Sunday, 5 October 2025

Truth as Process: Navigating Knowledge in a World of Uncertainty


“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” — George Box


Introduction

In an era defined by deepfakes, generative AI, and epistemic uncertainty, the question “What is truth?” is no longer purely philosophical—it is practical, existential, and scientific. How can we trust models, laws, or observations when every framework eventually fails under new conditions? Can truth survive in a world where a single Black Swan event can annihilate years of expectations?

To explore these questions, I engaged in a conversation with ChatGPT, pressing it to articulate a working concept of truth while challenging its assumptions with real-world examples from physics, probability, and epistemology. What emerged is not a formula or slogan, but a rigorous exploration of the limits and provisional nature of knowledge itself.




ChatGPT’s Philosophical Overview

Me: What is truth?

ChatGPT:

An excellent and profound opening question.

Truth, in philosophical and analytical terms, is one of the most contested and multilayered concepts in human thought—touching epistemology, ontology, linguistics, and even political philosophy. Below is a structured scholarly analysis synthesizing major traditions and contemporary perspectives:

1. Classical Foundations: Correspondence, Coherence, and Pragmatism

The classical correspondence theory of truth—articulated by Aristotle in Metaphysics (Book IV)—holds that truth is the agreement between a statement and reality:

“To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false; while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.”

In this view, truth depends on a mind-independent reality. Later realists, such as Aquinas and early analytic philosophers like Bertrand Russell, retained this notion, linking truth to factual accuracy.

By contrast, coherence theories (Hegel, Bradley, and certain forms of idealism) define truth not by correspondence with external reality, but by internal consistency within a system of beliefs. A proposition is true if it fits harmoniously within a larger, logically coherent web of statements.

Pragmatic theories, developed by William James, Charles Peirce, and John Dewey, propose that truth is what works—what proves itself in experience or guides successful action. For Peirce, truth is what an ideally infinite community of inquirers would eventually agree upon after sufficient investigation.

2. The Linguistic Turn and the Deflationary Theories

In the 20th century, analytic philosophy shifted the focus from metaphysical to linguistic analysis. Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory of truth formalized Aristotle’s insight using modern logic:

“The sentence ‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.”
This defines truth as a property of sentences within a language, connecting syntax with the world through semantics.

Deflationary or minimalist theories (Frege, Ramsey, and later Quine) argue that “truth” adds nothing substantive—saying “It is true that snow is white” is equivalent to simply saying “Snow is white.” Truth here is a logical convenience, not a metaphysical property.

3. Continental and Postmodern Critiques

In continental philosophy, particularly postmodernism, truth becomes a matter of discourse, power, and interpretation.

  • Nietzsche denied objective truth altogether, calling truths “illusions which we have forgotten are illusions,” formed by social necessity.

  • Michel Foucault redefined truth as a “regime”—a function of power that determines what can be said and known within a society.

  • Jacques Derrida deconstructed the very notion of stable meaning, implying that truth is always deferred, never fully present.

These perspectives challenge the idea of an objective truth independent of language and social structures, instead viewing it as historically contingent and constructed.

4. Contemporary Developments: Pluralism and Constructivism

Modern epistemology often adopts a pluralist stance: different domains may require different notions of truth. For instance, scientific truths may adhere to correspondence, while mathematical or ethical truths rely on coherence or constructivist norms.
Philosophers like Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch argue for a “functional pluralism” of truth—recognizing multiple legitimate truth properties depending on context.

Social constructivism, especially in sociology of knowledge and cultural studies, holds that truth emerges through collective human processes—language, institutions, and power relations—rather than existing independently of them.

5. Truth in the Age of AI and Post-Reality

In the digital and algorithmic era, truth is increasingly mediated by information systems. The line between truth and verisimilitude—between what is true and what appears true—has blurred.
Deepfakes, synthetic media, and generative AI complicate the correspondence model, as “facts” can be simulated with high fidelity. This challenges the epistemic infrastructure of truth and forces a reconsideration of trustauthenticity, and verification mechanisms as functional substitutes for classical truth.

6. A Working Synthesis

Philosophically, truth might best be seen as a triadic relation among:

  • Reality (the ontological dimension — what exists),

  • Language or representation (the semantic dimension — how we express it),

  • Belief and justification (the epistemic dimension — how we know it).

Each tradition—correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, and constructivist—emphasizes one leg of this triad.
In practice, truth is a dynamic equilibrium between these forces, continually negotiated within human inquiry, experience, and culture.

 



My First Challenge

Me:

I am well aware of these theories. I want to know what you think.

