Introduction
As Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives in New Delhi on December 4-5, 2025—his first visit to India since the war in Ukraine began—India's delicate geostrategic balancing act between its deeply entrenched partner, Russia, and its ascending strategic ally, the United States, enters a critical phase. The upcoming 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit and the ongoing complexities in Indo-American relations underscore New Delhi's steadfast commitment to strategic autonomy amidst a fragmenting global order. The core challenge for India is transforming its relationship with the United States into a genuine strategic partnership without entirely jeopardizing its long-standing, indispensable ties with Russia. This balancing act has become more precarious than ever, with India facing unprecedented pressure from Washington while simultaneously deepening its engagement with Moscow.
The significance of this moment extends beyond bilateral relations. India's diplomatic maneuvering represents a critical test case for middle powers seeking to preserve strategic autonomy in an increasingly polarized international system. As the United States and its Western allies pressure nations to align definitively against Russia, and as China extends its influence across the Indo-Pacific, India's ability to maintain constructive relationships across this divide carries implications for the future architecture of global order. The December 2025 summit occurs at a particularly fraught juncture: U.S. tariffs have substantially increased the economic cost of India's Russia relationship, yet New Delhi's security imperatives and energy requirements make a complete rupture with Moscow strategically untenable.
The Enduring Pillar: Deepening Indo-Russian Ties Amid Western Pressure
The Historical Foundation and Contemporary Challenges
The India-Russia "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" traces its lineage to the Cold War era, when the Soviet Union emerged as India's most reliable security partner and diplomatic supporter. This relationship survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union and has adapted to the dramatically altered geopolitical landscape of the twenty-first century. However, the partnership is now being tested and reinforced simultaneously. The latest developments, driven by Russia's urgent need for non-Western partners following its international isolation and India's imperatives for security and energy, highlight Moscow's proactive steps to safeguard the relationship from Western pressure.
The contemporary Indo-Russian relationship operates within a complex web of constraints and opportunities. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally altered its position in the international system, transforming it from a major global power with extensive European economic ties into an increasingly isolated state dependent on partnerships with non-Western nations. For Russia, the India relationship represents not merely a diplomatic asset but a strategic necessity—a counterweight to its growing dependence on China and a demonstration that it retains significant partnerships beyond the Sino-Russian axis.
From India's perspective, the Russia relationship serves multiple strategic functions. Most immediately, it ensures the continuity of defense supplies for a military arsenal that remains 60-70 percent dependent on Russian-origin equipment. Beyond materiel considerations, the relationship provides India with leverage in its complex triangular dynamic with Russia and China, helping to prevent a scenario wherein Russia becomes entirely subordinate to Beijing's strategic interests. Such an outcome would severely constrain India's own strategic space vis-à-vis China, with whom India maintains a contested 3,488-kilometer border and has experienced deadly clashes as recently as 2020 in the Galwan Valley.
Defense and Logistics: A New Stage of Military Integration
A significant and timely development is the ratification of the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistic Support (RELOS) agreement by the Russian State Duma on December 2, 2025, just two days before Putin's arrival. This pact, which facilitates mutual use of military facilities, port calls, and logistical support for joint exercises and humanitarian missions, marks a profound step toward deeper military integration between the two nations.
The strategic architecture of RELOS extends far beyond routine logistics cooperation. The agreement enables India's Navy and Air Force to access Russian military facilities across the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, and potentially in the Mediterranean Sea, expanding India's operational reach significantly into regions where it has historically lacked strategic access. The pact regulates not only the movement of troops and equipment but also the logistics tied to those deployments, including replenishment of supplies such as fuel, rations, and spare parts, enabling sustained deployments in critical regions far from Indian territory.
For India, the RELOS agreement opens up potential cooperation in strategically vital areas, particularly the Arctic region where New Delhi seeks to secure greater energy supplies and establish a presence in one of the emerging theaters of geopolitical competition. India's Arctic interests have grown substantially in recent years, driven by climate change opening new maritime routes and making previously inaccessible hydrocarbon resources exploitable. The Arctic region contains an estimated 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its undiscovered natural gas, making it a priority for energy-hungry nations like India. RELOS facilitates Indian naval and research vessels' access to Russian Arctic ports and facilities, potentially accelerating India's engagement with this strategically important region.
For Russia, RELOS provides strategic access to the Indian Ocean, offering a counterbalance to the expanding presence of other navies, particularly China's increasingly assertive naval deployments in the region. The Indian Ocean represents a critical strategic theater for Russia, both as a conduit for its energy exports and as a region where it seeks to maintain influence and project power. Russian warships have become increasingly regular participants in joint naval exercises with India, and RELOS formalizes the infrastructure that makes such cooperation operationally sustainable. The agreement essentially provides Russia with a strategic foothold in a region where China has been making substantial inroads through its Belt and Road Initiative, the establishment of its first overseas military base in Djibouti, and growing port access across South Asia and East Africa.
