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Tuesday, 17 November 2026

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Why Taiwan’s Semiconductor Edge Resists Replication


Tacit Knowledge, Ecosystem Density, the Advanced-Packaging Chokepoint and the Limits of Agentic AI


Farid Novin


Revised assessment for G7 and G20 audiences · Information current to 16 November 2026

 


 

Summary Judgement

The proposition that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry “cannot be replicated” is neither a myth nor a law of nature. It is a statement about time, capital and compounding learning. Taiwan itself was assembled deliberately between the mid-1970s and the 1990s through technology transfer, returning diaspora talent and sustained state backing. What has changed is the price of admission. A leading-edge fab now costs tens of billions of dollars, the incumbent reinvests tens of billions of dollars every year, and the industry’s binding constraint has migrated from wafer fabrication to advanced packaging, where Taiwan’s lead is, if anything, more concentrated.

The evidence assembled to mid-November 2026 supports five conclusions. First, Taiwan’s dominance is intensifying rather than eroding: TSMC held about 72.5 percent of global foundry revenue in the second quarter of 2026, and its third-quarter revenue rose roughly 41 percent year on year in US dollar terms. Second, overseas fabs in Arizona, Kumamoto and Dresden are real and, in Arizona’s case, profitable, but they replicate a trailing node and rely on Taiwan for packaging, know-how and personnel. Third, public subsidy has bought capacity but not yet ecosystems; the United States is moving from grants towards equity stakes and tariff leverage, while the European Union is reorienting towards design, equipment and packaging under a proposed Chips Act 2.0. Fourth, the realistic policy objective is resilience through diversification and interdependence, not autarky. Fifth, agentic AI is already shortening design and engineering cycles, but it does not remove the physical, capital and data constraints on which the replication timeline depends, and it is more likely to reinforce the incumbent’s learning curve than to flatten it.

I. A Distributed Global Supply Chain

No country controls the whole semiconductor value chain. The industry rests on a specialised international division of labour in which each stage is dominated by a different group of economies, a pattern documented in the supply-chain mapping by Khan, Mann and Peterson at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (2021) and in the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group study of the same year, and popularised in Chris Miller’s Chip War (2022).

At the upstream end, chip design and the electronic design automation software that supports it are led by the United States, with firms such as Nvidia, Apple, AMD and Qualcomm designing the chips and Synopsys and Cadence dominating design software. The United Kingdom contributes through Arm, which licenses the processor architectures on which much of the world’s computing runs. Raw materials form the second stage. Japan supplies a majority of the world’s silicon wafers through Shin-Etsu and SUMCO and an estimated ninety percent of advanced photoresists through firms such as JSR and Tokyo Ohka Kogyo, while Germany adds wafers and specialty chemicals through Siltronic and BASF.

The third stage, manufacturing tools, is the most concentrated. The Netherlands’ ASML is the sole supplier of extreme ultraviolet lithography systems, which depend on optics from Germany’s Carl Zeiss. American firms such as Applied Materials, Lam Research and KLA, together with Japan’s Tokyo Electron, build the deposition, etching and inspection equipment that surrounds the lithography step. The fourth stage, fabrication, is where Taiwan and South Korea dominate: TSMC leads in contract manufacturing and leading-edge logic, while Samsung and SK Hynix lead in memory, with Samsung also contesting advanced logic. The fifth stage, assembly, testing and packaging, is led at the advanced end by Taiwan, where ASE Group is the principal outsourced provider and TSMC runs its own packaging lines, while China, Malaysia and Vietnam handle much of the high-volume conventional work.

Because every stage depends on the others, supremacy at one point confers leverage but not self-sufficiency. This is the structural fact against which both the Taiwan “replication” debate and the rival American and European subsidy programmes must be read.

II. Taiwan’s Position in 2026

TrendForce’s ranking of the world’s foundries, published on 9 September 2026, put TSMC at about 40.2 billion dollars of second-quarter revenue and 72.5 percent of the market, up from roughly 67.6 percent in early 2025. Samsung Foundry stood second at 5.9 percent and China’s SMIC third at 5.4 percent, the latter narrowing the gap with Samsung. Revenue share is not the same as capability, but the figures confirm that the AI cycle is concentrating, not dispersing, advanced manufacturing. Taiwan is also generally estimated to produce around ninety percent of the world’s most advanced logic chips, although precise figures depend on how “advanced” is defined.

TSMC’s own results illustrate the scale of the incumbent’s reinvestment. In its report of 15 October 2026 the company announced third-quarter revenue of about 46.7 billion dollars, up 41.2 percent year on year, with a gross margin of 66.4 percent. Two-nanometre technology already accounted for 8 percent of wafer revenue in its first full commercial quarter, alongside 33 percent for three-nanometre and 28 percent for five-nanometre. Management reaffirmed 2026 capital expenditure of 60 to 64 billion dollars, raised from an earlier range of 52 to 56 billion, said that 2026 to 2028 spending would be significantly higher than in the preceding three years, and indicated that two-nanometre capacity would more than double in 2027. A newcomer is therefore not chasing a stationary target. It is chasing a firm that spends more each year on equipment than most national industrial programmes commit in total.

Taiwan’s strategic position adds a geopolitical layer. The island’s centrality to global chip supply is widely described as a “silicon shield”: a deterrent that raises the economic cost of coercion or invasion and gives Washington and its partners an incentive to defend stability in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan operates with its own government, armed forces, currency and constitution, yet only twelve states maintain formal diplomatic relations with it, a number that has fallen steadily under pressure from the People’s Republic of China, which claims the island. Beijing’s sanctions in October 2026 on ministers from two of those twelve partners, Paraguay and Belize, show that this pressure continues.

III. Why Replication Is Difficult: Four Structural Barriers

Tacit knowledge and the yield learning curve

Buying the world’s most advanced equipment is only the starting line. Making an extreme ultraviolet scanner print reliably at volume requires thousands of interdependent adjustments in temperature, chemical purity, process timing and defect control, much of it held as unwritten engineering practice rather than as documentation. A fab earns money only if a high proportion of the wafers it starts emerge as working chips, a metric known as yield. Because TSMC manufactures for virtually every major designer, it processes far more wafers at each node than any rival and so identifies and eliminates defects faster. That produces a compounding knowledge advantage that capital alone cannot shortcut.

Intel’s experience is instructive. Its 18A process entered high-volume production at its Arizona Fab 52 around the turn of the year, yet public estimates of yields have varied widely, and as of November 2026 the company had not publicly announced a major external customer for its successor, 14A. Management has said that customer decisions on 14A are expected between the second half of 2026 and the first half of 2027, and that it will build 14A capacity only against firm commitments. The case shows that technical capability, a government shareholder and a state-of-the-art plant are still not sufficient without the volume that drives learning.

A hyper-dense local ecosystem

Over roughly four decades Taiwan clustered hundreds of specialised suppliers of chemicals, gases, wafers, equipment servicing and packaging around its fabs, most visibly at the Hsinchu Science Park, established in 1980. An engineer there can summon a specialist to fix a custom component or adjust a chemical formulation within hours. When TSMC builds abroad, it must import much of this capability. In Arizona it has relied on Taiwanese engineers and supply chains, and until packaging capacity is built locally, wafers fabricated in Phoenix must still be shipped to Taiwan to be completed into finished AI processors.

