The Italian Trajectory: Political Stability, Economic Challenges, and the Road to 2036

 

Executive Summary

Italy’s political landscape between 2022 and 2025 has undergone an unexpected stabilization under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose government has displayed an executive durability rare in the history of the Italian Republic. This stability provides a window to reassess Italy’s medium-term trajectory to 2036—a horizon that will coincide with decisive demographic, fiscal, and technological turning points.

Economically, Italy has made progress in fiscal consolidation and in executing portions of its National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), but core structural vulnerabilities persist. Productivity growth remains stagnant, public debt continues to rise due to adverse interest–growth dynamics, and demographic decline is accelerating. The NRRP’s expiration in 2026 introduces a risk of a “growth cliff” unless reforms to boost productivity, female labor participation, and skilled immigration are fully implemented.

Internationally, Italy has positioned itself as the EU’s principal geopolitical actor in the Wider Mediterranean, leveraging the Mattei Plan to shape EU-level compacts on energy, migration, and development. Its Atlanticism and its role as a potential intermediary between the US and the EU add to Italy’s strategic relevance, even as its influence on fiscal governance remains constrained.

The balance of probabilities suggests a bifurcated future. If reforms stall, Italy in 2036 risks becoming a stable but shrinking economy, burdened by demographic contraction and rising debt. If reforms accelerate, Italy could consolidate its role as a Mediterranean anchor and emerge as an influential mid-century player in a reshaped European Union. The next two years—before NRRP funding ends—will determine which trajectory prevails.

Introduction: Meloni and the Achievement of Political Stability

The consolidation of Giorgia Meloni’s government between 2022 and 2025 constitutes one of the most consequential political developments in contemporary European politics. Italy—long theorized in comparative politics as a paradigmatic “unstable democracy,” characterized by fragmented party systems, weak programmatic institutionalization, and coalition volatility—has entered an unexpected phase of executive durability. Meloni’s administration, while ideologically rooted in the post-fascist right, has demonstrated an institutional longevity and strategic coherence unmatched by most Italian governments of the post-war era. This moment of political stability invites a fundamental reassessment of several long-standing assumptions in political science: the supposed incompatibility between populist-right governance and technocratic credibility, the fragility of hybridized party systems, and the EU’s capacity to integrate and domesticate illiberal-leaning actors.

Yet this stability masks profound contradictions. Italy’s macroeconomic environment remains structurally fragile, with public debt breaching historic thresholds, productivity stagnating, and demographic decline accelerating. These entrenched vulnerabilities constrain the government’s fiscal and strategic autonomy even as Meloni seeks to project Italy as a geopolitical actor in the Wider Mediterranean. The coexistence of political stability and economic inertia challenges conventional models of “performance legitimacy” and suggests that Italian politics may be entering a phase in which executive endurance derives more from party-system reconfiguration and identity politics than from socio-economic outcomes.

Moreover, the Meloni government’s stability has generated new forms of institutional contestation. Conflicts over judicial independence, oversight mechanisms, and megaproject governance—exemplified by the October 2025 standoff with the Court of Auditors over the Strait of Messina Bridge—signal the emergence of what some scholars describe as an “illiberal equilibrium.” The government’s attempt to fuse technocratic reassurance with executive centralization raises questions about the long-term resilience of Italy’s democratic institutions.

Taken together, the Italian case between 2022 and 2025 offers a crucial laboratory for studying the transformation of advanced democracies under conditions of populist governance, economic stagnation, and geopolitical volatility. The road to 2036—by which point Italy’s demographic, fiscal, and energy transitions will reach decisive turning points—will determine whether this period becomes a durable realignment or a contingent episode preceding renewed instability.

The Ideological Evolution: From Extreme Right to Pragmatic Conservatism?

A central analytical question in assessing the Meloni government concerns the nature and extent of its ideological transformation. The conventional expectation in the literature on radical-right parties is that entry into office generates a tension between ideological purity and governing responsibility, often producing either moderated policy outputs or intensified conflict with domestic and supranational institutions. The Italian case, however, exhibits a more complex pattern. Rather than a unilateral move toward centrism, Meloni has pursued a dual-track strategy: a pronounced moderation and alignment in foreign and European policy, paired with a gradual but systematic reconfiguration of domestic institutions in line with a conservative-nationalist political project. This bifurcated trajectory renders simplistic labels—“moderation,” “normalization,” or “continuity of the radical right”—inadequate. Instead, Meloni appears to be constructing what might be termed a bifurcated conservatism: outwardly cooperative, inwardly transformative.

