Strategic Middle Power Diplomacy: Canada's Positioning in NATO-Turkey Relations Through the Lens of November 2025

Executive Summary

The geopolitical landscape of late 2025 presents a decisive moment for middle power diplomacy within NATO. The U.S. boycott of the G20 Johannesburg Summit on November 22-23, 2025, alongside Turkey's continued possession of the Russian S-400 air defense system, has created both strategic tensions and diplomatic opportunities. Mark Carney assumed office as Canada's 24th Prime Minister on March 14, 2025, bringing with him extensive experience in international finance and a mandate to transform Canada's economic strategy. This analysis examines how documented shifts in energy security, critical minerals development, and alliance dynamics through November 2025 inform potential strategic partnerships, while distinguishing carefully between established facts and strategic projections.

The Diplomatic Vacuum: The G20 Johannesburg Summit

The United States Withdrawal

The November 2025 G20 Summit in Johannesburg marked an unprecedented rupture in multilateral cooperation. U.S. President Donald Trump boycotted the summit based on discredited claims regarding white Afrikaners in South Africa, refusing to send any representative despite the U.S. being next in line to assume the rotating presidency. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa closed the summit by banging the ceremonial gavel but had no U.S. official present to receive the handover, and the planned handover was postponed to occur between officials of similar rank on a subsequent date.

The 122-point Johannesburg declaration made only one reference to Ukraine in a general call for an end to global conflicts, and French President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged the bloc was "struggling to have a common standard on geopolitical crises". The weight of evidence suggests that this diplomatic absence reinforced perceptions among medium-sized powers that U.S. commitment to multilateral institutions has become unreliable, creating space for alternative partnerships and diplomatic leadership.

Canadian Presence and Strategic Positioning

Prime Minister Mark Carney attended the G20 Summit, appearing in the official family photograph alongside leaders including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In November 2025, Carney updated premiers on his recent Indo-Pacific trip and upcoming travel to the United Arab Emirates and the G20 Leaders' Summit to strengthen Canada's global trade relationships. The balance of probabilities suggests that Canada's consistent engagement at such forums, contrasted with U.S. absence, positions Ottawa as a more reliable partner for countries seeking stable Western relationships without ultimatums.

Turkey's Strategic Autonomy and the S-400 Dilemma

The Enduring Defense Rift

Turkey's 2019 acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system remains the cornerstone issue in U.S.-Turkey defense relations. As of June 2025, Turkish President Erdoğan confirmed that the S-400 system remains in Turkey's possession, though not currently operational, and can be activated within 12 hours. Following the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, Erdoğan confirmed that Turkey has resumed technical-level discussions with the United States regarding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, though he described the S-400 matter as finalized.

Turkey was ejected from the F-35 program in 2019 and sanctioned under CAATSA for purchasing the S-400 system, which NATO leaders warned could expose the F-35's stealth profile. Section 1245 of the FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits F-35 transfers to Turkey while it continues to possess the S-400 system. Despite various proposals—including suggestions that Turkey might declare the system "inoperable"—the fundamental legal and security obstacles persist through late 2025.

The Eurofighter Alternative

After Ankara reached a preliminary understanding with the UK in mid-2025, the Eurofighter sale required consent from the consortium's four partners—Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain, with Berlin's hesitation delaying final approval until October 2025. The Eurofighter Typhoon serves as a stopgap 4.5-generation platform bridging the gap until Turkey's indigenous KAAN fighter can reach production, yet it stands to reason that this acquisition validates Ankara's strategy of pursuing alternatives to Washington when the latter imposes conditions Turkey deems unacceptable.

Energy Security and the Persistence of Russian Leverage

Turkey's Continued Dependence on Russian Gas

In January-June 2025, Russia increased pipeline gas supplies to Turkey by 28% year-on-year to approximately 11 billion cubic meters, and in the first nine months of 2025, Russian gas shipments to Turkey reached 16 billion cubic meters, representing a 16% increase. Data from the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas shows Moscow exported about 12.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey between January and July 2025, a 26.4% increase compared to the same period in 2024.