The symbolism of RELOS extends beyond its operational implications. At a time when Russia finds itself increasingly isolated from Western security architectures—having been effectively expelled from European security cooperation and facing a dramatically expanded NATO—RELOS demonstrates that Moscow retains the capacity to forge meaningful security partnerships with major non-Western powers. For India, entering into such an agreement despite intense Western pressure demonstrates a willingness to prioritize its own strategic calculus over Western preferences, reinforcing its credentials as a genuinely independent strategic actor.
Future Defense Acquisitions: Maintaining the Pipeline
India's defense procurement plans signal a continuing commitment to the Russian defense partnership despite New Delhi's ongoing efforts to diversify its supplier base. India plans to open discussions on acquiring Russian Su-57 fighter jets and an advanced S-500 missile defense system during President Putin's visit this week, with talks expected to focus on next-generation Russian platforms that could fill critical gaps in India's fighter fleet and air defense architecture.
The Su-57 represents Russia's entry into the fifth-generation fighter category, featuring stealth capabilities, supercruise performance, advanced avionics, and sensor fusion comparable to Western fifth-generation aircraft like the F-22 and F-35. For India, the Su-57 offers several strategic advantages. Indian pilots and maintenance crews possess extensive experience with Russian aircraft systems, having operated Sukhoi and MiG platforms for decades. This familiarity reduces training time and integration challenges compared to transitioning to Western platforms. Additionally, Russia has historically been more willing than Western suppliers to engage in technology transfer agreements, co-development arrangements, and licensed production—critical considerations for India's push toward defense manufacturing self-sufficiency under its "Atmanirbhar Bharat" (self-reliant India) initiative.
India's interest in the S-500 air defense system reflects both satisfaction with the performance of the S-400 systems already in Indian service and recognition of evolving aerial threats. India is in talks to procure five more regiments of the S-400 Triumf air defense system, taking the total number to an eventual ten. Sources indicate the S-400s performed exceptionally well during Operation Sindoor—India's military response to Pakistani drone and missile attacks—and recorded their longest hit ever during the conflict. The S-500, representing a generational advancement beyond the S-400, offers enhanced capabilities against hypersonic missiles, extended range, and the ability to target satellites and other space-based assets.
Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov confirmed that the Su-57 will be on the agenda during the visit, calling it the best aircraft in the world, though he cautioned about competitors who might engage in unfair practices to dissuade India from the purchase. This statement reflects Russia's awareness that Western powers, particularly the United States, are likely to pressure India against proceeding with major Russian defense acquisitions, potentially threatening sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
While major contracts are not expected to be signed during the summit, the discussions signal India's intent to maintain the defense pipeline despite diversification efforts. The conversations represent what might be characterized as a statement of intent—a diplomatic signal that India's Russia relationship remains robust despite Western pressure. The accelerated delivery of the remaining S-400 Triumf air defense systems and addressing critical maintenance and spare parts for India's substantial Russian-origin military inventory remain immediate priorities. With an estimated 60-70 percent of India's military equipment being of Russian origin, ensuring the continued availability of maintenance support, spare parts, and technical expertise is not merely a procurement issue but a fundamental national security imperative.
India's defense secretary articulated this strategic continuity clearly, stating that India's defense cooperation with Russia is long-standing and the nation does not intend to stop it anytime soon. This public affirmation, delivered in the immediate lead-up to Putin's visit, represents a deliberate signal to both Moscow and Western capitals about India's strategic priorities.
Energy and Trade: Navigating Sanctions and Seeking Adaptation
Energy has become the primary driver of the contemporary bilateral partnership, though it now faces unprecedented challenges from Western sanctions and American diplomatic pressure. India's purchase of Russian crude rose from less than one percent of total oil imports before the war in Ukraine to a peak of almost 40 percent, making India the biggest buyer of Russian seaborne crude. This dramatic shift reflected straightforward economic logic: Russia, facing a collapse in its traditional European energy markets due to sanctions, offered substantial discounts to Asian buyers, while India, perpetually concerned about energy security and cost, seized the opportunity to secure cheaper supplies.
However, this economically rational arrangement has become a major irritant in Indo-American relations. On August 27, 2025, the United States imposed a 25 percent duty on India's Russian oil purchases on top of the 25 percent reciprocal tariffs, effectively doubling the tariff burden on many Indian exports to 50 percent. Furthermore, sanctions on Russian companies Rosneft and Lukoil were announced on October 22, taking effect on November 21, 2025, directly targeting the companies from which India purchases the bulk of its Russian crude.