Foreign Policy Realignment and the Politics of External Moderation

In foreign policy, the movement toward moderation is most visible and analytically consequential. During her rise in opposition, Meloni frequently articulated positions characteristic of the European radical right: Euroskepticism, civilizational rhetoric, and hostility toward supranational governance. Once in office, however, she adopted a markedly different posture. Her government not only reaffirmed Atlanticist commitments but, by 2024–25, positioned Italy as an interlocutor capable of operating comfortably in both Brussels and Washington.

Her decision to attend Donald Trump’s 2025 inauguration—the only European leader to do so—and her subsequent visit to the White House in April 2025, where she initiated exploratory channels for renewed transatlantic trade engagement, signaled a pragmatic recalibration. These moves were not interpreted as ideological alignment with Trumpism, but rather as calculated demonstrations of Italy’s capacity to operate as a bridge between a reshaped United States and a cautious European Union. For EU partners, Meloni’s consistent support for Ukraine, her adherence to fiscal discipline, and her avoidance of confrontational rhetoric constituted a surprising but strategically valuable deviation from the patterns of earlier radical-right executives elsewhere in Europe.

Internationally, therefore, Meloni has undertaken what might be described as an external moderation: a recalibration that reassures markets and allies without abandoning the symbolic politics that animate her domestic coalition.

Domestic Policy: The Logic of Incremental Transformation

If foreign policy represents the sphere of Meloni’s moderation, domestic policy reveals a different dynamic—one less visible in daily headlines but far more consequential for Italy’s institutional evolution. Here, the government has advanced a set of reforms that cumulatively point toward a reconfiguration of the Italian state. Key initiatives include:

Constitutional Reform: In June 2024, the Italian senate approved the so-called Premierato constitutional reform bill by 109 votes to 77. The proposed reform would allow for direct election of the Prime Minister with the coalition that supports the winning candidate given at least 55 percent of seats in both houses of parliament to ensure a workable majority. The constitutional reform bill was approved by the Senate in June 2024 and is now under review by the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. While Meloni frames this as a remedy to chronic instability, critics warn it risks concentrating power and weakening checks and balances.

Judicial System Reform: Legislation which has now passed the Italian Senate would reshape Italy's judicial system by banning prosecutors and judges from switching roles throughout their career and would split the judicial council in half with members selected at random rather than by election. The balance of probabilities suggests this will be submitted to a referendum in early 2026, as Meloni's government does not have a two-thirds majority.

Institutional Reshaping: It is possible to surmise that appointments to state institutions, public broadcasters, and state-owned companies have favored loyalists—a strategic move interpreted by critics as weakening democratic institutions from within.

Security and Culture Policies: The government approved a decree-law in April 2025 expanding the powers of secret services and requiring universities and research bodies to collaborate with them. On November 14, 2025, tens of thousands of students rallied across Italy against the government's education policies and support for Israel, with demonstrations under the banner "No Meloni Day". Migration policies continue to reflect a nationalist-conservative agenda, notably the Albania protocol for asylum processing, which faces legal challenges from Italian judges and the European Court of Justice.

The resulting classification is a blend: an Atlanticist, fiscally disciplined foreign policy combined with a nationalist and socially conservative domestic agenda. The balance of probabilities suggests that this represents strategic moderation to enable governing and maintain European standing, rather than a total ideological conversion.

The Structure of Ideological Change

Taken together, these developments reveal a pattern not of ideological renunciation but of strategic differentiation across policy spheres. Internationally, Meloni has embraced moderation as a currency to purchase credibility, autonomy, and market reassurance. Domestically, she has pursued a program resonant with the core tenets of the radical right: institutional centralization, cultural conservatism, strong-state security, and restrictive migration governance.

This dual trajectory suggests that Meloni’s ideological repositioning is best understood as an instrumental adaptation to governing constraints, rather than a deep programmatic conversion. The resulting political formation is neither a fully normalized center-right party nor an untransformed radical-right movement, but a hybrid structure calibrated to maximize executive durability under conditions of economic fragility and European scrutiny.