The overseas record is nonetheless more encouraging than the sceptics predicted. TSMC Arizona began volume production on four-nanometre technology in the fourth quarter of 2024 and reported first-quarter 2026 profit of 18.8 billion New Taiwan dollars, higher than for the whole of 2025. Its second fab, on three-nanometre technology, is scheduled for commercial production in the second half of 2027, and a third fab is under construction. In Japan, the second Kumamoto fab has been re-planned from a six-nanometre to a three-nanometre process. In Dresden, the European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, a joint venture in which TSMC holds 70 percent alongside Bosch, Infineon and NXP, remains under construction and loss-making, with production planned for 2027 on mature nodes. Overseas replication is therefore feasible at trailing nodes, with the leading edge, the learning loop and the packaging step still anchored in Taiwan.

Workforce culture and labour economics

Operating a leading-edge fab means continuous twenty-four-hour operation with almost no tolerance for error. Taiwan has a deep pipeline of master’s and doctoral graduates in physics and engineering prepared to work demanding shifts in cleanroom environments. In the United States, Germany and France, many top engineering graduates prefer the higher pay and flexibility of software and design roles, and labour regulation, union practice and wage levels raise operating costs. Estimates of the resulting Arizona cost premium vary widely, and a range of roughly twenty to fifty percent is often cited for the cost of chips relative to Taiwan. That should be read as an upper-bound estimate: it is moderated by subsidy, by TSMC’s scale in Arizona, and by customers’ willingness to pay for supply security. TSMC has indicated that it intends to use its growing Arizona scale to improve the cost structure.

The business-model trust barrier

TSMC pioneered the pure-play foundry model: it does not design or sell chips under its own brand, and so never competes with its customers. Apple, Nvidia, AMD and Qualcomm, who are rivals in many markets, therefore entrust it with their most sensitive designs. Integrated manufacturers that both design and sell their own chips, as Intel historically did, face an inherent conflict of interest in persuading competitors to place their intellectual property in the same factory. Intel’s separation of its foundry business, and Nvidia’s five-billion-dollar equity investment in Intel in 2025, are attempts to address that conflict, but trust accumulated over thirty-five years cannot be legislated.

IV. Advanced Packaging: The New Chokepoint

Advanced packaging has become the principal bottleneck in AI hardware because printing individual dies is no longer the hardest step. The hard part is wiring multiple ultra-expensive compute and memory chiplets together with microscopic precision. Packaging was once a low-technology final step: a protective shell around a single chip and metal pins for mounting on a board. For AI accelerators such as Nvidia’s Blackwell and Rubin generations it is now a leading-edge manufacturing process in its own right.

Why AI processors require advanced packaging

Three physical constraints push designers away from single monolithic chips. The first is the reticle limit: lithography tools can expose only a limited area in one shot, roughly 858 square millimetres, so greater computing power requires several smaller dies assembled side by side, in what is called 2.5D packaging, or stacked vertically, in 3D packaging. The second is the memory wall. AI workloads spend much of their time and energy moving data between processor and memory, so vertical stacks of high-bandwidth memory are placed within microns of the compute dies on a shared silicon interposer, delivering far greater bandwidth at lower power. The third is yield protection. A single defect on a very large die can ruin it, whereas smaller chiplets can be tested first and only the working ones assembled.

How the chokepoint formed

TSMC’s principal technology, CoWoS (chip-on-wafer-on-substrate), has been scaled faster than almost any manufacturing process in history. Industry estimates reported in the trade press and attributed to TrendForce put capacity at about 35,000 wafers a month in late 2024, around 130,000 by the end of 2026, and some 260,000 by the end of 2028, with growth concentrated in Taiwan at the AP7 complex in Chiayi. Even so, the company’s chief executive said in July 2026 that packaging capacity was so tight that it was limiting customers’ growth, which is to say that TSMC is rationing capacity. Estimates of 2026 demand are on the order of one million wafers, and analysts estimate a supply gap of around twenty percent narrowing towards ten percent by the end of 2026, with some forecasting that it could widen again in 2027.

Concentration is the second feature. Nvidia is estimated to have reserved nearly sixty percent of 2026 CoWoS supply, and the three largest customers, Nvidia, Broadcom and AMD, are estimated to account for more than eighty-five percent. Those figures are analyst estimates, not company disclosures. Reports from August 2026 suggest that Nvidia’s share will be diluted in 2027 as AMD and others gain allocation. A third feature is the unforgiving economics of assembly: a single misaligned connection can destroy a package containing logic dies and eight to twelve memory stacks worth tens of thousands of dollars, and large packages warp under heat, requiring specialised substrates and thermal control. A fourth is switching cost. Packaging rules are embedded in a chip’s design from the outset, so moving to Intel’s EMIB technology or to Samsung entails a costly redesign lasting months. Nonetheless, TSMC is now outsourcing part of the process to outsourced assembly and test firms such as ASE, which are estimated to add on the order of 50,000 to 60,000 wafers a month of related capacity in 2026, and Intel is positioning its packaging services as a second source.

The geopolitical consequence

The bottleneck undermines Western efforts to build domestic resilience. At present the first American CoWoS-class capacity is not due before 2028: Amkor’s roughly seven-billion-dollar campus in Peoria, Arizona, which has a ten-year agreement with TSMC and is targeted for volume production in early 2028, and TSMC’s own Arizona packaging facilities, which a senior executive said in April 2026 would come on line before 2029. Until then, wafers produced in Phoenix are returned to Taiwan to be packaged. A rational planner would therefore treat packaging, not wafer fabrication, as the more urgent target for diversification, and this logic is visible in the European Commission’s decision to prioritise advanced packaging and chiplets in its Chips Act 2.0 proposal.

V. Country Positions

The United States invents most of the world’s chip designs and design software and leads in research. It offshored most of its leading-edge manufacturing decades ago and now confronts slow permitting, high construction costs and a shortage of skilled construction trades. Its position is nevertheless strengthening at the margin through TSMC’s Arizona cluster and Intel’s 18A line.

China has the workforce, state funding and speed of construction to build fabs quickly, but is constrained by export controls on extreme ultraviolet lithography and advanced tools, which the United States, the Netherlands and Japan restrict. SMIC therefore relies on older deep ultraviolet machinery, with lower yields and higher costs at its most advanced nodes. Even so, its 2026 progress is notable: SMIC’s second-quarter revenue rose 20 percent sequentially to over 3 billion dollars, driven by mature-node and AI-peripheral demand, and analysts including the American Enterprise Institute have argued that advanced deep ultraviolet tools allow near-frontier chips to be printed at poor yields. Policy has also turned less predictable. In January 2026 the Bureau of Industry and Security moved licence review for Nvidia’s H200 and AMD’s MI325X to a case-by-case standard for China, subject to conditions, while Chinese customs authorities reportedly blocked the chips, and in August 2026 Nvidia wrote down about 400 million dollars of H200 inventory after Beijing restricted licensed sales. The question of chip access is on the agenda for the 33rd APEC leaders’ meeting in Shenzhen on 18 and 19 November 2026, at which President Trump and President Xi are expected to meet.

Japan was the world’s leading chipmaker in the 1980s and still dominates upstream materials and specialised equipment. It lost ground in logic manufacturing after missing the shift to the foundry model, and it faces an ageing engineering workforce. Its response is twofold: hosting TSMC at Kumamoto and backing Rapidus, a state-supported venture that aims to begin two-nanometre mass production in the second half of fiscal 2027 with cumulative government support approaching 2.5 trillion yen. A report of 10 November 2026 that the project is months behind on a key memory-circuit milestone, which the company has disputed, illustrates how hard it is to compress learning curves even with large subsidies.