The impact of U.S. pressure has been substantial. India has reduced its purchases of Russian crude oil for December deliveries, reflecting the growing impact of Western sanctions and ongoing trade negotiations with the United States. The U.S. sanctions precipitated an 8 percent increase in global Brent crude oil prices, with the price escalation projected to increase India's annual oil import expenditure by $6-7 billion. For an economy where energy imports already constitute a significant portion of the current account deficit, this represents a substantial economic burden.
President Trump has repeatedly claimed that India has "largely stopped" buying Russian oil, framing this as a victory for American pressure. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov indicated that the dip in Russian oil imports to India may last only for a brief period as Moscow plans to boost supplies to New Delhi, suggesting that both parties view the current reduction as tactical rather than strategic. The dynamics of the global oil market, the price differential between Russian and non-Russian crude, and India's fundamental energy security requirements suggest that New Delhi will continue seeking mechanisms to maintain access to Russian energy supplies, albeit potentially at reduced volumes and through more complex arrangements.
Workarounds and Payment Mechanisms: Financial Architecture Beyond the Dollar
Both nations are actively seeking solutions to payment challenges imposed by Western financial sanctions. Over 90 percent of bilateral trade payments are now conducted using the Russian ruble and the Indian rupee, marking a profound shift away from reliance on the U.S. dollar. This de-dollarization represents both a practical necessity—given restrictions on Russian banks' access to dollar-clearing systems—and a symbolic statement about the emerging architecture of non-Western economic cooperation.
The Reserve Bank of India removed the prior-approval hurdle for opening Special Rupee Vostro Accounts used to conduct international trade in rupees and crucially changed policy to allow rupee surpluses to be invested fully in Indian government securities. This policy adjustment addresses a significant challenge that had emerged: Russian entities accumulated large rupee balances in Indian banks with limited options for deploying these funds, creating a bottleneck in the payment system.
Russia is pitching for creating an architecture to insulate its trade ties with India from third-country pressures, with the Kremlin spokesperson calling for a new system of global trade where the payment system is not used as a political tool. This reflects a broader Russian objective—shared by China and several other nations—of developing alternative financial infrastructure that reduces vulnerability to Western sanctions. Discussions are expected on formalizing a new payment framework, possibly using the UAE Dirham as a bridge currency or integrating Russia's SPFS (System for Transfer of Financial Messages) with India's RuPay network, to facilitate transactions while circumventing Western financial infrastructure.
The technical complexity of these alternative payment arrangements should not be underestimated. The dollar-denominated global financial system benefits from network effects, deep liquidity, and established infrastructure built over decades. Alternative arrangements using local currencies or third-country bridges face challenges including exchange rate volatility, limited convertibility, and the need for new clearing and settlement mechanisms. Nevertheless, the India-Russia experience in developing rupee-ruble trade represents an important precedent for how determined nations can create workarounds to sanctions-based pressure.
Trade Growth, Imbalances, and Diversification
In the fiscal year ending March 2025, trade between India and Russia stood at $68.72 billion, heavily skewed in favor of Russia. Indian exports to Russia reached just $4.88 billion while imports stood at $63.84 billion, creating a trade imbalance of nearly 13:1. This asymmetry reflects the composition of bilateral trade: India imports primarily energy and defense equipment from Russia, while Indian exports consist largely of pharmaceuticals, tea, and light manufactured goods—sectors where bilateral trade remains relatively modest.
Both countries have set an ambitious target to expand bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2030. Achieving this goal will require substantial increases in Indian exports to Russia, necessitating both market access improvements and the identification of sectors where Indian products can be competitive in the Russian market. The acceleration of India's trade talks with the Eurasian Economic Union—comprising Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan—represents an extension of bilateral measures aimed at facilitating Indian export growth. The 18-month work plan adopted in August 2025 entails opening new EAEU markets to Indian micro, small, and medium enterprises, farmers, and fishermen.
Labor Mobility and Economic Cooperation: Beyond Traditional Trade
India and Russia are expected to sign a bilateral mobility agreement that will establish a framework for legal migration, protection of workers' rights, and expansion of skilled Indian manpower in Russia. Over 70,000 Indian nationals are expected to be officially employed across Russia by the end of the year. The agreement will establish a framework for the legal migration of skilled Indian workers to support Russia in sectors experiencing labor shortages, such as information technology services, construction, healthcare, and hospitality.
This labor mobility agreement addresses a concrete Russian need. Western sanctions and the departure of many Western companies from Russia have created skills gaps in numerous sectors, while the demographic challenges facing Russia—including population decline and the military mobilization for the Ukraine war—have exacerbated labor shortages. For India, the agreement provides opportunities for Indian workers in a market where competition from other source countries may be limited due to sanctions and political considerations.