Economic Challenges and the NRRP Implementation

The Central Role of Recovery Funds

The heart of Italy's immediate economic future is the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), funded by €194.4 billion from the EU (€71.8 billion in grants and €122.6 billion in loans). Italy is one of the European countries at the forefront of NRRP implementation and the first to have requested the sixth and seventh installments. By the end of 2024, Italy had obtained €121.6 billion from the European Union to finance its NRRP.

Current Economic Performance

After a modest contraction in the second quarter of 2025, GDP growth stabilized in the third quarter, with annual growth for 2025 now forecast at 0.4%. Investment is expected to gain momentum, buoyed by the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) through non-residential construction projects, although net exports are projected to subtract from overall GDP growth.

The European Central Bank estimates the NRRP will boost Italy's GDP by 1.4 points by 2026 in a scenario of high absorption of European aid. However, labour productivity is set to continue declining in 2025, as employment is projected to rise by 1%—creating what economists describe as an "employment without productivity" paradox.

The Implementation Paradox and the Growth Cliff

The government has struggled to spend NRRP funds as quickly as planned. The delay stems not from Meloni's ideological shift but from a lack of administrative capacity at local and regional levels—the very weakness the NRRP's associated reforms aim to address. This creates what can be described as an "implementation paradox": productivity is declining in the short term even as employment remains high.

It stands to reason to expect that this slow implementation pace creates critical risks. The NRRP funding is set to conclude, and investment is forecast to slow down significantly in 2027, with household consumption expected to become the main growth driver. The balance of probabilities suggests that if necessary structural reforms to boost long-term productivity, female labor force participation, and digital skills are not completed before 2027, the economy risks hitting a "growth cliff." This would mean the economic gap with Northern Europe will deepen in the long term..

Fiscal Discipline and Public Debt Dynamics

Progress on Deficit Reduction

Italy has made notable strides in reducing its budget deficit. For 2025, the government now forecasts a general government deficit of around 3 percent of GDP, down from earlier estimates of roughly 3.3 percent. This improvement is largely attributed to stronger-than-expected tax revenues, underpinned by a buoyant labor market and enhanced tax compliance. 

If these projections are confirmed, Italy could potentially exit the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure a year ahead of schedule, a signal of restored fiscal credibility.

Over the past two years, under Prime Minister Meloni’s government, the headline deficit has more than halved. In 2024, Italy returned to a primary surplus, according to the IMF, reinforcing investor confidence.  Indeed, credit rating agencies have taken notice: Moody’s upgraded its outlook on Italy to “positive”, citing improved fiscal metrics, political stability, and better-than-expected revenues.

The Debt Challenge

Despite these gains, Italy’s public debt remains a formidable challenge. In December 2024, debt reached 135.3 percent of GDP, a level that is projected to climb further in coming years. According to the European Commission’s spring 2025 forecast, the debt ratio may rise to 136.7 percent in 2025, and even reach 138.2 percent by 2026. 

Why is debt increasing even if the primary balance is improving? Key factors include:

1. Interest-growth rate differential: The “snowball effect” remains adverse. Even with a primary surplus, debt servicing costs continue to outpace the growth of the economy. 

2. Stock-flow adjustments: Past tax-credit schemes—especially housing renovation credits (the “Superbonus”)—are still affecting cash flows, contributing to upward pressure on borrowing needs.

IMF and EU staff recommend a more forceful consolidation path. The IMF’s 2025 Article IV consultation urged Italy to achieve a primary surplus of 3 percent of GDP by 2027, through a combination of policy measures: better tax compliance, phasing out inefficient incentives, and rationalizing tax expenditures. 

However, this adjustment strategy poses political risks. Interest expenditure is projected to remain above 4 percent of GDP in the medium term, putting sustained pressure on the public finances. Maintaining fiscal discipline without eroding public support or undermining the broader political agenda will require deft policymaking.