South Korea leads in memory and in high-bandwidth memory, the other half of the AI accelerator, and remains the second source of leading-edge logic. Its foundry business is, however, losing ground: Samsung’s share of foundry revenue fell to 5.9 percent in the second quarter of 2026, and its leading-edge customers have largely remained with TSMC.

Germany and France play indispensable roles: Germany supplies the ultra-precise optics from Carl Zeiss inside ASML’s machines, and France hosts STMicroelectronics. European manufacturing is, however, concentrated in mature chips for vehicles and industry rather than cutting-edge AI processors, and high energy costs and regulatory burdens slow expansion. Intel’s 2025 cancellation of its planned thirty-billion-euro Magdeburg mega-fab removed the continent’s main prospect of a leading-edge logic plant.

VI. Policy Responses and Their Results

United States

The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 authorised about 52.7 billion dollars, of which 39 billion dollars was for manufacturing incentives and about 11 billion dollars for research and development, with the balance for defence microelectronics and international security programmes. It also provided an investment tax credit for fabs, which legislation in 2025 raised from 25 to 35 percent for qualifying projects that begin construction before the end of 2026. Rather than relying solely on American firms, Washington funded the world’s leading chipmakers to build on American soil, among them TSMC, Samsung, Micron and Intel.

The strategy has since shifted from grants towards equity and trade leverage. In August 2025 the Commerce Department converted about 8.9 billion dollars of awarded but undisbursed grants into a 9.9 percent passive stake in Intel. A narrow 25 percent Section 232 tariff on certain advanced computing chips has applied since 15 January 2026, with broad exemptions for United States data-centre, research and other uses, and no amendment to its scope had been issued as of mid-November 2026. The administration’s earlier threats of far broader tariffs were not implemented. On the same day, the United States and Taiwan signed an agreement under which Taiwanese firms will invest at least 250 billion dollars in American semiconductor, energy and AI capacity, Taiwan’s government will provide at least a further 250 billion dollars in credit guarantees, and companies building American capacity may import up to 2.5 times their planned output free of Section 232 duties during construction. A reciprocal trade agreement setting a 15 percent tariff ceiling on Taiwanese goods was finalised in February 2026. TSMC’s planned American investment has since been reported at about 265 billion dollars, and on its October earnings call TSMC said it was also looking at capacity outside Arizona.

Washington’s stated ambition is higher still. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has spoken of moving about forty percent of Taiwan’s semiconductor supply chain to the United States and earlier floated a “50-50” split of production, which Taipei rejected. Taiwan’s chief trade negotiator described the forty percent goal as impossible, and Taiwanese authorities maintain a rule, widely known as N-2, requiring overseas TSMC plants to trail the island’s most advanced technology by a set margin. Taiwan’s officials point to the island’s limits in land, water and energy and to the shortage of the “very special culture” required, while insisting that the best protection of the industry is to prevent war. Delivery to date is mixed: Arizona is producing and profitable, but construction delays, labour shortages and costs have pushed several Intel and Samsung timelines into 2027 and 2028.

European Union

The European Chips Act, adopted in 2023, aimed to mobilise 43 billion euros and to double Europe’s share of global production from about ten percent to twenty percent by 2030. Because Europe’s industrial base centres on cars and machinery, funding focused on pilot lines and on mature and specialised chips such as power electronics and automotive controllers. The results have been uneven. The European Court of Auditors concluded in 2025 that the twenty percent target was unlikely to be met, projecting a share of around 11.7 percent. Bruegel’s Policy Brief 12/2026 of 13 May 2026 judged that the Act had underdelivered in the scale of funding mobilised and in strategic coordination, noting that only 13.75 billion euros of state aid had been approved, and recommended that the revision pursue “indispensability” rather than self-sufficiency. The Commission’s own assessment, published with its proposal, offered a more favourable reading: investment has risen to about five times its pre-Act level, and without the Act Europe’s share would have fallen from 8.5 percent to 5.9 percent.

On 3 June 2026 the Commission proposed a Chips Act 2.0 (COM(2026) 504), which the Council’s Competitiveness Council discussed on 24 September 2026. As of the latest available information it remains a legislative proposal in the ordinary procedure. It places more weight on demand-side measures such as public procurement, supports both mainstream and advanced chips including AI chips, and concentrates on technology tracks where Europe has strengths: advanced packaging and chiplets, silicon photonics, power semiconductors and secure hardware. Its design confirms the diagnosis made here: Brussels has, in effect, pivoted from chasing cutting-edge fabs towards the stages of the chain where Europe is already indispensable.

Japan

Japan’s approach combines hosting a foreign leader, TSMC at Kumamoto, with a domestic champion, Rapidus, which the government has backed with cumulative support running into trillions of yen and a structure that preserves state influence over the company. The approach is consistent with the evidence in this essay: foreign anchor investment can be brought on shore comparatively quickly, whereas domestically developed leading-edge capability depends on customers and yield learning that cannot be subsidised into existence.

VII. How Taiwan Did It, and Why the Window Has Narrowed

In the late 1970s and 1980s Taiwan was a low-cost economy making textiles, toys and inexpensive electronics, with almost no local semiconductor supply chain and very few domestic doctorates in the field. Its success rested on a deliberate strategy of importing capability. In 1976 the government arranged for the American firm RCA to transfer an older chip-making technology and train a group of Taiwanese engineers in the United States. Through the 1960s and 1970s thousands of Taiwanese students had studied at leading American universities and worked at firms such as Texas Instruments, Intel and Bell Labs, and in the 1980s the government recruited experienced Taiwanese-American engineers home. The most famous was Morris Chang, who had spent about twenty-five years at Texas Instruments before founding TSMC in 1987 at the age of fifty-five, with state backing and a technology partnership with Philips. This “brain circulation” is analysed in AnnaLee Saxenian’s The New Argonauts (2006), and the wider East Asian pattern of state-led technology acquisition in Mathews and Cho’s Tiger Technology (2000).

Three differences make that route harder today. The first is scale of physics and capital. When TSMC launched, it began with mature technology measured in microns, years behind Intel and the Japanese leaders, and a fab cost a fraction of a billion dollars. Today leading-edge transistors are measured in a few nanometres, a single leading-edge fab is reported to cost in the range of 20 to 30 billion dollars, and a High-NA extreme ultraviolet tool from ASML costs close to 400 million dollars. A newcomer can no longer afford to learn on cheap, older equipment.

The second is the moving target. In the 1980s the industry was smaller and miniaturisation slower, which gave new entrants room to catch up while incumbents made strategic errors, notably their disdain for contract manufacturing, which delayed their adoption of the foundry model. Today TSMC reinvests the profits of a firm with more than 66 percent gross margins, spending tens of billions of dollars a year on capital equipment and research. A would-be competitor is not catching up with a stationary finish line but sprinting against an incumbent that compounds its lead.

The third is the political economy of dependence. The US-Taiwan agreement, the N-2 rule and the silicon-shield debate mean that Taiwan is itself a strategic actor in the replication question. Taiwanese policy seeks to be present abroad while keeping the leading edge, the research base and the packaging core at home. Replication is thus constrained not only by technology but by the incentives of the incumbent’s own government.

VIII. Can Agentic AI Compress the Timeline?

A natural objection is that the replication argument belongs to an earlier technological era. If autonomous software agents can now write and verify chip designs, tune process recipes and help run fabs, why can they not compress a forty-year head start into a much shorter period? The evidence to mid-November 2026 supports a more qualified answer. Agentic AI is real, is being deployed at scale by the incumbents themselves, and does shorten engineering cycles. But it acts chiefly on the cognitive and repetitive parts of the problem, which were never the binding constraints for a newcomer, and in several respects it strengthens the position of firms that already run large volumes.

