies and reflects broader trends toward executive centralization in response to complex governance challenges.
However, this development should be understood within the context of what political scientists call "institutional adaptation." Parliamentary systems have evolved mechanisms for managing increased governmental complexity while maintaining democratic accountability. These include enhanced committee systems (the House of Commons has over 20 standing committees with significant oversight powers), parliamentary budget officers (the PBO was established in 2006 to provide independent analysis to Parliament), and access to information regimes—innovations that Coyne's analysis largely overlooks.
Parliamentary committees have demonstrated substantial influence over policy development. For example, the Standing Committee on Health's 2021 report on long-term care directly influenced federal legislation on care standards, while the Standing Committee on Finance regularly shapes budget priorities through its pre-budget consultations that hear from hundreds of witnesses annually.
Question Period and Democratic Communication
Coyne's dismissal of Question Period as mere partisan theater underestimates its role in what deliberative democracy theorists call "democratic discourse." While Question Period may not produce immediate policy changes, it serves crucial functions in democratic accountability by forcing government explanations of policy decisions, highlighting opposition concerns, and providing information to media and citizens.
Research on parliamentary questions by scholars like Reuven Hazan demonstrates that even highly partisan questioning serves democratic functions by creating incentives for governmental responsiveness and transparency. The theatrical nature of these exchanges, rather than undermining democracy, may actually enhance public engagement with political issues. On average, over 100 questions are asked during Question Period each sitting week in the House of Commons, with supplementary questions allowing for extended exchanges on key issues.
Strategic Voting and Democratic Choice
Coyne's criticism of strategic voting reflects a narrow understanding of democratic choice. Rational choice theory, as developed by scholars like William Riker and Gary Cox, demonstrates that strategic voting can be understood as rational behavior by voters seeking to maximize their utility given institutional constraints.
Rather than representing a failure of democracy, strategic voting may indicate sophisticated voter behavior that takes institutional realities into account. The prevalence of strategic voting in FPTP systems worldwide suggests that voters adapt their behavior to electoral rules in ways that can enhance their influence over policy outcomes.
In the 2025 federal election, strategic voting again played a notable role. While exact figures vary between polls, some research suggests that around 5% of voters vote strategically in Canadian elections. However, other reports indicate that as many as 10-15% of voters considered strategic voting in the 2019 election, and similar considerations were present in the lead-up to the 2025 election.
The 2025 election saw particular discussions around strategic voting, especially among progressive voters. With the Conservatives initially leading in polls, there was a perceived shift of left-of-centre voters towards the Liberals to prevent a Conservative majority government. This dynamic appeared to significantly impact the New Democratic Party (NDP), which saw a substantial reduction in their seat count (from 25 in the previous election to 7 in 2025) and the loss of their leader's seat. Conversely, the Liberals benefited from this strategic shift, ultimately forming a minority government despite earlier projections of a strong Conservative victory. This highlights how voters in FPTP systems often engage in strategic calculations at the riding level, aiming to elect the "least undesirable" candidate or to prevent a specific party from winning.
Evaluating Coyne's Reform Prescription
Coyne's extensive list of proposed reforms—ranging from limiting prime ministerial powers to mandatory voting—reveals both the breadth of his concerns and the complexity of democratic reform. However, his omnibus approach to institutional change raises several analytical concerns that undermine his broader critique.
Contradictory Reform Logic
Many of Coyne's proposals work at cross-purposes, suggesting insufficient consideration of their systemic interactions. Mandatory voting, for instance, might increase turnout but could also amplify the very populist pressures that make other reforms (like moving benches closer together to encourage more civil debate) necessary. Research by scholars like Arend Lijphart shows that mandatory voting can increase turnout by 7-16 percentage points, but it also tends to increase support for extremist parties as disengaged voters make less informed choices.
Similarly, ending the leader's veto on candidate nominations while simultaneously giving MPs power to elect their leader could create internal party chaos that undermines the governmental stability that Westminster systems are designed to provide. The experience of the UK Conservative Party's leadership selection process in 2022, which produced three different prime ministers within seven weeks, illustrates how weakening party leadership authority can destabilize governance.
Theatrical vs. Substantive Reforms
Several proposals reflect aesthetic preferences rather than evidence-based solutions to identified problems. The suggestion to "ban members from reading speeches," "rip out the desks," or manipulate camera angles appears more theatrical than substantive. Research on legislative behavior suggests that prepared remarks often reflect more careful policy analysis than extemporaneous debate, while the physical layout of Westminster chambers has evolved to facilitate both government-opposition dialogue and practical legislative work.