The Demographic Time Bomb

The Scale of the Challenge

Italy’s demographic outlook is deeply worrying and poses a structural threat to fiscal sustainability. According to the IMF, the working-age population is projected to decline sharply, with double-digit losses anticipated between 2024 and 2050. United Nations projections suggest Italy’s population may shrink by 10 percent by 2040 (and possibly 17 percent by 2050) under a low-fertility scenario; the working-age population could decline by 19 percent by 2040, and up to 31 percent by 2050

Istat data reinforce this trend: as of 2025, the working-age cohort (ages 15–64) is expected to contract by more than 20 percent over 25 years, while the proportion of residents older than 65 could increase from about 24 percent today to 34.6 percent by 2050. Meanwhile, Italy’s birth rate hit a historic low, with fewer than 370,000 births in 2024, continuing a decades-long decline. 

Economic Implications

This demographic decline exacerbates preexisting structural weaknesses. A shrinking working-age population reduces the pool of labor available for innovation, investment, and productivity growth—precisely at a moment when Italy needs more human capital, not less. The IMF warns that without significant reforms, demographic headwinds could erode potential growth.

Specifically:

• Labor force participation: The IMF insists on measures to increase employment, especially among women, such as improving childcare provision and removing tax disincentives for dual-earner households. 

• Human capital and skills: Upskilling through education and on-the-job training is crucial to mitigate the loss of working-age population and foster innovation. I

If implmented, a reform package along these lines could boost average annual GDP growth by 0.1 to 0.4 percentage points during 2025–2050, according to IMF estimates. 

Navigating the Trade-Offs

The path ahead for Italy is fraught with difficult trade-offs:

1. Short-term austerity vs. social cohesion: Reaching a 3 percent primary surplus by 2027 requires substantial fiscal effort, which risks political backlash, especially if it undermines popular social programs or investment momentum.

2. Reform urgency: Without aggressive labor and productivity reforms, demographic decline could overwhelm fiscal consolidation efforts. Delaying action may force even harsher adjustments later, as debt servicing emerges as a more binding constraint.

3. Sustainability of public investment: Maintaining NRRP-backed and other public investments is essential for long-term growth. But these investments must be balanced with the need to rein in borrowing and reduce debt vulnerability.

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Italy's Trajectory in the European Union to 2036

Geopolitical Positioning and Mediterranean Strategy

Italy’s prospects in the European Union through 2036 will be shaped by the interplay between its domestic political-economic trajectory and a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. Under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Rome has pursued a more assertive international posture, grounded in the conviction that Italy’s strategic value lies in its position as Europe’s primary interlocutor in the Wider Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean Anchor

A central pillar of Italy’s strategy is the Mattei Plan, which Meloni has sought to align with the EU’s Global Gateway initiative. The European Commission’s commitment of €150 billion for Global Gateway projects in Africa has effectively elevated the Mattei Plan from a national initiative to a cornerstone of the EU’s southern strategy. The alignment strengthens Italy’s diplomatic leverage in Brussels and positions Rome as a policy entrepreneur in areas—energy security, supply-chain diversification, and migration governance—that are increasingly critical to the EU’s external action.

Between 2023 and 2025, Meloni played a leading role in shaping EU-level agreements with Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. These deals, focused on migration containment and economic stabilization, have become a template for the EU’s emerging “Mediterranean compacts” model. The balance of probabilities suggests that Italy will consolidate its status as the EU’s geopolitical anchor in the Mediterranean, provided it can maintain political stability and administrative capacity to deliver on these agreements.

Meloni’s ability to forge coalitions among southern and eastern member states on migration management has given Rome influence disproportionate to its formal institutional weight. As the EU moves toward a more security-driven external policy, Italy’s centrality in managing the migration-energy nexus is likely to deepen.

Atlanticist Positioning

Italy’s longstanding Atlanticist orientation remains the bedrock of its security strategy. Meloni has repeatedly underscored that “the security of the Alliance’s external borders is indivisible”, signaling unwavering support for NATO at a time of shifting US priorities. Italy formally reached the 2 percent of GDP NATO spending target in 2025, facilitated in part by revised accounting of defense-related expenditures and accelerated procurement.

Rome has also advocated for permanent flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact for defense investments, arguing that European security imperatives require a rethinking of fiscal orthodoxy. By 2036, Italy is likely to remain aligned with a more defense-integrated EU—provided the Union resolves the tension between enhanced fiscal discipline and soaring defense expenditures.

Influence and Constraints within the EU

Despite its heightened diplomatic activism, Italy’s influence remains constrained on core EU dossiers. On fiscal governance and migration policy, Rome often still operates within frameworks shaped primarily by Franco-German compromises. Italy also remains the only euro-area member state that has not ratified the European Stability Mechanism reform, a stance popular domestically but perceived in Brussels as a sign of ambivalence toward deeper economic integration.