What agentic AI can already do

In chip design, the main electronic design automation vendors have moved from assistants to agents. Cadence launched its ChipStack AI Super Agent on 10 February 2026 for front-end design and verification, with early deployment at firms including Nvidia, Qualcomm, Altera and Tenstorrent, and has since extended the approach to analogue design, digital implementation, and printed-circuit-board and advanced-packaging design. At the Design Automation Conference in July 2026, Synopsys announced long-running autonomous verification workflows. The vendors report large gains, including more than forty-fold faster validation of certain design blocks at Cadence and up to fifty-fold faster time to validated design at Synopsys, together with debug-cycle reductions of 25 to 40 percent in other workflows. These are vendor-reported figures measured against baselines that have not been independently published. They nonetheless matter, because verification is generally estimated to absorb well over half of the engineering effort in a modern chip project.

In manufacturing, Samsung told the Nvidia GTC conference in March 2026 that it is integrating agentic AI into fab quality management, equipment-alarm handling and yield diagnostics, supported by a full-scale digital twin of its Pyeongtaek fab, and its co-chief executive said at its AI Forum that agentic systems already run inside its fabs and design workflows. Applied Materials reported at SEMICON West in July 2026 that AI-based tools had cut the number of iterations needed to optimise etch-chamber uniformity from six to two. Notably, Samsung’s own description is that in yield management the agent recommends diagnostic actions rather than acting autonomously. The technology is therefore shortening engineering loops inside existing fabs, with humans still accountable for decisions.

Why it does not close the gap

The binding constraints are physical and financial, not cognitive. A fab cannot produce leading-edge wafers until its lithography tools are delivered, installed and qualified. In its second-quarter 2026 results ASML put its low-NA extreme ultraviolet capacity at about 65 systems for 2026, with a planned increase of 30 percent for 2027 and a further 30 percent under investigation for 2028, and its deep ultraviolet immersion capacity at about 130 systems. Industry reporting puts extreme ultraviolet lead times at well over a year, and the construction of a new fab shell at two to three years, with Samsung reportedly citing more than three and a half years between starting a fab and producing wafers. High-NA optics depend on a single German supplier, Carl Zeiss. No software agent can manufacture a scanner, pour a cleanroom, secure power and water, or accelerate permitting. The same logic applies to packaging, where new capacity depends on physical plants such as TSMC’s AP7 complex in Chiayi and Amkor’s Arizona campus, not on better software.

Tacit knowledge is learned from proprietary wafer data, and that data accrues to whoever runs the volume. Agents can only optimise a process from the sensor traces, inspection images and recipe histories that production wafers generate on a specific tool set, and these are closely held trade secrets. A firm processing the largest number of wafers at the leading edge therefore generates the richest training data, so AI tends to reinforce the yield learning curve described in Section III instead of flattening it. Published academic studies of fab-data yield prediction report only moderate accuracy, which is consistent with the continued need for experienced engineers. The case of Samsung is revealing. It is a deeply capitalised incumbent with in-house agentic systems and a digital twin, yet its foundry share fell to 5.9 percent in the second quarter of 2026, while TSMC’s rose to 72.5 percent. AI tooling did not substitute for process maturity and customer trust.

The tools diffuse to everyone, including the incumbent. Cadence and Synopsys sell their agents commercially, and the same capabilities are available to Taiwan’s designers and fabless customers. They raise productivity across the industry, so the relative advantage still depends on complementary assets: capital, volume, suppliers and customers. Moreover, chip design was never Taiwan’s distinctive edge. The United States leads in design, and the replication problem lies in manufacturing and packaging, where the constraints above bind.

Reliability and accountability limit autonomy where the stakes are highest. A mistaken recipe change in a fab costing tens of billions of dollars can scrap entire lots, and a flawed design can cost a tape-out. The deployments described above keep humans in the loop for consequential decisions, and that is likely to remain so until agents demonstrate reliability that is independently verified rather than vendor-reported.

Where agentic AI could change the picture

Three effects deserve recognition. First, agents may shorten the yield ramp of fast followers such as Intel’s 18A and 14A, Samsung’s two-nanometre process and Rapidus, which could reduce the number of months needed to reach commercial yields once they have customers. Second, AI addresses part of the workforce barrier identified in Section III, because it lowers the number of scarce senior engineers required for design verification and routine process tuning, which matters most for the United States and Europe. Third, AI-assisted design of chiplets and packaging could ease some of the engineering load in the packaging chokepoint, although not the physical capacity.

There is also a countervailing effect. Agentic AI is itself a principal driver of demand for the leading-edge processors and advanced packaging that Taiwan supplies. Applied Materials told investors in 2026 that agentic AI compute demand was growing significantly, and TSMC’s capital expenditure and CoWoS expansion are driven by that demand. AI thus raises the incumbent’s reinvestment capacity and the size of the moving target at the same time as it shortens some engineering tasks.

The net judgement is that agentic AI will modestly compress the learning curve for well-funded entrants that already have anchor customers and proprietary process data, and will help close the workforce gap at the margin. It is unlikely to collapse the replication timeline, because the critical path runs through tool supply, construction, supplier ecosystems, customer trust and accumulated production data, none of which software can substitute. This is a reasoned assessment on current evidence and should be revisited as independent measurements of agentic productivity in fabs become available.

IX. Strategic Interaction and Outlook to 2030

The strategic interaction can be read as a game among four sets of actors with partly misaligned interests. Washington wants leading-edge capacity on its soil and is willing to use tariffs and equity to get it. Taipei wants to preserve its indispensability and has the credible threat of withholding its most advanced nodes. TSMC wants to follow its customers while protecting its margins and its learning curve. Beijing wants to close its technology gap while exploiting the uncertainty that surrounds the island. These are the author’s judgemental assessments, not statistical forecasts, and they remain subject to updating as new information arrives.

On the evidence, the most probable path to 2030 is one in which Taiwan retains the large majority of the world’s leading-edge logic capacity, with the American share rising materially but remaining a minority as Arizona moves through three-nanometre in 2027 and then more advanced nodes. Taiwan remains the near-monopoly source of advanced packaging until the Arizona facilities reach volume in 2028 and later, after which the dependence loosens but does not disappear. Agentic AI is the principal upside risk to this path: it could shorten yield ramps for well-funded followers, but on the evidence in Section VIII it is unlikely to alter the ordering. A moderately likely variant is that Intel, Samsung and Rapidus secure a limited number of anchor customers, giving large customers a credible second source for some products, though probably at higher cost. A less likely but consequential variant is that China narrows the gap at mature and near-frontier nodes sufficiently to alter the economics of the trailing-node market. The lowest-probability, highest-impact scenario is a disruption in the Taiwan Strait, whose consequences for the global economy would be severe, and which is precisely what the “silicon shield” and the diversification programmes are intended, in different ways, to deter and to hedge.

X. Final Assessment

It is not a myth that a country can build a chip ecosystem from scratch. Taiwan proved it could be done over thirty to forty years, with strong state backing, imported talent and relentless execution. What is difficult today is compressing that forty-year head start into five, at the limits of atomic physics, against an incumbent that already captures the great majority of the industry’s profits and reinvests them continuously. The claim of non-replicability is therefore best restated: Taiwan’s edge is replicable in principle, but not within the political time horizons that subsidy programmes assume, and not at all without access to the tacit knowledge, supplier density and customer volume that cannot be purchased. Agentic AI shortens engineering cycles, but it does not shorten the delivery of lithography tools, the construction of fabs or the accumulation of production data.