The focus on such superficial changes raises questions about whether Coyne's critique addresses genuine democratic deficits or merely stylistic preferences that conflate process with substance.
Ignoring Implementation Challenges
Coyne's reform agenda also fails to grapple seriously with implementation challenges and unintended consequences. "Truth in Politics" laws, for example, face significant constitutional challenges related to freedom of expression and raise complex questions about who determines political "truth." Australia's attempt at such legislation was abandoned after legal challenges, while similar efforts in other jurisdictions have proven largely ineffective at curbing political misinformation while creating new venues for partisan dispute.
The Fallacy of the "Iron Ring of Self-Interest"
Coyne's argument that democratic reform is impossible because "the system can be changed only by those who were elected under the existing system" contains a fundamental flaw: it ignores substantial evidence of successful democratic reform across Westminster systems and Canadian history specifically.
Historical Evidence of Democratic Reform
The "iron ring of self-interest" theory cannot explain how New Zealand adopted mixed-member proportional representation in 1996, despite the electoral disadvantage this created for the two major parties. It cannot account for how the UK implemented devolution in the late 1990s, transferring significant powers away from Westminster. Nor can it explain how various Canadian provinces have reformed their electoral systems and legislative procedures, often reducing the advantages of incumbent parties.
In Canada specifically, major democratic innovations occurred despite potential disadvantages to incumbent politicians. The expansion of suffrage, the creation of independent electoral boundaries commissions, campaign finance reforms, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms all represent instances where politicians acted against apparent short-term electoral interests in response to changing public expectations and legitimacy concerns.
Recent Evidence of Reform Capacity
The period from 2015-2024 provides several examples of significant institutional reforms that contradict Coyne's pessimistic assessment. The creation of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians in 2017 provided unprecedented parliamentary oversight of security agencies. The strengthening of the Parliamentary Budget Officer's mandate in 2017 enhanced legislative independence from executive control. The implementation of gender-balanced cabinets since 2015 demonstrates institutional adaptation to changing democratic expectations.
These reforms occurred not because of crisis or breakdown, but through normal democratic processes responding to evolving public expectations and identified institutional weaknesses.
Learning from Comparative Experience
Countries that have implemented proportional representation systems—Coyne's preferred alternative—provide mixed evidence about their democratic benefits, suggesting that electoral system change alone does not resolve the tensions he identifies.
The Mixed Record of Proportional Systems
Germany's mixed-member system has produced stable coalition governments but has also empowered extremist parties like the Alternative for Germany, which won 12.6% of the vote and 94 seats in 2021. New Zealand's shift to MMP increased representation but also led to policy instability and coalition governments that implement policies no party explicitly campaigned on. The 2017-2020 Labour-NZ First coalition, for example, abandoned several Labour campaign promises while implementing NZ First policies that lacked broad electoral support.
More tellingly, several countries with proportional systems have experienced the very democratic problems Coyne attributes to FPTP systems. Italy's proportional system produced 69 different governments between 1946 and 2022, with an average duration of 13 months. Israel's extreme proportionality has empowered small religious and ethnic parties that hold disproportionate influence over policy, leading to coalition agreements that contradict the preferences of majority parties and voters.
Electoral Systems and Democratic Satisfaction
Comparative research by scholars like Christopher Anderson and Christine Guillory shows that citizen satisfaction with democracy correlates more strongly with economic performance and governmental effectiveness than with electoral system proportionality. Countries with FPTP systems (UK, Canada, India prior to recent challenges) often score higher on democratic satisfaction measures than proportional systems with unstable coalitions.
The Netherlands, despite having one of the world's most proportional electoral systems, has experienced significant challenges forming stable governments, with coalition negotiations lasting 271 days in 2017 and 299 days in 2021-2022. This suggests that proportionality alone does not resolve the governance challenges that concern Coyne.
Recent Evidence of Democratic Adaptation and Resilience
The Minority Government Natural Experiment
The 2019-2024 period of minority government in Canada provides crucial evidence contradicting Coyne's critique. Rather than producing the chaos that critics of minority government often predict, this period demonstrated considerable policy innovation through inter-party cooperation while maintaining governmental stability and democratic accountability.