Yet Meloni has carved out a unique geopolitical role: she is viewed as the closest mainstream European leader to Donald Trump, a position that could turn Italy into a strategic “bridge” between Washington and European capitals. This dual alignment could either amplify Italy’s relevance or expose it to geopolitical risks if divergences between US and EU priorities widen.

The next decade will test whether Italy can leverage this intermediary position into institutional influence—or whether it risks marginalization if forced to choose between transatlantic loyalty and European strategic autonomy.

Political Alignment and the European Right

Meloni’s domestic consolidation of power has reverberated across Europe, energizing the radical and sovereignist right. Her decision in 2025 to hand leadership of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group to former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki frees Meloni to operate as a stateswoman above the fray of European parliamentary politics, while ensuring that ECR remains ideologically aligned with her brand of conservatism.

By 2036, the balance of probabilities suggests the emergence of a more structured pan-European right-wing bloc, with Meloni’s party—Fratelli d’Italia—serving as a central pillar. Such a bloc could shift the EU’s gravitational center toward a model emphasizing:

• national sovereignty over supranational legal authority,

• stricter border protection,

• conditionality in development assistance, and

• a more transactional approach to EU solidarity mechanisms.

This evolving political landscape could reshape EU governance. A stronger right-wing coalition may obstruct or delay reforms vital for addressing collective challenges—from the climate transition and digital competitiveness to fiscal integration and joint defense procurement. In this sense, Italy’s ascent within the European right could paradoxically complicate the EU’s capacity to act collectively, even as Rome gains more political weight.

Scenario Analysis: Italy in the EU by 2036

1. Baseline Scenario (Most Probable)

In the baseline scenario, Italy in 2036 is a stable but structurally constrained middle power within the EU. Meloni—or a political successor aligned with her positioning—maintains a broadly conservative but institutionalist orientation. Italy preserves its status as the EU’s Mediterranean anchor, shaping Brussels’ policies on migration, energy interdependence, and relations with North Africa.

Economically, growth remains modest. Italy narrowly avoids a post-NRRP “growth cliff” thanks to partial reform implementation and selective productivity gains in digitalization, green industries, and logistics. However, demographic decline continues to erode potential growth, leaving Italy’s economy incrementally larger but not fundamentally transformed.

Politically, Italy occupies an increasingly visible—yet not decisive—position. Its influence is strongest where its interests align with broader EU objectives (Mediterranean strategy, migration compacts, energy diversification), but more limited where deeper integration is required (fiscal governance, institutional reform). A more structured European right-wing coalition emerges in the European Parliament, with Italy as a leading voice but operating within the EU’s traditional consensus-driven architecture.

Outcome: A stable but bounded Italy—important, regionally influential, but still constrained by demographics and its inability to fully capitalize on the NRRP decade.

2. Optimistic Scenario (High-Performance Transformation)

In the optimistic case, Italy uses the post-2025 window to execute decisive reforms in productivity, digital skills, female labor participation, and high-skilled immigration. Administrative capacity improves, allowing Italy to absorb and deploy the final tranches of NRRP funds efficiently, creating a multiplier effect throughout the economy.

By 2036, Italy becomes the EU’s pivotal Southern policy-shaper, co-authoring the Union’s Mediterranean strategy and spearheading energy corridors, critical raw material routes, and migration partnerships. Italy’s role as mediator between Washington and Brussels strengthens rather than weakens its European standing, enabling it to bridge Atlanticist and strategic autonomy camps.

Economically, productivity accelerates in advanced manufacturing, green technologies, pharmaceuticals, and AI-assisted services. The working-age population still shrinks, but skill intensity and labor participation partially offset the demographic drag. Public debt stabilizes and begins to decline gradually after 2030.

Politically, Italy becomes the dominant force within a consolidated European right bloc, shifting the EU’s center of gravity toward a flexible-integration model that blends sovereignty with selective supranational action.

Outcome: A re-energized Italy—innovative, outward-looking, structurally modernized—cementing itself as Europe’s indispensable Mediterranean power.