For G7 and G20 policymakers four implications follow. Packaging, not fabrication, should be treated as the most urgent chokepoint, and capacity in the United States, Japan and Europe should be sequenced accordingly. Subsidies should be tied to anchor customers and to supplier-ecosystem development rather than to plants alone, since Intel’s and Rapidus’s experience shows that capacity without volume does not generate learning. And the objective should be to become indispensable in some part of the chain and interdependent with the rest, which is the lesson of Bruegel’s analysis for Europe and, in a different form, of Taiwan’s own approach to protecting its position. Finally, governments should treat agentic AI as a complement to, not a substitute for, investment in tools, ecosystems and anchor customers, and should fund independent measurement of its effect on fab yields and design cycle times so that policy does not rest on vendor claims.





Principal Sources

This revision relies on primary, official and peer-reviewed or institutional sources wherever possible. Figures marked in the text as estimates derive from industry analysts as reported in specialist and financial press and should be verified against primary releases before formal citation.

TSMC, Third Quarter 2026 Results, Form 6-K filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 15 October 2026; and TSMC third-quarter 2026 earnings call transcript, 15 October 2026.

TrendForce, Global Foundry Revenue Approaches US$53.49 Billion in 2Q26, 9 September 2026; TrendForce reporting on CoWoS capacity and on Rapidus (10 November 2026).

European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act 2.0), COM(2026) 504, with Staff Working Document SWD(2026) 504, 3 June 2026; Council of the European Union, presidency background note 12887/26 for the Competitiveness Council of 24 September 2026.

Poitiers, N. and Schenk, T., Revamping Europe’s chips strategy: indispensability, not self-sufficiency, Bruegel Policy Brief 12/2026, 13 May 2026.

European Court of Auditors, special report on the EU’s industrial policy for strategic autonomy in microchips, 2025.

US Department of Commerce, Fact Sheet: Restoring American Semiconductor Manufacturing Leadership Through an Agreement on Trade and Investment with Taiwan, 15 January 2026; Presidential Proclamation 11002, Adjusting Imports of Semiconductors, 14 January 2026; Bureau of Industry and Security final rule on advanced computing chip licensing, January 2026.

Intel Corporation, Form 8-K of 22 August 2025 on the Commerce Department equity purchase; Amkor Technology, investor presentation filed on Form 8-K, 2026.

Focus Taiwan (Central News Agency), reporting on TSMC Arizona and Kumamoto results, May 2026; Taipei Times, reporting on the N-2 rule, the “50-50” proposal and Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, 2025 and 2026; CNBC, reporting on the US-Taiwan agreement and Taiwan’s response, January and February 2026; Reuters factbox on Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, 2 May 2026.

Khan, S., Mann, A. and Peterson, D., The Semiconductor Supply Chain: Assessing National Competitiveness, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, 2021; Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era, 2021.

Miller, C., Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology, Scribner, 2022; Saxenian, A., The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy, Harvard University Press, 2006; Mathews, J. and Cho, D.-S., Tiger Technology: The Creation of a Semiconductor Industry in East Asia, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Cadence Design Systems, press release on the ChipStack AI Super Agent, 10 February 2026; Synopsys announcements of autonomous agentic workflows at the Design Automation Conference, July 2026; Samsung Semiconductor, report on its Nvidia GTC 2026 session on agentic AI in semiconductor manufacturing, March 2026.

ASML, second-quarter 2026 results and capacity statement, July 2026; Applied Materials, Form 8-K on third-quarter 2026 results, and remarks at SEMICON West, July 2026.

American Enterprise Institute, April 2026 report on deep ultraviolet lithography and Chinese chip production (Fedasiuk and Torres), as summarised in specialist reporting.


Monday, 16 November 2026


The Cost of American Maritime Hegemony and the Strategic Dividends  of Chinese Geoeconomic Expansion



The United States as the World's Policeman versus China as the World's Market-Maker



The Strait of Hormuz, Military Expenditure, Industrial Interdependence, Knowledge Formation, and the Changing Architecture of Global Power


A Strategic Economic and Geopolitical Assessment Prepared for the G7

Farid Novin



 Executive Assessment

The prolonged American military commitment in the Persian Gulf, particularly the deployment of substantial naval and air assets to the Strait of Hormuz during the 2026 conflict with Iran, raises a fundamental question about the changing economics of international leadership. The United States continues to provide much of the military infrastructure underpinning international maritime security. However, the financial, logistical and opportunity costs of maintaining this position are becoming increasingly apparent. At the same time, China is expanding its influence through a different mechanism: the development of industrial ecosystems, global production networks, infrastructure, technological capabilities, commercial relationships and increasingly important positions within international supply chains.

The distinction between these two approaches is more consequential than a conventional comparison of military expenditure and trade volumes suggests.

The United States exercises geostrategic influence through its ability to protect maritime routes, maintain military alliances, deter hostile actors and provide security guarantees. Its influence is therefore substantially connected to the provision of strategic public goods, although these goods are not distributed without conditions or geopolitical expectations. American naval power helps sustain the international commercial environment within which global trade takes place. Nevertheless, the maintenance of this security architecture requires continuous expenditure, military readiness, technological superiority and political willingness to accept risks on behalf of other economies.

China's expanding geoeconomic influence operates through a different institutional and commercial mechanism. Its manufacturing capacity, infrastructure investment, technological development, industrial financing and integration into global production networks generate repeated economic interactions. These relationships can create commercial familiarity, specialized expertise, technical cooperation, managerial experience and accumulated institutional knowledge. Such capabilities can become embedded in the economic organization of participating countries, making the relationship more durable than a conventional diplomatic or military agreement.

The distinction is particularly important when examining what may be called organic interdependence: a relationship in which participating economies acquire productive capabilities, develop complementary expertise, establish recurring commercial relationships and become increasingly familiar with one another's institutional and technological environments. This form of interdependence is not simply a matter of buying and selling goods. It involves the development of capabilities that make continued cooperation economically useful to both parties.

Recent OECD research provides significant empirical support for the increasing importance of this phenomenon. Its November 6, 2026, assessment of global production networks finds that China had become the largest producer of manufacturing value-added in 14 of 18 manufacturing industries by 2024, compared with none in 2000. China also emerged as the largest foreign supplier in approximately 40 percent of the country-industry relationships examined, compared with approximately 4 percent in 2000. These figures demonstrate a profound structural transformation in the geography of international production.

However, they also reveal a strategic vulnerability: all 79 partner economies examined in the OECD study depended more heavily on Chinese manufacturing value-added than China depended on their respective contributions. Consequently, the expansion of Chinese economic interdependence should not automatically be interpreted as the creation of balanced or mutually advantageous relationships.

The central argument of this report is that China's geoeconomic strategy has a greater capacity to create continuous, embedded and capability-generating interdependence, whereas America's geostrategic strategy remains indispensable for protecting the security environment in which much of that interdependence operates. Neither approach is sufficient by itself. The strategic challenge for the G7 is to preserve the benefits of American-led maritime security while developing a more productive, technologically sophisticated and institutionally reciprocal economic architecture.

The Hormuz conflict provides a particularly revealing illustration of the distinction. Washington is bearing substantial military and fiscal costs to maintain strategic leverage over a critical maritime corridor. Beijing, meanwhile, has opportunities to expand its commercial and diplomatic relationships with economies seeking diversified markets, infrastructure, industrial investment and technological cooperation. Yet China's own dependence on energy imports and international shipping means that it is not immune to the consequences of instability in the Persian Gulf,.