The labor mobility framework also carries symbolic significance. Most labor mobility agreements are concluded between countries with strong economic integration and high levels of mutual trust. That Russia and India are formalizing such arrangements—even as the United States pressures India to distance itself from Moscow—demonstrates the continuing institutionalization of the bilateral relationship across multiple dimensions.
Connectivity and Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Long-term Strategic Projects
The acceleration of infrastructure connectivity projects aims to enhance trade resilience and Eurasian integration, counteracting geographical obstacles and sanctions-related hurdles. The Chennai–Vladivostok Maritime Corridor represents a direct maritime link between India's eastern coast and the Russian Far East, potentially reducing shipping times and costs for bilateral trade while bypassing chokepoints that might be subject to third-party pressure.
The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multi-modal transportation network connecting India with Russia via Iran and Central Asia, represents an even more ambitious connectivity project. By providing an alternative route to the traditional pathway through the Suez Canal, INSTC enhances India's connectivity to both Russia and the broader Eurasian region while reducing vulnerability to disruptions in maritime chokepoints.
Civil nuclear cooperation represents another pillar of long-term strategic collaboration. Apart from completing Phases II and III of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu—which will eventually comprise six reactors making it one of India's largest nuclear facilities—Rosatom has proposed building small modular reactors in Indian regions with limited grid infrastructure. A memorandum of understanding was signed with the Government of Maharashtra in April 2025, indicating expanding cooperation beyond the existing Kudankulam project.
Nuclear cooperation carries particular significance in the India-Russia relationship. The United States and most Western nations maintained nuclear technology embargoes against India for decades following its 1974 nuclear test, during which period Russia remained willing to cooperate on civil nuclear projects. Even after the 2008 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement partially lifted the American embargo, Russia has remained India's most significant partner in nuclear energy, both in terms of reactors under construction and the willingness to engage in technology transfer. As India seeks to dramatically expand its nuclear power capacity to meet growing energy demand while reducing carbon emissions, Russian cooperation remains indispensable.
The Convoluted Alignment: Challenges in Indo-American Geopolitics
The Strategic Imperative and Its Limitations
The Indo-American relationship, founded on a shared strategic imperative to counter China's regional assertiveness, has emerged as one of the most significant partnerships in contemporary geopolitics. The transformation from the Cold War era—when India and the United States found themselves on opposite sides of most international issues—to the current strategic convergence represents a remarkable evolution. The rise of China as a peer competitor to the United States and as a direct threat to India along their contested Himalayan border has created a foundation for partnership that transcends ideological differences and historical mistrust.
However, this relationship remains complex and often contradictory, marked by persistent differences on trade, divergent strategic priorities, and fundamentally different approaches to India's relationship with Russia. The current tensions illustrate that strategic convergence on China, while necessary, is insufficient to overcome other sources of friction.
Tariffs and the Russia Nexus: Unprecedented Economic Pressure
The most significant friction point in contemporary Indo-American relations is the U.S. imposition of punitive tariffs directly linked to India's Russian oil purchases. The United States doubled tariffs on many imports from India to 50 percent in August 2025, with President Trump following through on his threat to punish New Delhi for buying discounted Russian oil. President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order on August 6, 2025, imposing an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian imports linked to Russian energy trade, bringing total duties to 50 percent when combined with pre-existing reciprocal tariffs.
The economic impact on India has been substantial. The Indian government estimates the tariffs will impact more than $48 billion worth of exports, with Indian officials warning that the new duties could make exports to the United States commercially unviable, leading to job losses and slowing growth. The sectors most severely affected include textiles, pharmaceuticals, automotive components, and information technology services—industries that collectively employ millions of Indians and contribute significantly to India's export earnings.
The economic calculus for India is complex. A lack of a U.S.-India trade deal could mean revenue loss of $20 billion in trade surplus for India, while the cost advantage with Russian discounted oil was approximately $8 billion. Weighed only in monetary terms, trade with the United States is demonstrably more important for India than the savings from Russian oil purchases. However, this purely economic calculation overlooks crucial strategic considerations: energy security, the imperative of maintaining defense supply chains, and the long-term objective of preserving strategic autonomy.
The Trump administration's approach to tariffs represents a fundamentally transactional view of international relations, wherein partnerships are evaluated primarily through the lens of bilateral trade balances and immediate economic reciprocity. This approach sits uncomfortably with India's conception of strategic partnerships as multidimensional relationships that cannot be reduced to simple commercial metrics. The resulting tension has created what some analysts characterize as a crisis of trust in the bilateral relationship.