3. Adverse Scenario (Fragmentation and Decline)

In the adverse scenario, Italy fails to complete essential reforms before the NRRP expires in 2026. Investment falls sharply in 2027–2028, triggering the very growth cliff economists warn about. Productivity stagnates, female labor participation stalls, and skilled emigration accelerates. Debt rises above 150% of GDP by the early 2030s amid weak growth and high interest expenditure.

Geopolitically, Italy’s relevance declines. The Mattei Plan loses momentum due to underfunding and administrative bottlenecks, while rival actors—France, Germany, and external players like China and Turkey—expand influence in the Mediterranean. Italy’s refusal to ratify deeper economic integration mechanisms increasingly isolates it within the Eurozone.

A weakened economy erodes Italy’s diplomatic leverage. Rome becomes more reactive than agenda-setting, forced to align with larger powers while losing the ability to lead migration or energy negotiations. Domestically, political stability frays as the socio-economic pressure of demographic decline intensifies.

Outcome: Italy enters 2036 as a structurally weakened, demographically shrinking, politically inward-facing economy—a cautionary tale of missed opportunities during a once-in-a-generation reform window.

Policy Implications: What Italy Must Do to Shape Its 2036 Trajectory

1. Lock In Productivity Reforms Before the NRRP Window Closes

• Complete the digitalization of public administration.

• Streamline procurement and accelerate local administrative capacity.

• Expand incentives for automation and AI adoption in SMEs.

2. Address the Demographic Crisis With a Multi-Pillar Strategy

• Female labor participation: Expand childcare, enforce equal-pay rules, and reform joint taxation.

• Skilled immigration: Create targeted “Mediterranean skills corridors” aligned with the Mattei Plan.

• Reversing brain drain: Tax incentives and career-path commitments to retain high-skilled youth.

3. Fiscal Strategy: Sustainable Consolidation Without Undercutting Investment

• Preserve space for defense, green, and digital investment through SGP flexibility clauses.

• Phase out inefficient tax incentives and broaden the tax base through compliance modernization.

• Preserve the primary surplus while protecting high-multiplier public spending.

4. Strengthen EU Influence Through Coalition-Building

• Deepen ties with Mediterranean member states (Spain, Greece, Malta, Croatia) on energy and migration.

• Position as indispensable interlocutor between Brussels and Washington.

• Prepare for variable-geometry integration by shaping—not resisting—new EU governance models.

5. Institutional Strategy

• Ratify the ESM or negotiate a face-saving alternative mechanism.

• Push for EU-level solutions to long-term care, pension sustainability, and defense procurement, reducing pressure on national budgets.

These combined actions would not eliminate Italy’s demographic and fiscal constraints, but they would give the country a realistic path to achieving the optimistic scenario.

Conclusion: Italy at the Crossroads 

Italy in 2036 is projected to be a more politically stable and internationally assertive nation, increasingly central to the European Union’s engagement with the Southern Mediterranean. Under Giorgia Meloni, Italy has regained a level of domestic stability not seen in decades, while becoming a key architect of the EU’s migration, energy, and neighborhood policy. The period of Italy as the habitual outlier in Europe’s fiscal debates appears, for now, to have receded.

Yet beneath this political consolidation lies a far more fragile economic foundation. The balance of probabilities suggests that Italy’s long-term strength will depend entirely on whether it can break from its historical pattern of low productivity, slow reform uptake, and demographic decline. With the working-age population projected to shrink by nearly 30 percent over the next quarter century, Italy’s growth prospects hinge on radical improvements in productivity, female labor participation, and the attraction of skilled migrants. Without these, the foundations of Italy’s fiscal and geopolitical revival may prove brittle.

Meloni has secured the political house; the challenge now is to renovate its structural supports. The window offered by the NRRP, running only through 2026, constitutes a finite and non-renewable opportunity to modernize Italy’s economic base. Whether Italy can use this final phase effectively will determine whether 2036 finds the country standing as a revitalized European leader or as a demographically contracting economy grappling with the compounded effects of inaction.

The trajectory toward 2036 is therefore contingent, not predetermined. It depends on the interplay between Meloni’s political acumen and the profound structural constraints that no government—however stable—can circumvent through willpower alone. Italy’s story over the next decade will be one of racing against demographic and economic clocks. The outcome will matter not only for Italy’s prosperity, but for the strategic orientation, cohesion, and global relevance of the European Union itself.