The resulting strategic competition is therefore not a simple contest between American military power and Chinese commercial expansion. It concerns which model of international influence creates the more sustainable institutional relationships, productive capabilities and political agency over the longer term.

I. The Strait of Hormuz: The Economics of Maintaining the Role of World Policeman

1. The strategic importance of the maritime corridor

The Strait of Hormuz occupies an exceptional position in the international political economy. It connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea and provides a critical route for international petroleum and liquefied natural gas shipments.

Its importance extends beyond the immediate interests of Iran,the Persian Gulf monarchies and the United States. Major Asian manufacturing economies, European energy consumers and international commodity markets are exposed to disruptions in this narrow maritime passage.

Consequently, the ability to maintain navigational security has implications for global inflation, industrial production, transportation costs, insurance premiums, sovereign fiscal balances and the stability of international financial markets.

The American naval presence in the region has historically provided an important element of this security architecture. However, the 2026 conflict has demonstrated that maintaining maritime access under conditions of sustained missile, drone and mine threats is considerably more demanding than maintaining a peacetime naval presence.

The American commitment is no longer simply a matter of deploying warships to demonstrate military superiority. It requires the continuous coordination of naval forces, air defence systems, intelligence networks, surveillance aircraft, logistics vessels, tanker aircraft, maintenance facilities and ammunition supplies.

These activities impose both direct financial costs and less visible opportunity costs.

2. The logistical vulnerability of the American naval deployment

One of the most consequential developments has been the damage inflicted on the American military infrastructure in Bahrain.

The United States Naval Support Activity Bahrain has historically served as the principal logistical and command centre for the Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces Central Command. Iranian missile and drone attacks during the opening phase of the conflict damaged command facilities, satellite communications infrastructure, warehouses and other buildings.

The Congressional Research Service reported on September 23, 2026, that preliminary estimates placed the damage to American facilities at a minimum of approximately US$400 million. The Chief of Naval Operations subsequently indicated that a return to the previous operating arrangements would not occur in the immediate future.

This development has forced the United States to reconsider the geography of its regional logistics network. Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, has assumed greater importance as a supporting facility for replenishment and logistics operations. The resulting supply route is approximately 2,200 miles, substantially longer than the short regional connections previously available.

The significance of this development is not limited to additional transportation expenditure. Longer supply routes increase fuel consumption, reduce the flexibility of replenishment schedules and place additional pressure on a finite fleet of combat logistics vessels.

They also complicate the coordination of ammunition, food, maintenance materials, aircraft components and other supplies required to sustain an extended deployment.

The vulnerability of the Bahrain logistics network therefore illustrates an important weakness in military systems designed around concentrated forward facilities. A strategically valuable base can simultaneously become a high-value target whose destruction or temporary incapacitation imposes costs throughout the wider operational network.

The United States retains considerable logistical capacity, and the relocation of supply activities does not demonstrate an inability to sustain operations. Nevertheless, the loss of a nearby regional hub increases the resources required to maintain the same operational presence.

3. The financial and opportunity costs of the conflict

The most authoritative public assessment of the financial burden is the Congressional Budget Office report of September 15, 2026, entitled Estimating the Cost of Combat Operations Against Iran.

The CBO estimated that the Department of Defense had incurred approximately US$38 billion in operational, logistical and sustainment costs by August 1, 2026.

This estimate includes the replacement of expended munitions and equipment lost in combat, increased flying hours, additional operations and higher fuel expenditure. It does not include all costs borne by other federal agencies or military operating expenses already incorporated into the ordinary federal budget.

The CBO estimated that the conflict would generate an additional US$2 billion per month if the level of violence remained relatively low, rising to approximately US$3 billion per month if operations returned to the intensity experienced in July.

A separate Pentagon estimate reported to Congress placed the cost at approximately US$43.6 billion through September 3, with subsequent reporting indicating an additional US$1.5 billion in fuel expenditure. These estimates should not be added together: they refer to different reporting dates and accounting presentations.

The composition of the expenditure is particularly important. The CBO identified approximately US$21.7 billion in munitions replacement costs, including a substantial expenditure on missile-defence interceptors. Increased flying hours accounted for approximately US$10.4 billion, while additional fuel expenditure accounted for approximately US$2.7 billion. Equipment losses represented approximately US$1.9 billion.

The greatest strategic concern, however, is not necessarily the immediate financial expenditure. It is the reduction in the availability of certain advanced military capabilities.

The CBO assessed that the United States had consumed between approximately one-half and two-thirds of its combined inventory of selected Patriot, THAAD, SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors since June 2025. It warned that replenishing these inventories could take five years or longer, even if production rates increased.

The importance of this assessment becomes apparent when considering the Western Pacific. A future military confrontation involving China could require substantial quantities of precisely these categories of defensive weapons.

The United States is therefore facing an opportunity-cost problem: resources employed in one strategic theatre are not simultaneously available for other contingencies.

This does not establish that American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific has collapsed. It does, however, demonstrate that the simultaneous management of several high-intensity strategic commitments can expose limitations in the defence industrial base.

The distinction between military expenditure and military opportunity cost is fundamental. The former measures resources already consumed; the latter measures strategic capabilities that cannot be deployed elsewhere because they have been committed, expended or placed under operational strain.

For a G7 assessment, this second category deserves particular attention.

4. The changing operational situation on November 16

The conflict has not reached a stable resolution.

As of November 16, the arrival of the USS Theodore Roosevelt in the CENTCOM area has brought the number of American aircraft carriers operating in the broader Middle Eastern theatre to three, according to reporting by the Associated Press.

The November 15 assessment by the Institute for National Security Studies described a regional posture of approximately two carriers, 13 destroyers and one cruiser, with additional destroyers operating under the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, while the third carrier group was approaching.

At the same time, maritime traffic through Hormuz remains severely disrupted. Reuters reporting on November 16, based on Kpler shipping data, indicated that only five commodity vessels had transited on Saturday, while none were registered on Sunday, compared with 31 during the preceding weekend.

These figures illustrate the continuing disruption of international shipping. They should not be interpreted as a complete measure of all vessel movements, particularly where ships operate with their automatic identification systems disabled.

The current situation also demonstrates the limitations of interpreting naval superiority as equivalent to the restoration of commercial confidence. A navy may retain the ability to escort vessels, conduct surveillance and threaten hostile forces without immediately restoring the willingness of commercial operators, insurers and energy companies to resume ordinary operations.

Commercial navigation depends on a wider institutional environment involving predictable rules, credible security guarantees, insurance availability, port infrastructure and confidence in the continuity of maritime passage.

The difference between military control and commercial normalization is therefore strategically important.

A naval force may establish considerable tactical control while the broader economic system remains impaired.

II. China's Geoeconomic Strategy: From Manufacturing Power to Global Market-Maker

1. A different architecture of international influence

Whereas American geostrategic influence is substantially exercised through security guarantees and military capabilities, China's international influence increasingly derives from its position within the production and distribution systems of the global economy.

The expression world market-maker is used here as an analytical description rather than an official Chinese policy designation.

It refers to an economy that increasingly influences the availability, cost, technological direction and organization of goods, services, industrial inputs and infrastructure across international markets.

China's influence is no longer adequately described by its role as a low-cost manufacturing centre. Its industrial development has progressively extended into electric vehicles, batteries, solar technologies, telecommunications equipment, machinery, shipbuilding, advanced materials and several other technologically sophisticated sectors.

This transformation has involved a combination of public investment, industrial planning, private entrepreneurship, economies of scale, infrastructure development, research and development, supply-chain integration and access to a vast domestic market.