After the cessation of gas transit through Ukraine at the beginning of 2025, TurkStream became the only gas pipeline through which Russia can directly supply gas to Europe, with deliveries via TurkStream increasing by 23% to 16.7 billion cubic meters in 2023. The weight of evidence indicates that despite Western pressure, Turkey's energy dependence on Russia has actually deepened in 2025, strengthening Moscow's economic leverage over Ankara.

U.S. Pressure and Turkey's Diversification Efforts

During a White House meeting on September 25, 2025, President Trump urged Turkish President Erdoğan to reduce Turkish oil and gas imports from Russia, with Turkey's energy ministry subsequently unveiling a balanced independence strategy. Turkey's imports of Russian products totaled approximately $31.8 billion between January and September 2025, while Russia's share of Turkey's gas imports dropped to 37% in the first half of 2025, down from more than 60% two decades ago. It stands to reason that while Turkey is pursuing gradual diversification, the scale of Russian energy flows means any rapid substitution would require massive alternative supply arrangements and infrastructure investments.

Canada's Critical Minerals Strategy: A Foundation for Strategic Partnerships

Comprehensive Investment and Policy Framework

Prime Minister Carney's Budget 2025 outlined a plan to enable $1 trillion in total investments over five years, including a Productivity Super-Deduction that will lower Canada's marginal effective tax rate to 13.2%, reinforcing Canada as the most tax-competitive country for business investment in the G7. In October 2025, Minister Tim Hodgson announced the first round of strategic projects under the Canada-led Critical Minerals Production Alliance, including 26 new investments and partnerships worth $6.4 billion.

Budget 2025 allocated a $2 billion Critical Minerals Sovereign Fund launching in 2026-27 for equity investments, loan guarantees, and offtake agreements, alongside $443 million over five years for developing innovative processing technologies. The Major Projects Office was launched on August 29, 2025, with the first and second tranches of projects representing combined investment of more than $116 billion. The balance of probabilities suggests this represents a fundamental shift from Canada's historically passive resource development approach to active strategic intervention in critical minerals supply chains.

Security-Focused Realignment

While the focus of Canada's 2022 critical minerals strategy was on energy transition and battery metals, discussions in 2025 center on security, resilience against Chinese market manipulation, strengthened defense industrial supply chains, and leveraging resource endowments to enhance relations with allies. There is acceptance that Canada can and should align support for critical mineral production and processing with its NATO spending commitments, with critical mineral investment or strategy likely to shift to the Department of National Defence in the forthcoming defense industrial strategy.

This security-centric pivot indicates that Ottawa now views critical minerals not merely as commercial opportunities but as instruments of alliance cohesion and geopolitical influence.

Turkey's Critical Minerals Endowment: Strategic Assets

Boron Dominance

Turkey possesses approximately 73% of the world's known boron reserves, with the EU importing around 98% of its borates from Turkey. Turkey aims to increase income from boron exports by converting boron ore into boron carbide, which has higher added value, positioning itself to play a key role in producing and selling the world's third-hardest material. The weight of evidence suggests Turkey already exercises substantial leverage over European supply chains for this critical mineral essential to multiple industries.

Rare Earth Elements: From Discovery to Development

In April 2023, President Erdoğan inaugurated the Beylikova pilot plant, which began regular operations processing ore, with Minister Alparslan Bayraktar stating Turkey aims to be among the top 5 countries producing rare earths. The Beylikova facility, which started operations in April 2023, is set to add 1,200 tons of rare elements to the Turkish economy annually by processing fluorite, barite, and rare earth elements.

Turkish officials eventually aim to produce 10,000 tonnes of rare element oxides annually, in addition to 72,000 tonnes of barite, 70,000 tonnes of fluorite, and 250 tonnes of thorium. Turkey joined the U.S.- and EU-led Minerals Security Partnership forum to cooperate on production of critical raw materials and rare earth elements, with formal announcement expected. It stands to reason that Turkey's transition from exploration to production in rare earth elements positions it as a strategically significant supplier outside Chinese-dominated supply chains, though full-scale industrial production remains years away.