A Strategic Dialogue Disconnect: Divergent Threat Perceptions
Beyond the immediate tariff dispute lies a more fundamental challenge: Washington and New Delhi often operate with divergent strategic priorities and threat perceptions. Washington views the partnership primarily through the lens of the Indo-Pacific—a theater where China's military expansion, particularly its naval buildup and aggressive posturing in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, constitutes the central concern. American strategic planning envisions India as a critical component of a broader coalition to balance Chinese power in maritime Asia.
Conversely, India's immediate strategic concerns are rooted in the Indian Ocean Region and, even more urgently, its long-standing land border disputes with China. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops, brought home the reality that India faces an immediate, kinetic threat from China along their disputed Himalayan border. For New Delhi, the China challenge is not primarily about competing for influence in Southeast Asian waters or maintaining the status quo regarding Taiwan—it is about territorial integrity, border security, and the balance of power in South Asia.
This divergence in threat perception shapes each country's view of the Russia relationship. For the United States, India's continuing partnership with Russia is primarily viewed through the lens of the Ukraine war and Western efforts to isolate Moscow. From Washington's perspective, India's purchase of Russian oil provides Moscow with crucial revenue to sustain its war effort, while defense cooperation legitimizes a regime that has violated fundamental principles of international law.
For India, however, the Russia relationship is viewed primarily through the prism of the China challenge. Russian defense equipment remains critical to Indian military readiness, particularly for operations along the Himalayan border. Perhaps even more significantly, India fears that if Russia becomes entirely dependent on China—economically, diplomatically, and strategically—this would fundamentally alter the regional balance of power to India's disadvantage. A Russia completely subordinate to Chinese interests would be less likely to maintain the careful balance in its relationships with both India and China, potentially leaving India more isolated in its confrontation with Beijing.
This strategic dialogue disconnect means that even when both nations articulate shared objectives—such as maintaining a "free and open Indo-Pacific"—they often envision different operational implications and have divergent views about what sacrifices are acceptable in pursuit of these goals. The result is that American and Indian policymakers are, in the words of some analysts, often "talking past each other," using similar language while actually referring to quite different strategic concepts and priorities.
Erosion of Trust: The Credibility Deficit
A string of unexpected provocations from the White House, including the imposition of new punitive tariffs, has substantially eroded New Delhi's trust in the United States. While most analysts expect that the U.S.-India relationship will ultimately stabilize—the shared concern about China provides too strong a foundation for the partnership to collapse entirely—the damage to American credibility among Indian policymakers and strategic thinkers may prove difficult to repair.
Trust in international relations is built slowly through consistent behavior, demonstrated reliability, and the fulfillment of commitments. It can be destroyed rapidly through perceived betrayal or unpredictability. From the Indian perspective, the Trump administration's sudden imposition of tariffs—after years of American officials encouraging closer ties and deeper integration—represents precisely such a betrayal. Indian officials had been led to believe that the strategic partnership would insulate the bilateral relationship from transactional trade disputes. The tariffs demonstrated that this assumption was incorrect.
The credibility deficit extends beyond the immediate tariff issue. Indian policymakers increasingly question whether the United States can be relied upon as a consistent partner. Will American support for India persist through changes in administration? Will strategic commitments survive when they come into conflict with domestic political considerations? Can India depend on American defense supplies in a crisis, or might future administrations impose embargoes as occurred in the past?
These questions of reliability take on particular salience given India's consideration of major defense acquisitions from American manufacturers. Modern weapon systems represent multi-decade commitments. Fighter aircraft acquired today will remain in service for 30-40 years, requiring continuous supplies of spare parts, technical support, and periodic upgrades. India's bitter experience with defense embargoes—the United States cut off spare parts for American-origin equipment during India's 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan—creates institutional memory about the risks of depending on suppliers who might prove unreliable in crisis.
The Search for a Coherent Partnership: Quad and Multilateral Cooperation
Despite substantial tensions in the bilateral relationship, Indo-American cooperation continues in crucial multilateral frameworks, particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. The Quad represents an important institutionalization of Indo-Pacific security cooperation, even as it carefully avoids the formal alliance structures that India has traditionally eschewed.
At the 10th Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Washington on July 1, 2025, ministers announced the launch of the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative and the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership to be hosted in Mumbai in October 2025. These initiatives reflect the Quad's evolution beyond purely security-focused cooperation into economic and technological domains. The Critical Minerals Initiative addresses concerns about Chinese dominance of supply chains for materials essential to advanced technologies, from semiconductors to electric vehicle batteries, while the Ports of the Future Partnership aims to enhance maritime infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific.
The Quad has also demonstrated its capacity for humanitarian cooperation. Following the earthquake that struck central Myanmar in March 2025, the Quad contributed together over $30 million in humanitarian assistance to support affected communities. This humanitarian dimension serves multiple purposes: it demonstrates that Quad cooperation extends beyond military security, it builds goodwill among regional populations, and it provides an alternative to Chinese-dominated assistance mechanisms.