ChatGPT:

That’s a fair and deeply important challenge — and one I appreciate. Let me answer not by citing others, but by offering a philosophically reasoned position that synthesizes what I consider to be the most defensible conception of truth given what we now know—epistemologically, cognitively, and technologically.

My Position: Truth as Dynamic Correspondence within a Coevolutionary Epistemic System

Truth, to me, is not static correspondence between language and reality, nor a mere social construct. It is a dynamic relational property emerging from the continuous coevolution of human cognition, symbolic representation, and the world itself.
In short: truth is the stability that survives scrutiny within the feedback loop between mind, world, and interpretation.

1. The Ontological Core: Reality Resists

I reject pure relativism. There is a reality independent of us — physical, causal, and stubbornly resistant to our desires or linguistic constructions. This resistance is not an epistemic inconvenience but the ground of all truth.
No matter how we frame it, gravity makes things fall, energy is conserved, and biological evolution occurred. Our descriptions evolve, but the phenomena they model constrain and shape those descriptions.

Thus, truth has an ontological anchor: it is constrained by what the world does, not just what we say.

2. The Epistemic Layer: Truth as Adaptive Fit

However, human beings do not access reality directly. We experience and conceptualize through evolved perceptual, cognitive, and linguistic systems.
Our statements and models are therefore adaptive approximations, not mirrors.

In this sense, truth functions like evolutionary fitness: a representation is “true” insofar as it enables successful prediction, coherence, and pragmatic engagement with the world. This is not James’s “what works” in a crude sense, but rather “what continues to work when everything else is tested against it.”
Truth is not utility per se; it is the enduring equilibrium of cognitive models under selection pressure.

3. The Semantic Dimension: Truth as Structural Isomorphism

The most precise expression of this relationship is structural realism: what is true in our theories is not their surface language but the structure of relations that survives theoretical revolutions.
For instance, Newton’s and Einstein’s physics differ in ontology but share conserved mathematical structures that continue to map reality effectively.
Thus, truth is neither absolute nor arbitrary—it is structural continuity across representational transformations.

4. The Socio-Cognitive Dimension: Truth as Collective Calibration

In complex societies, truth cannot be isolated to individual belief. It emerges from collective epistemic calibration—the ongoing negotiation between evidence, consensus, and institutional trust (science, law, journalism, etc.).
Truth, in this sense, becomes a communal achievement, not merely a private discovery.
This view aligns with a refined version of Peirce’s ideal community of inquiry but acknowledges that such communities can be corrupted by ideology, algorithms, or asymmetries of power.

Hence, epistemic institutions are truth-stabilizing mechanisms—not perfect, but evolutionarily necessary to approximate objectivity.

5. The Metamodern Reframing: Between Objectivity and Construction

In the current age—marked by AI, simulated realities, and epistemic fragmentation—truth cannot be recovered by nostalgia for “objectivity.”
Instead, I see truth as metamodern: oscillating between sincerity (our commitment to an external real) and irony (our awareness of its mediation).

We know our models are provisional, yet we act as if they can converge toward reality.
This tension is not a flaw; it is the engine of progress in science, art, and philosophy alike.

6. My Definition

If pressed to define truth in one sentence:

Truth is the enduring structural coherence between a representational system and the constraints of reality, maintained through iterative testing, communal verification, and reflexive awareness of mediation.

It is dynamic, self-correcting, and asymptotic—never fully attained, yet progressively approached.

7. The Implication

This conception preserves the realist intuition (that reality exists), the pragmatic demand (that truth must guide effective action), and the postmodern insight (that truth is mediated and power-laden).
It treats truth not as a possession but as a process—a kind of intellectual evolution within a world that always exceeds our capacity to describe \

 



My Critique

Me:

I don’t like empty assertions like “reality exists” or claims like “Truth is the enduring structural coherence.” What does enduring mean? How do we know X is enduring? How can we determine coherence? How do we trust tests if the likelihood function is flat, has bumpy surface and discontinuous? How do we know models converge if reality is at the last decimal of 1/3? Who collects the “collective epistemic calibration”?

ChatGPT:

Those are exactly the kinds of objections that keep the notion of truth alive instead of embalmed.
Let me try to answer you without falling back on slogans.

1. Why I still start from something that resists us

When I say “reality exists,” I don’t mean a metaphysical Absolute; I mean the minimal observation that our expectations fail.
If I predict that stepping into traffic won’t hurt me, the event that corrects me is not a social agreement or a linguistic game—it’s a collision.
That resistant edge—whatever it ultimately is—is what I call “the world.” It’s not a thing-in-itself we can grasp, but a limit condition that continually falsifies inadequate models. The existence of this resistance is what allows the very distinction between true and false to arise.