The Liberal-NDP supply and confidence agreement produced significant policy initiatives including a national dental care program, enhanced childcare funding, and accelerated climate action measures. These policies emerged from negotiation and compromise rather than single-party dominance, reflecting the kind of consensus-building that Coyne claims is impossible under current institutional arrangements.
Parliamentary committees gained enhanced influence during this period, with opposition parties successfully amending government legislation and compelling detailed government responses to reports. The minority context forced greater governmental transparency and responsiveness, demonstrating that Westminster systems naturally adapt to more proportional outcomes without requiring fundamental institutional transformation.
Democratic Resilience During Crisis
Canada's response to the COVID-19 pandemic showcased both the strengths and adaptability of Westminster governance. While emergency measures raised legitimate concerns about executive power, parliamentary oversight mechanisms remained functional throughout the crisis. Regular committee meetings, opposition questioning, judicial review, and media scrutiny continued to operate, contrasting favorably with democratic backsliding observed in countries like Hungary and Poland where emergency powers were used to suppress opposition and independent media.
The Parliament of Canada's adaptation to virtual and hybrid proceedings during the pandemic demonstrated institutional flexibility while maintaining democratic function. Over 100 committee meetings were held virtually in 2020-2021, ensuring continued legislative oversight and public engagement despite public health restrictions.
Comparative Democratic Performance
Canada in Global Context
To properly assess Coyne's claims about Canadian democratic decline, we must examine Canada's performance relative to other established democracies. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index (2023), Canada ranks 12th globally with a score of 8.88 out of 10, classified as a "full democracy." The V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (2024) places Canada among the top 15 liberal democracies worldwide, with stable scores on most dimensions. Canada's LDI score in 2023 was 0.88, consistent with its performance over the previous decade.
Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World report consistently rates Canada among the freest countries globally, with perfect scores of 40/40 on political rights and 60/60 on civil liberties in its 2024 report. These comparative measures demonstrate that whatever problems Canadian democracy faces, they are not indicative of the systemic erosion and institutional capture observed in countries experiencing genuine democratic backsliding.
Democratic Resilience Indicators
Recent research on democratic resilience emphasizes the importance of institutional safeguards and democratic norms in maintaining democratic stability. Canada's federal structure, independent judiciary, professional civil service (approximately 360,000 federal employees), and robust media environment (ranking 16th globally in the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index) provide multiple checks against democratic erosion.
Public trust in democratic institutions in Canada, while showing some decline consistent with global trends, remains relatively high compared to other G7 nations. A 2023 Environics survey found that 64% of Canadians express confidence in their democracy, compared to 49% of Americans and 45% of Britons. This suggests that citizen satisfaction with democratic performance contradicts Coyne's diagnosis of advanced disrepair.
Contemporary Challenges and Democratic Innovation
Responding to New Threats
The digital revolution has created new challenges for democratic governance that extend far beyond traditional institutional concerns. Issues like foreign electoral interference, disinformation campaigns, and the concentration of information power in private platforms require institutional responses that parliamentary systems are still developing.
Canada's approach to these challenges, including the Online Harms Act (Bill C-63) and enhanced foreign interference measures through the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, demonstrates institutional adaptation to new threats. The establishment of the Digital Citizen Initiative and enhanced cybersecurity frameworks show systematic rather than ad hoc responses to technological challenges.
Innovation Within Westminster Framework
Rather than requiring fundamental system transformation, Canadian democracy has demonstrated capacity for innovation within existing institutional frameworks. The creation of parliamentary internship programs, enhanced committee broadcasting, digital engagement initiatives, and systematic consultation processes represent evolutionary improvements that address citizen engagement concerns without wholesale institutional restructuring.
The House of Commons' adoption of electronic petitions, which have generated over 500,000 signatures on various issues since 2015, provides new avenues for citizen input while maintaining parliamentary oversight and government accountability.
Addressing Legitimate Democratic Concerns
While rejecting Coyne's diagnosis of democratic breakdown, we can acknowledge legitimate concerns about democratic responsiveness and representation that merit targeted reforms rather than systemic transformation.
Practical Parliamentary Improvements
Strengthening committee systems through enhanced research support, greater independence in witness selection, and expanded powers to compel testimony could address concerns about executive dominance while maintaining governmental effectiveness. The UK Parliament's Liaison Committee model, which regularly questions the Prime Minister on behalf of all select committees, could be adapted to Canadian circumstances.
Enhanced roles for parliamentary officers, including expanded mandates for the Parliamentary Budget Officer and creation of additional independent oversight positions, could improve legislative independence without undermining responsible government principles.