Naval cooperation through exercises like Malabar continues to deepen. Naval forces from Australia, India, Japan, and the United States successfully concluded Exercise Malabar 2025, held November 10–18 in and around the island of Guam, marking the 29th edition of the exercise. These multilateral naval exercises serve multiple functions: they enhance interoperability among participating navies, signal collective capability and resolve to potential adversaries, and maintain a visible presence in contested waters.
However, challenges to Quad cohesion have emerged. The Trump administration's tariffs and transactionalism have been especially damaging to international partnerships, raising questions among Quad partners about American reliability. Reports claiming the new U.S. National Defense Strategy will prioritize the Western Hemisphere call into question American focus on countering China in the Indo-Pacific. If the United States appears to be pivoting away from Asia—even rhetorically—this undermines the fundamental premise of the Quad as an American-backed security framework.
Nevertheless, the second Trump administration has signaled its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China's efforts to dominate the region. President Trump has mentioned his interest in visiting India later in 2025 to attend a Quad summit in New Delhi, suggesting that despite bilateral tensions, the multilateral framework retains White House support.
The Trade Hurdle: Stalled Negotiations and Mutual Frustrations
Progress on a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement between India and the United States has been frustratingly slow for both sides, often stalling over Indian tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods and India's reciprocal demand for preferential status in the U.S. market. The negotiating dynamics reflect deeper structural challenges in the economic relationship.
The United States seeks greater market access for its agricultural exports, particularly high-value products where American producers enjoy competitive advantages. However, Indian tariffs on agricultural imports reflect domestic political imperatives: Indian farmers constitute a massive voting bloc, and agricultural policy remains politically sensitive following recent farmer protests against proposed agricultural reforms. Opening Indian markets to American agricultural products risks domestic political backlash.
Conversely, India seeks preferential access to U.S. markets for its manufacturing and service exports, particularly in sectors like pharmaceuticals and information technology where Indian companies have developed competitive advantages. The United States, however, faces its own domestic political constraints: concerns about job losses in manufacturing states make expanded market access for imports politically difficult, regardless of the exporting country.
President Trump has indicated that trade talks with India were progressing well and suggested he could visit the country in 2026, calling Prime Minister Modi his friend and a great man. However, the Russian oil issue remains a persistent sticking point, with Trump repeatedly emphasizing that tariff reductions depend on India substantially cutting Russian oil imports.
This linkage creates a challenging dynamic. From the U.S. perspective, the linkage is straightforward: if India wants better market access, it must stop providing Moscow with revenue through energy purchases. From India's perspective, the linkage conflates separate issues—bilateral trade should be negotiated on its merits, not conditioned on India's relationships with third countries. This fundamental disagreement about the appropriate scope of trade negotiations reflects deeper differences about sovereignty and strategic autonomy.
The Paradox of Strategic Autonomy: India's Sophisticated Calculus
Managing Competing Imperatives
The geopolitical landscape of December 2025 finds India managing multiple paradoxes simultaneously. On one hand, maintaining robust ties with Russia is a crucial strategic hedge that ensures continuity of defense readiness and secures vital energy resources at competitive prices. This long-term, time-tested partnership also serves New Delhi's interest in preventing Moscow from falling into near-total dependence on Beijing—a scenario that would severely constrain India's own strategic space vis-à-vis China.
On the other hand, the burgeoning yet politically fraught strategic alignment with the United States is essential for counterbalancing China's rise in the maritime domain and accessing cutting-edge Western technology. According to Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group, Putin's visit indicates that India wants to maintain its relations with Russia, especially at a time when it sees the United States as unreliable and China as hostile. This succinct assessment captures India's strategic predicament: facing a hostile China and an unreliable America, India cannot afford to sacrifice its relationship with Russia.
The sophistication of India's approach lies in its refusal to accept the binary logic that increasingly dominates international relations. As great power competition intensifies, the international system appears increasingly structured around opposing camps: the U.S.-led West versus a Sino-Russian axis, with other nations pressured to choose sides. India's determined pursuit of strategic autonomy represents a rejection of this binary framework—an insistence that non-alignment remains viable and indeed necessary for protecting core national interests.
The Diplomatic Signals: Choreography and Substance
The choreography of Putin's visit itself sends important signals. The Kremlin has stated that Putin's visit is of great importance, as it provides an opportunity to discuss the entire extensive scope of Russia-India special and privileged strategic partnership in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, as well as cultural and humanitarian affairs, in addition to addressing current international and regional issues. The visit includes a private dinner hosted by Prime Minister Modi on December 4, representing personal rapport between the two leaders; a ceremonial welcome at Rashtrapati Bhawan, demonstrating the highest diplomatic protocol; bilateral talks at Hyderabad House; and a state banquet hosted by President Droupadi Murmu.