Analytical Framework: Hypothetical Canada-Turkey Strategic Partnership

Energy Infrastructure and Diversification

The hypothetical proposition of Canadian LNG as an alternative to Russian gas deserves careful examination against documented realities. Canada does not currently have substantial LNG export infrastructure operating at scale on either coast, though the second tranche of Major Projects Office initiatives includes LNG export capacity development. The balance of probabilities suggests that while Canadian LNG could theoretically contribute to Turkey's energy diversification over a 5-10 year timeframe, it cannot provide immediate substitution for existing Russian pipeline gas flows.

However, the strategic logic remains compelling: Turkey's major 25-year Russian gas agreement faces expiration in 2026, creating a critical juncture for renegotiation or diversification. Canadian involvement in financing, technology, or joint ventures for Turkish LNG import terminal expansion could facilitate gradual diversification without forcing an immediate rupture with Moscow that Turkey's economy cannot currently sustain.

Defense Technology and Dual-Use Cooperation

The weight of evidence suggests that Canada's approach to Turkey could circumvent U.S. CAATSA sanctions by focusing on non-lethal, dual-use technologies. Prime Minister Carney pledged to meet the 2% NATO defense spending target in Fiscal Year 2026, creating budgetary capacity for defense industrial cooperation. Canadian expertise in aerospace components, advanced materials, communications systems, and surveillance technology could strengthen Turkey's indigenous defense industry—particularly the KAAN fighter program—without triggering CAATSA prohibitions applicable to lethal systems.

This represents a sophisticated middle power strategy: enabling Turkey's strategic autonomy through technological cooperation that neither violates Western sanctions frameworks nor forces Turkey into exclusive dependence on Russian systems.

Critical Minerals Supply Chain Integration

Here the strategic rationale achieves its greatest coherence. Canada's Critical Minerals Production Alliance aims to establish standards-based markets, drive capital toward critical minerals projects, and catalyze innovation across supply chains through cooperation with G7 and allied countries. Turkey's position—holding 73% of global boron reserves and developing rare earth production capacity—creates natural complementarity with Canada's strategy.

The balance of probabilities suggests that a Canada-Turkey critical minerals partnership would offer several advantages:

For Turkey:

• Access to patient capital from Canada's $2 billion Critical Minerals Sovereign Fund for processing infrastructure
• Integration into Western-allied supply chains that reduce dependence on Chinese processing
• Technology transfer for value-added processing that Turkey explicitly seeks
• Enhanced credibility for Turkish minerals in Western markets through Canadian partnership certification

For Canada:

• Secure access to boron supplies essential for nuclear and advanced manufacturing
• Geographic diversification of critical minerals supply beyond North America
• A bridge to Middle Eastern and Central Asian markets through Turkey's strategic location
• Demonstration of alliance value through practical economic partnership rather than ultimatums

For NATO:

• Reduction of Russian economic leverage over a critical southern flank ally
• Creation of alternative supply chains outside Chinese control
• De-escalation of U.S.-Turkey tensions through third-party mediation
• Practical demonstration of alliance benefits beyond security guarantees

Turkey's Strategic Geographic Position

Turkey maintains a Customs Union with the EU and serves as a logistical bridge to the Middle East and Central Asia. The weight of evidence indicates that a Canadian-Turkish minerals partnership could establish a transparent, Western-allied supply chain leveraging Turkey's geographic position to create a continental distribution network, directly challenging China's supply chain dominance while respecting Turkey's strategic autonomy.

Comparative Analysis: Middle Power vs. Superpower Approaches

The U.S. Approach: Sanctions and Ultimatums

The U.S. strategy toward Turkey since 2019 has emphasized coercion: CAATSA sanctions, F-35 expulsion, demands for S-400 removal. Section 1245 of the FY 2020 NDAA makes F-35 transfer prohibition explicit and mandatory, leaving no room for executive discretion. Yet this approach has demonstrably failed to change Turkish behavior—the S-400s remain, Russian gas flows have increased, and Turkey has found alternative suppliers for military equipment.