The resulting economic relationships are qualitatively different from conventional security arrangements.

A country that purchases a military security guarantee develops a relationship with the provider of that guarantee. A country that participates in a Chinese-supported industrial ecosystem may develop relationships involving engineers, manufacturers, suppliers, technicians, financial institutions, logistics operators, universities, regulators and commercial enterprises.

These relationships generate repeated interactions and opportunities for learning.

They can also create long-term institutional familiarity, as firms and public agencies become accustomed to working with particular technical standards, production methods, financing arrangements and commercial practices.

It is this accumulation of productive and organizational knowledge that gives geoeconomic interdependence its potentially organic character.

2. The empirical transformation of global manufacturing

The OECD's November 6, 2026, policy brief, Economic Security in Global Production: Dependencies and Vulnerabilities in Global Value Chains, offers particularly important evidence.

Its analysis of international input-output relationships demonstrates that China's position in global manufacturing has changed substantially over the past two decades.

By 2024, China had become the largest producer of manufacturing value-added in 14 of the 18 industries examined by the OECD. It was also the largest producer by gross output in 17 industries.

The transformation is especially pronounced in electrical equipment, textiles and apparel, non-ferrous metals, basic iron and steel, and other non-metallic mineral products.

In five manufacturing industries, China's share of world value-added had reached approximately 37 to 49 percent, compared with approximately 8 to 13 percent in 2000.

The OECD also found that China's share of foreign value-added embodied in world exports increased from approximately 3 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2024.

Perhaps more revealing is the transformation of international supplier relationships. China became the largest foreign supplier in approximately 40 percent of the country-industry relationships examined in 2024, compared with approximately 4 percent in 2000.

These findings are significant because they reveal that China's influence extends beyond direct bilateral trade.

Chinese components and intermediate goods may enter the production process of one country, be incorporated into products manufactured in another, and ultimately reach consumers in a third economy.

Consequently, conventional bilateral trade statistics can substantially underestimate the degree of economic integration.

The OECD's input-output approach captures these indirect relationships by tracing the value created at different stages of production.

This is precisely the kind of interdependence that can generate institutional familiarity, accumulated production knowledge and specialized expertise.

However, the same OECD research identifies an important asymmetry: all 79 partner economies examined depended more heavily on Chinese manufacturing value-added than China depended on their respective contributions.

The result is a system that creates extensive interdependence but does not necessarily distribute bargaining power equally.

3. Industrial ecosystems and the accumulation of expertise

The most consequential dimension of China's geoeconomic strategy may be its capacity to create industrial ecosystems rather than simply export finished products.

An industrial ecosystem connects suppliers, manufacturers, research institutions, technical education, logistics infrastructure, financial services, government agencies and final markets.

Once these elements become established, the resulting economic relationships can generate cumulative advantages.

For example, a country participating in an electric-vehicle production network may acquire experience in battery assembly, quality control, electronic systems, power management, industrial safety, component certification and logistics management.

As local firms gain experience, they may develop the ability to supply additional components, undertake maintenance, improve production processes and eventually participate in product development.

Such activities can create a cumulative learning process in which commercial participation generates technical knowledge, and technical knowledge subsequently creates new commercial opportunities.

This is more durable than a relationship based solely on the purchase of imported finished goods.

The same process may occur in telecommunications, renewable energy, port management, railway systems, industrial machinery and digital infrastructure.

Nevertheless, the development of local expertise is not automatic. It depends on the structure of investment agreements, the participation of domestic firms, training arrangements, technology licensing, access to intellectual property, local procurement policies and the willingness of foreign investors to develop local capabilities.

A Chinese-financed industrial facility that employs imported technicians, imports most components and retains its engineering functions abroad may generate employment without producing substantial domestic technological autonomy.

The relevant question is therefore not simply how much China invests abroad, but how much productive knowledge and managerial capacity remain in the recipient economy.

4. The importance of standards, technical familiarity and institutional learning

An additional source of Chinese influence is the growing international presence of Chinese industrial and technical standards.

Standards are economically important because they establish the specifications, compatibility requirements, testing procedures and certification practices through which products and services can enter markets.

A manufacturer that designs its products around a particular technical standard becomes familiar with the associated testing laboratories, software, engineering requirements, maintenance systems and regulatory procedures.

Over time, this familiarity can reduce transaction costs and increase the attractiveness of continuing relationships with suppliers and institutions operating within the same technical environment.

China has increasingly sought to participate in international standard-setting activities, particularly in renewable energy, electric vehicles, telecommunications and industrial technologies.

Official Chinese reporting indicates that the country led the formulation and issuance of 285 international standards under ISO and IEC in 2025. Such figures should be treated as official administrative reporting rather than as independent evidence of Chinese control over international standards.

Indeed, a July 2026 study by Alex He of the Centre for International Governance Innovation provides an important qualification. It finds that China's influence in international digital standard-setting remains uneven, particularly in emerging technologies, where established international institutions and other countries retain considerable agenda-setting influence.

Thus, China's expanding industrial presence should not be confused with comprehensive control over global technical governance.

Nevertheless, the broader strategic significance remains substantial. Technical familiarity, certification capacity and participation in standards organizations can create institutional relationships that endure beyond individual investment projects.

5. Trade, investment and the limits of reciprocal interdependence

The expansion of China's manufacturing influence has not necessarily generated balanced trade relationships.

A March 2026 Federal Reserve research note by François de Soyres and co-authors examined China's growing trade dominance and the role of industrial policies.

The researchers reported that China's trade surplus reached approximately US$1.2 trillion in 2025, exceeding 6 percent of GDP.

They found that Chinese export expansion had occurred across a broad range of manufacturing sectors, including both lower-value-added products and increasingly sophisticated manufactured goods.

At the same time, imports of manufactured goods from advanced economies had not increased at a comparable rate. Commodity imports had become more important, accounting for approximately 44 percent of Chinese imports.

This pattern has important implications for the international distribution of economic benefits.

China's manufacturing partners may become increasingly dependent on Chinese intermediate goods and finished products without gaining equivalent access to the Chinese market for their own manufactured output.

For advanced industrial economies, this raises concerns about the erosion of domestic industrial capacity, competitive pressures, trade imbalances and the concentration of strategic production.

The distinction between interdependence and mutual dependence is therefore essential.

A country may become deeply integrated into China's production system while possessing relatively little influence over the decisions governing that system.

Organic interdependence requires more than repeated transactions. It requires the development of complementary capabilities and sufficient reciprocal economic interests to sustain cooperation over time.


III. The Comparative Political Economy of American and Chinese International Influence

1. Security provision versus productive integration

The central difference between the American and Chinese approaches concerns the mechanisms through which international influence is accumulated and reproduced.

American strategic influence is principally supported by the provision of security, deterrence and access to a global network of military facilities. This arrangement creates relationships of considerable institutional depth. Military alliances involve intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, procurement agreements, standardized procedures, officer education, technological cooperation and long-term defence planning.

These relationships can generate substantial expertise and institutional familiarity. NATO, for example, has developed extensive military interoperability through common operational procedures, training, communications systems and defence planning.

It would therefore be incorrect to characterize American geostrategic influence as merely the provision of military protection. Its security partnerships also generate technical knowledge, institutional experience and managerial capabilities.

However, the distribution of these capabilities is often concentrated in defence establishments, military contractors and government institutions. The benefits do not necessarily extend throughout the productive economy of the participating countries.

China's geoeconomic approach has a different potential transmission mechanism. Its commercial relationships can involve a wider range of economic participants, including private enterprises, industrial workers, engineers, logistics companies, research institutions, financial organizations and public-sector administrators.