This elaborate ceremonial framework matters in diplomatic terms. Putin's first visit to India since the Ukraine war began occurs at a moment of maximum Western pressure on both Russia and India to downgrade their relationship. That India is rolling out the full ceremonial treatment—rather than organizing a low-key working visit that might deflect some Western criticism—represents a deliberate signal that New Delhi will not allow external pressure to dictate the conduct of its bilateral relationships.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov's comments have been particularly revealing about Russian thinking regarding the triangular dynamic. Peskov said Russia understands U.S. pressure on India over Russian oil but will not interfere in India-U.S. ties, noting that this pressure now shapes how Russia approaches its partnership with India. Peskov emphasized that Russia seeks to create an architecture for the relationship that must be free of any influence coming from any third country.
This Russian emphasis on creating a sanctions-proof architecture for the relationship reflects Moscow's determination to prevent the India partnership from becoming another casualty of Western pressure. Russia has watched as numerous countries, particularly in Europe, have substantially reduced or entirely severed economic ties under the weight of sanctions and political pressure. The loss of India as a major partner—especially given India's importance as an arms customer and oil buyer—would represent a strategic defeat for Russia, leaving it with diminished options beyond near-total reliance on China.
The Costs of Autonomy: Counting the Price
India's pursuit of strategic autonomy carries real costs. The 50 percent U.S. tariffs on Indian goods linked to Russian oil purchases represent the most visible economic price, potentially affecting $48 billion in exports and threatening jobs across multiple sectors. However, the costs extend beyond measurable economic metrics.
Diplomatically, India faces persistent criticism and pressure from Western nations regarding its Russia stance. Each vote India takes at the United Nations that refrains from condemning Russia—whether through abstention or opposition—generates negative commentary in Western media and capitals. Indian officials must repeatedly explain and defend their position, consuming diplomatic capital and creating friction with partners India values.
Within the broader strategic community, questions arise about whether India can truly be a reliable partner if it maintains close ties with Russia even as Russia prosecutes a war that has violated fundamental principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Some Western analysts and policymakers question whether India's commitment to the "rules-based international order"—a phrase frequently invoked in joint statements—is genuine if India continues supporting Russia economically during its war in Ukraine.
There are also opportunity costs. Closer alignment with the West might bring benefits that India foregoes by maintaining its Russia ties: potentially greater technology transfer, deeper intelligence cooperation, stronger security guarantees, and more favorable trade terms. The counterfactual—what India might gain by decisively choosing the Western camp—remains unknowable but is surely contemplated by Indian strategists.
The Logic of Non-Alignment 2.0
Despite these costs, India's leadership has consistently chosen to absorb them rather than fundamentally alter its approach. This reflects a considered strategic judgment, not mere inertia or sentimental attachment to Cold War-era partnerships. Indian policymakers assess that the costs of abandoning strategic autonomy—the loss of defense supply continuity, increased energy costs, reduced leverage with China, and the precedent of allowing external pressure to dictate fundamental policy choices—would exceed the costs of maintaining the current balancing act.
India's foreign policy is best understood as a sophisticated, interest-driven exercise in non-alignment 2.0. The original Non-Aligned Movement of the Cold War era was founded on the principle that newly independent nations should avoid entanglement in the superpower rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. While critics often characterized non-alignment as naive or unprincipled fence-sitting, its practitioners—including India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru—conceived of it as a strategic necessity for nations that were militarily weak, economically vulnerable, and focused on domestic development rather than great power competition.
Contemporary India's strategic situation differs markedly from the Cold War context—it is a rising power, not a newly independent vulnerable state—yet the logic of avoiding exclusive alignment retains force. In the current environment, non-alignment 2.0 reflects the judgment that maintaining diversified partnerships across ideological divides serves India's interests better than exclusive alignment with any single power or bloc.
This approach, which India sometimes describes through the Sanskrit concept of "Vishwamitra" (friend of the world), emphasizes engagement with all major poles of influence in the international system. India maintains strategic dialogues with the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, ASEAN nations, and increasingly with Middle Eastern powers and African nations. This omnidirectional engagement provides India with options, reduces dependence on any single partner, and maximizes its ability to shape outcomes on issues where it holds strong interests.
Critics argue that this approach is unsustainable—that as competition intensifies, fence-sitting becomes impossible, and nations will be forced to choose sides. There is historical precedent for this concern: the Cold War eventually forced many nations into closer alignment with one superpower or the other, as the costs and risks of neutrality grew too high. The current trajectory of U.S.-China competition, increasingly characterized by decoupling in critical technology sectors and competing alliance systems, suggests similar pressures may intensify.