The Canadian Alternative: Partnership Without Surrender

The strategic insight of potential Canadian engagement lies in offering Turkey a different model: partnership that respects sovereignty while advancing shared interests. Canada lacks the coercive leverage of the United States but possesses distinct advantages:

1. No Historical Baggage: Canada has no territorial disputes, arms embargo history, or regime change attempts clouding relations with Turkey
2. Complementary Economic Structures: In 2024, two-way merchandise trade totaled over $4.3 billion, creating a foundation for expansion
3. Multilateral Credibility: Canada led the G7 Critical Minerals Production Alliance and held the G7 presidency in 2025, providing institutional platforms
4. Technology Without Strings: Canadian defense and energy technology comes without the political conditions attached to U.S. systems

It stands to reason that this approach—emphasizing mutual benefit rather than compliance—may prove more effective at gradually reducing Russian influence while maintaining Turkey's commitment to NATO.

Limitations and Alternative Scenarios

Obstacles to Implementation

Several factors could impede a comprehensive Canada-Turkey strategic partnership:

Economic Scale: Canada's economy, while sophisticated, lacks the sheer scale of investment that U.S. or EU partnerships could provide. The $2 billion Critical Minerals Sovereign Fund, while significant, represents a fraction of Turkey's infrastructure needs.

Distance and Logistics: Unlike contiguous partners, Canada-Turkey cooperation faces substantial geographic barriers affecting energy shipments and supply chain efficiency.

Turkish Domestic Politics: Ankara's foreign policy priorities may shift with political transitions, and Turkey's tradition of balancing multiple partners complicates exclusive alignments.

U.S. Reaction: Washington may view Canadian engagement with Turkey as undermining sanctions pressure, potentially complicating broader Canada-U.S. relations.

European Competition: The EU, as Turkey's largest trading partner and aspirational integration destination, has deeper institutional connections and greater economic leverage than Canada.

Alternative Projections

Scenario 1: Limited Sectoral Cooperation - More probable than comprehensive partnership, this would involve specific project-based collaboration in critical minerals processing, LNG infrastructure financing, and educational exchanges without strategic realignment.

Scenario 2: Multilateral Framework - Rather than bilateral, Canada-Turkey cooperation might develop through multilateral vehicles like the Minerals Security Partnership or NATO infrastructure programs, reducing bilateral exposure while advancing shared objectives.

Scenario 3: Failed Engagement - If Turkey's partnership demands exceed Canada's capacity or willingness, or if Turkey ultimately opts for Chinese or Russian partnerships despite Western overtures, Canadian engagement could yield minimal results.

Conclusion: Redefining Alliance Leadership in a Multi-Polar Era

The documented events of 2025—the U.S. G20 boycott, Turkey's continued S-400 possession despite F-35 negotiations, deepening Turkish-Russian energy ties, and Canada's $6.4 billion Critical Minerals Production Alliance—collectively illustrate a fundamental shift in alliance dynamics.

The weight of evidence suggests that traditional superpower leverage through sanctions and exclusion has reached its limits in compelling middle power compliance. Turkey, with its strategic location, energy transit role, and critical minerals endowment, possesses sufficient alternatives to resist ultimatums. Yet Ankara also faces genuine vulnerabilities: overdependence on Russian energy, exclusion from advanced Western defense programs, and need for capital and technology to develop indigenous capabilities.

The balance of probabilities indicates that Canada, as a capable middle power, could offer a third way: partnership predicated on mutual interest rather than hierarchy. By combining critical minerals cooperation, energy diversification support, and defense technology sharing—all structured to respect Turkish sovereignty while advancing NATO cohesion—Canada could demonstrate that alliance value derives not from coercion but from concrete benefits.

Whether such a partnership materializes depends on choices yet to be made in both Ottawa and Ankara. But the strategic logic is compelling: in an era of great power incoherence and middle power agency, effective alliance leadership may belong not to those with the greatest coercive capacity, but to those offering the most credible partnerships.

The success of such an approach would fundamentally validate the role of middle power diplomacy in maintaining alliance cohesion during periods when traditional superpowers pursue unilateral agendas inconsistent with collective institutional commitments. As documented through November 2025, those conditions now exist—creating both imperative and opportunity for strategic middle power engagement.