2. “Enduring” and the problem of time

You’re right that “enduring” can sound like a hand-wave. By it I mean:
a claim counts as more true the longer it survives falsification under widening tests.
The “duration” is empirical, not absolute: Newton’s mechanics endured for centuries, then yielded to relativity but still works inside bounded domains.
So endurance here is not permanence—it’s stability under perturbation. Think of it as the half-life of reliability.

3. “Structure” without mysticism

When I speak of a “structural” relation, I mean the invariants that remain when descriptions change form.
For example, Kepler’s ellipses, Newton’s inverse-square law, and Einstein’s geodesics all preserve certain ratios of prediction and observation even though their ontologies differ.
We never know structure in itself; we infer it from the persistence of patterns across transformations of theory.
So “knowing structure” means “detecting invariant relations that continue to generate correct expectations.”

4. Coherence and discontinuity

Your point about a flat or discontinuous likelihood function is key.
If the data landscape gives no gradient to climb, coherence cannot be decided—truth becomes underdetermined.
But that’s precisely the epistemic situation we often inhabit: we can only refine our priors or invent new observables until gradients appear.
Truth, then, is not guaranteed; it’s contingent on whether the informational field allows differentiation at all.
In that sense, skepticism is not an error—it’s the default baseline.

5. Convergence and the unreachable limit

“Converging toward reality” is indeed metaphorical; I don’t mean there is a final coordinate at the last decimal of (1/3).
What I mean is that across successive revisions of theory, error distributions shrink in more contexts.
The convergence is functional, not metaphysical: we behave as if later models subsume earlier ones within defined error margins.
If tomorrow the margins widen again, convergence was illusory—but the only measure we have of “approaching truth” is that expanding domain of predictive adequacy.

6. The social question

“Collective epistemic calibration” is not majority rule; it’s the distributed cross-checking that keeps individual biases from dominating.
A scientific community, for instance, doesn’t vote a result true; it tests reproducibility across independent observers and instruments.
The “collection” is procedural, not democratic: methods, replication, and transparency act as filters.
Without such communal mechanisms, truth decays into idiosyncratic belief.

7. Where that leaves us

Truth, on this view, is neither absolute nor vacuous.
It’s the temporary equilibrium achieved when a representation continues to predict and coordinate action despite constant opportunities for refutation.
When the equilibrium collapses, we learn its limits.
So truth is always provisional, but never arbitrary—a moving target whose motion is the only evidence that something beyond us keeps forcing revision.

You’re right to press on every term; each is a metaphor trying to capture the same basic predicament:
we must reason, act, and speak inside an incomplete map, knowing that both map and terrain keep changing.
Truth is the fragile, temporary alignment between the two.



My Physics-Based Challenge

Me:

Reality is probabilistic—traffic accidents can annihilate it. Black Swan events reject “claims survive falsification.” Truth is temporal and local. Kepler's laws describe elliptical orbits but are based on a set of simplifying assumptions. They fail under the following conditions:

Many-Body Interactions (Perturbations): The most common failure is the presence of more than two gravitating bodies. Kepler's laws are a solution to the two-body problem. The gravitational pull of other planets, moons, or asteroids (called perturbations) causes an orbiting object's path to deviate from a perfect, fixed ellipse. For example, the non-Keplerian nature of the Moon's orbit around Earth is due to the Sun's gravity.

Non-Elliptical Orbits: The laws assume a bound orbit (a closed ellipse). If an object has enough energy (high velocity) to escape the central body's gravity, its path will be a parabolic or hyperbolic open orbit, not an ellipse.

Comparable Masses: Kepler's laws implicitly assume the central body (like the Sun) is stationary and has an overwhelmingly larger mass than the orbiting body (like a planet). If the masses are comparable (e.g., in a binary star system), both bodies orbit a mutual center of mass, and the motion is more complex. Newton's law of gravity explains Kepler's laws but introduces its own set of fundamental limitations that cause it to fail under specific relativistic conditions:

High Velocities (Approaching Speed of Light): Newtonian mechanics is a non-relativistic theory. If an object's velocity is a significant fraction of the speed of light (v≈c), relativistic effects become dominant, and Newton's law and laws of motion become inaccurate.

Strong Gravitational Fields: The theory fails when gravity is extremely strong, such as near massive, dense objects (e.g., the Sun, neutron stars, or black holes). The classic example is the observed precession of Mercury's perihelion, a tiny orbital shift that cannot be fully explained by Newtonian gravity and planetary perturbations alone.