However, Indian policymakers bet that several factors distinguish the current environment from the Cold War, potentially enabling sustained strategic autonomy:
First, the contemporary international system is more multipolar than the Cold War bipolar structure, with multiple significant power centers (U.S., China, EU, Russia, India itself) rather than just two superpowers. This multipolarity creates more space for middle powers to maneuver.
Second, economic interdependence, while fraying, remains substantially deeper than during the Cold War. Complete economic decoupling is more difficult and costly today, creating practical limits on how far great powers can push smaller nations to choose sides.
Third, India's own power and importance have grown substantially. A India of 1.4 billion people, the world's fifth-largest economy, nuclear-armed, and critical to any Asian balance of power, has greater agency than smaller nations that might be compelled to choose sides.
Fourth, the nature of contemporary challenges—from climate change to pandemic response to terrorism—requires cooperation across ideological lines, creating functional imperatives for continued engagement even amidst strategic competition.
Whether these factors prove sufficient to sustain India's strategic autonomy remains to be seen. The December 2025 moment represents a critical test: if India can maintain substantive partnerships with both Russia and the United States despite unprecedented pressure, it may establish a template for how middle powers can navigate an increasingly polarized international system.
Conclusion: The Long Game and Its Uncertainties
The success of Putin's December 2025 visit to New Delhi will be measured not by the signing of major military deals—none are expected—but by the extent to which it reinforces the strategic floor of the India-Russia partnership, thereby ensuring India's leverage in the complex trilateral dynamic with Russia, the United States, and China.
Putin's visit comes at a time of considerable strain on the bilateral relationship, with New Delhi under growing pressure from the West, and the United States in particular, to downgrade relations with Moscow. Yet India is navigating a difficult path in attempting to maintain close relations with both Moscow and the West, demonstrating its longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy, where it maintains engagement with all major poles of influence in the international system—referring to itself as a "Vishwamitra" or friend of the world.
The immediate deliverables from the summit—the RELOS agreement ratification, progress on defense cooperation, advances on payment mechanisms, the labor mobility framework, and enhanced connectivity projects—matter less than the broader signal the visit sends. By hosting Putin with full ceremonial honors at a moment of maximum Western pressure, India demonstrates that it retains the capacity and willingness to make independent foreign policy choices based on its own assessment of national interests rather than external preferences.
This demonstration of independence carries costs, as the 50 percent U.S. tariffs make painfully clear. However, New Delhi's leadership has evidently calculated that the costs of compromising strategic autonomy would be higher still. Abandoning or substantially downgrading the Russia relationship would leave India more vulnerable to Chinese pressure, more dependent on Western partners whose reliability is questioned, and would establish the precedent that external economic pressure can compel India to make fundamental strategic concessions.
The broader question—whether India's bet on strategic autonomy will prove sustainable as great power competition intensifies—remains open. Historical precedent suggests that as international rivalries sharpen, the space for neutrality typically contracts. The pressures on India to choose sides are likely to intensify rather than diminish, particularly if U.S.-China competition continues its current trajectory toward technological decoupling and potentially military confrontation over Taiwan.
Yet India possesses certain advantages that may enable it to sustain strategic autonomy longer than historical precedent might suggest. Its substantial population and economy, its importance to any Asian balance of power, its democratic system that generates domestic political constraints on alignment choices, and the practical reality that no major power can afford to entirely alienate India—all these factors provide New Delhi with leverage and options.
The Putin summit of December 2025 will be remembered as a moment when India, facing unprecedented pressure, doubled down on strategic autonomy. Whether this proves to be a successful defense of independent policymaking in a multipolar world or an unsustainable attempt to avoid necessary choices will depend on how the broader geopolitical environment evolves in the years ahead.
What remains clear is that India's leadership views strategic autonomy not as a luxury or a sentimental attachment to Cold War-era policies, but as a fundamental requirement for protecting core national interests in an uncertain world. The decisions made during Putin's visit—and the broader balancing act between Moscow and Washington that they represent—reflect a determined effort to preserve the strategic flexibility that India's leadership believes essential for navigating the turbulent geopolitics of the twenty-first century.
As the countdown to Putin's arrival concludes, India stands at a pivotal moment. The decisions made during this summit will not merely shape bilateral ties with Russia but will send powerful signals about India's vision for its place in the emerging multipolar order. In an era of intensifying great power competition, India's determined pursuit of strategic autonomy—however costly in the short term—represents a calculated gamble that maintaining diversified partnerships across ideological divides will ultimately serve its long-term national interests better than exclusive alignment with any single power. The world watches to see whether this gamble on multipolarity will pay dividends or exact an unsustainable price. The answer will shape not only India's future but may also determine whether strategic autonomy remains a viable option for other middle powers seeking to navigate an increasingly polarized international system.</parameter