Electoral Engagement Innovation
Citizens' assemblies, like the one formed in British Columbia to study electoral reform in 2004, and deliberative polling experiments could supplement traditional electoral mechanisms and enhance democratic input into policy-making. Ireland's successful use of citizens' assemblies to address contentious issues like abortion and same-sex marriage demonstrates how such innovations can enhance democratic legitimacy without fundamental institutional change.
Digital engagement platforms, improved civic education, and systematic consultation processes could address concerns about citizen participation while building on rather than replacing existing democratic institutions.
Federalism Enhancement
Strengthening intergovernmental relations through more structured federal-provincial-territorial consultation mechanisms could address regional representation concerns without requiring electoral system change. Regular First Ministers' meetings, enhanced intergovernmental secretariats, and formal provincial input mechanisms for federal policy development would build on Canada's federal advantages while addressing regional alienation concerns.
Conclusion: Democratic Resilience in Uncertain Times
Andrew Coyne's critique of Canadian democracy, while raising important questions about representation and institutional effectiveness, ultimately suffers from several fundamental analytical flaws. His diagnosis conflates normal democratic tensions with systemic failure, his reform prescription contains contradictory and potentially counterproductive elements, and his pessimistic assessment of reform possibilities ignores substantial evidence of successful democratic adaptation and innovation.
Contemporary democratic theory emphasizes that democracy is not a fixed institutional arrangement but an ongoing process of contestation and adaptation. The challenges Coyne identifies—executive dominance, party discipline, regional representation disparities—are not unique to Canada and do not necessarily indicate democratic breakdown. Instead, they reflect inherent tensions in democratic governance that require ongoing management rather than wholesale institutional transformation.
The "iron ring of self-interest" theory that underlies Coyne's pessimism cannot account for the substantial history of democratic reform in Canada and other Westminster systems. From Confederation through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to recent innovations in parliamentary oversight and digital engagement, Canadian democracy has demonstrated remarkable capacity for evolutionary change in response to shifting citizen expectations and emerging challenges.
Canada's democratic performance, when assessed through rigorous comparative analysis and contemporary measures of democratic quality, indicates a resilient democratic system facing normal adaptive challenges rather than existential crisis. The 2019-2024 minority government period provides compelling evidence that Canadian institutions naturally adapt to more proportional outcomes while maintaining stability and effectiveness. The COVID-19 response demonstrated institutional resilience under genuine stress, while ongoing innovations in parliamentary oversight and citizen engagement show continued democratic evolution.
In an era of genuine democratic crisis in many parts of the world, accurate diagnosis of democratic health becomes crucial for appropriate institutional responses. Overstating the severity of democratic problems in stable democracies like Canada risks undermining confidence in democratic institutions while diverting attention from real threats to democratic governance emerging globally. The rise of competitive authoritarianism in Hungary, democratic erosion in the United States, and institutional capture in countries like Turkey represent genuine democratic emergencies that require urgent attention and resources.
The task for Canadian democracy is not fundamental transformation but thoughtful adaptation—strengthening democratic institutions, enhancing citizen engagement, and maintaining the delicate balance between effectiveness and representation that has served the country well for over 150 years. This requires serious engagement with legitimate democratic concerns while maintaining perspective on Canada's comparative democratic strengths and the ongoing global challenges facing all democratic societies.
Rather than pursuing Coyne's contradictory and potentially destabilizing reform agenda, Canada should focus on evidence-based improvements that build on existing institutional strengths. Enhanced parliamentary oversight, innovative citizen engagement mechanisms, strengthened intergovernmental relations, and continued vigilance against genuine threats to democratic governance represent a more promising path forward than wholesale institutional transformation.
As democracies worldwide face unprecedented challenges from authoritarianism, populism, and technological disruption, Canada's stable democratic institutions and traditions of peaceful power transfer represent valuable assets that should be strengthened rather than abandoned. The goal should be democratic improvement, not democratic transformation—building on existing strengths while addressing identified weaknesses through careful, targeted reform guided by evidence rather than ideology.
The evidence suggests that Canadian democracy, while imperfect, remains fundamentally sound and capable of continued evolution. Rather than existing in "advanced disrepair," it represents a resilient democratic system well-positioned to meet the challenges of the 21st century through adaptation rather than transformation, improvement rather than replacement, and evidence-based reform rather than wholesale institutional revolution.
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