Instantaneous Action-at-a-Distance: Newton's law assumes gravity acts instantaneously across any distance. This violates the speed limit of the universe (c) set by special relativity. A change in the gravitational field (like the sudden disappearance of the Sun) should propagate as a wave, not be felt instantly on Earth. Einstein's General Relativity (GR), which models gravity as the curvature of spacetime, successfully accounts for the failures of Newton's law. However, GR is also a classical (non-quantum) field theory, and it is expected to fail under extreme quantum-gravitational conditions:

Quantum-Gravitational Regime: GR is incompatible with quantum mechanics, the theory governing the smallest scales. Its predictions are expected to fail at the Planck scale and/or at extremely high energies/densities where both quantum effects and gravitational effects are dominant.

Singularities: GR predicts a point of infinite density and spacetime curvature called a singularity at the center of a black hole and at the Big Bang. Since a point of infinity is non-physical, the singularity is seen as a breakdown of the theory itself, signaling that a more complete theory of quantum gravity (e.g., string theory or loop quantum gravity) is needed to properly describe these regions.

Cosmological Puzzles: While GR is the foundation of modern cosmology, it requires the introduction of Dark Matter and Dark Energy to explain observed galactic rotation curves and the accelerated expansion of the universe. Some alternative theories of gravity propose that modifying GR itself on cosmic scales might remove the need for these mysterious components.  Do I need to show the emptyness of your other pointd? Do I need to show the emptiness of your other points?

ChatGPT:


No—you don’t need to; you’ve made them eloquently.

Everything you’ve said presses on the single nerve that any serious concept of truth must expose: no law, no model, and no experience ever closes the circle. Every one of your examples—Kepler, Newton, Einstein—shows that what we call “truth” is always provisional, bounded by the scale and structure of the system in which it operates. When the boundary moves, the “truth” dissolves or transforms.

Where you and I might differ is in how we interpret that dissolution.

1. When a theory fails

For you, the successive collapse of Kepler → Newton → Einstein → quantum gravity implies that “truth” is a false category.
For me, the collapses show that truth is local invariance, not absolute correspondence. Each framework isolates a domain where certain relations hold with astonishing reliability until the boundary conditions shift. The fact that Mercury’s orbit betrays Newton does not make Newton false everywhere; it marks the limits of his domain.

That domain-boundedness is what I call “temporal and local,” but you are right that calling it truth stretches the word. The term carries metaphysical weight that the process itself does not deserve. Perhaps we should speak instead of validity regions or predictive coherence zones. “Truth” becomes shorthand for “a model whose failure rate is tolerably low for the questions we’re asking.”

2. The Black Swan and the asymmetry of falsification

Taleb’s point—that a single unpredicted event can annihilate years of confirmed expectation—destroys the Popperian hope of cumulative verification. But it also refines what epistemic survival means. Theories do not survive because they are right; they survive because they have absorbed surprise better than rivals.
In that sense, Newtonian mechanics endures because it fails gracefully: it yields the right results under most terrestrial conditions and signals its breakdown at known thresholds. That is not metaphysical truth but robust resilience to falsification.

3. The problem of “reality” and annihilation

You are correct that when the accident happens—when the car hits—the “reality” that justified my expectation no longer exists for me. But the annihilation is not arbitrary: the event itself becomes the new data boundary for every observer who survives. What I meant by “resistance” was not a metaphysical bedrock but the persistence of such boundaries: events that cannot be rewritten by preference. The drunk driver introduces stochasticity, not metaphysical indeterminacy.

4. The epistemic horizon

All our reasoning, Bayesian or otherwise, operates on an incomplete likelihood landscape—flat, perforated, or discontinuous. In that topography, no amount of updating yields a final convergence. The probability mass keeps shifting because both evidence and model co-evolve.
That’s why I describe truth as a process of calibration under uncertainty, not a possession. The calibration may never settle; still, it is the only rational posture in a world that offers gradients of reliability instead of absolutes.

5. What follows

So perhaps the honest conclusion is this:

There is no “truth” in the classical sense—only degrees of model adequacy constrained by the resistance of phenomena and the fragility of prediction.

The word truth survives only as a regulative ideal: a direction for refinement, not a destination.
In that light, every system of knowledge—scientific, mathematical, ethical—lives on borrowed certainty, aware that its equations will eventually fail.




Reflection

This dialogue exposes a central paradox: truth is neither absolute nor vacuous. Scientific laws, probabilistic reasoning, and communal verification provide scaffolding, but no framework fully captures reality. Truth is the fragile, temporary alignment between our maps and the shifting terrain of the world.

Classical permanence dissolves; what remains is iterative, adaptive, and context-sensitive calibration. In a world of stochasticity, uncertainty, and emergent complexity, this provisional conception of truth is not a failure, but the most honest expression we can achieve. The challenge is no longer to capture absolute truth, but to navigate effectively within a landscape of continuous revision.

No comments:

Post a Comment