When these relationships develop into integrated production networks, their effects may extend beyond the immediate transaction. Suppliers acquire knowledge of manufacturing processes, domestic firms become familiar with international quality requirements, employees develop technical expertise, and local institutions acquire experience in regulating and managing increasingly sophisticated industrial activities.

This process can generate a more broadly distributed form of economic familiarity.

The distinction is not absolute. American security partnerships can create substantial civilian technological spillovers, while Chinese industrial partnerships can remain highly centralized and dependent on imported technology and managerial expertise.

Nevertheless, the underlying institutional mechanisms differ.

The American model tends to establish interdependence through security institutions and alliance networks. The Chinese model increasingly establishes interdependence through production, infrastructure, technological systems and commercial relationships.

2. The creation of expertise and institutional familiarity

For the purposes of this assessment, three dimensions of interdependence deserve particular attention.

The first is technical expertise. This concerns the ability of domestic workers, engineers, enterprises and research institutions to operate, maintain, modify and eventually improve the technologies introduced through international cooperation.

The second is institutional familiarity. This involves the accumulated knowledge of regulatory requirements, procurement systems, certification procedures, financial arrangements, commercial practices and organizational expectations.

The third is managerial agency. This concerns the capacity of domestic organizations to make informed decisions, negotiate contracts, manage projects, solve operational problems and adapt imported technologies to local economic conditions.

These dimensions are related but not interchangeable.

A country may possess sophisticated infrastructure without possessing the technical personnel required to maintain it. It may receive foreign investment without acquiring the managerial expertise needed to operate the resulting industrial facilities. It may participate in international trade without developing the domestic institutions required to negotiate more favourable commercial arrangements.

The extent to which an international partnership creates these capabilities determines whether interdependence becomes productive and self-reinforcing.

Consider two hypothetical arrangements.

In the first, a country purchases an advanced military system from a foreign supplier. Its armed forces receive training, maintenance support and access to specialized technology. The relationship generates military expertise and institutional familiarity, but its broader economic spillovers depend on domestic industrial participation.

In the second, a country establishes an industrial partnership involving foreign investment, local suppliers, technical training, engineering cooperation, research facilities and domestic manufacturing. If successfully implemented, the relationship can generate expertise across several layers of the economy.

The second arrangement has greater potential to create broadly distributed productive capabilities. However, it is also more demanding to organize and does not guarantee technology transfer or domestic ownership of knowledge.

The distinction is important for the G7 because international economic leadership should be evaluated not only by the volume of capital deployed or the number of security agreements signed, but also by the productive capabilities created in partner economies.

3. The importance of local agency

A further consideration is whether the recipient country becomes an active participant in the relationship or remains principally a purchaser, borrower or dependent customer.

The development literature has long emphasized the importance of domestic institutional capacity, absorptive capabilities and the ability of governments and enterprises to adapt external knowledge to local circumstances.

Foreign investment can contribute to industrial development, but its effects depend on domestic institutions, human capital, technological capabilities and the structure of relationships between foreign and local enterprises.

This is particularly relevant to China's overseas infrastructure and industrial investment.

A railway project, for example, may improve transportation capacity and reduce logistical costs. But its developmental consequences depend on whether domestic engineers participate in construction and maintenance, whether local suppliers acquire contracts, whether technical education is expanded and whether the recipient country develops the administrative capacity to manage the infrastructure over its entire life cycle.

Similarly, a renewable-energy project may increase electricity generation without necessarily creating domestic expertise in battery management, grid integration, power electronics or equipment manufacturing.

The same distinction applies to American development and security partnerships.

A military base or defence procurement agreement may improve a country's security, but it does not automatically generate independent industrial capacity.

Consequently, the most meaningful criterion of international cooperation is the extent to which external engagement expands the recipient country's capacity to act independently and participate more effectively in international markets.

In this sense, the ultimate measure of productive interdependence is not the persistence of dependence itself. It is the creation of complementary capabilities that make cooperation valuable while preserving the participating country's ability to exercise its own agency.

4. The strategic difference between a security guarantee and an industrial relationship

Security guarantees and industrial relationships also differ in their temporal and political characteristics.

Military protection is a continuing commitment. Its credibility depends on the provider's willingness to maintain capabilities, accept operational risks and honour its political obligations.

When domestic political priorities change, the perceived reliability of a security guarantee may also change.

Industrial relationships, by contrast, can become embedded in fixed capital, production processes, technical training, supply contracts and commercial routines. These arrangements may persist even when political relations become less favourable.

A manufacturing enterprise that depends on specialized components, established suppliers and technical standards cannot necessarily reorganize its entire production system in response to a diplomatic disagreement.

This creates a form of institutional and technological persistence.

However, it also introduces vulnerability. A country that becomes heavily dependent on a single supplier may find it difficult to change production systems without incurring substantial costs.

Thus, the durability of industrial interdependence can be both an economic advantage and a source of strategic exposure.

The G7 should therefore distinguish between productive integration and excessive supplier concentration.

A healthy international economic relationship should generate expertise, investment, technological cooperation and reciprocal opportunities without making the participating economies incapable of adapting when commercial or political circumstances change.

IV. The Strategic Windfall for Beijing: Opportunity Costs and the Redistribution of International Influence.

1. The opportunity cost of American military commitments

The 2026 conflict has created an opportunity for Beijing to benefit from the redistribution of American strategic resources.

The most direct benefit arises from the diversion of military assets and the consumption of advanced munitions that might otherwise contribute to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

The CBO's assessment is particularly important because it identifies the depletion of missile-defence interceptors as a major opportunity cost of the conflict.

A prolonged deployment also requires the United States to maintain carrier rotations, replenish ammunition, allocate intelligence and surveillance capabilities, sustain tanker operations and repair damaged facilities.

These requirements compete with other defence priorities.

The consequences are not necessarily immediate or irreversible. The United States possesses a substantial military-industrial base, extensive alliance networks and considerable capacity to mobilize additional resources.

Nevertheless, industrial production cannot always respond at the same speed as military consumption.

The replacement of sophisticated interceptors involves specialized manufacturing processes, scarce components, testing requirements, skilled personnel and lengthy procurement cycles.

China may therefore obtain a relative strategic advantage without directly confronting the American naval presence.

Its advantage is primarily relative: Washington is devoting additional resources to the Middle East while Beijing can continue developing its economic and technological position in other regions.

2. Why China is not an unqualified beneficiary

It would nevertheless be analytically incorrect to characterize the Hormuz conflict as an unambiguous Chinese strategic windfall.

China is a major importer of energy, and its industrial economy depends on the uninterrupted movement of petroleum, natural gas, industrial inputs and manufactured goods.

Disruption in Hormuz therefore imposes substantial costs on Beijing.

Higher energy prices increase industrial production costs, raise transportation expenses and create additional inflationary pressures. The uncertainty surrounding shipping and insurance can also complicate China's external commercial relationships.

Furthermore, Chinese companies and financial institutions have economic interests in the stability of Persian Gulf, infrastructure and the continuity of international trade.

Beijing therefore has competing strategic incentives.

On one side, prolonged American military commitments can create opportunities for China to strengthen its relative diplomatic and economic position.

On the other, prolonged instability in the Persian Gulf threatens Chinese energy security and the commercial environment required for its export-oriented industrial economy.

This creates a distinction between benefiting from the opportunity costs incurred by a strategic competitor and benefiting from the underlying conflict itself.

China may gain from the first while suffering considerably from the second.

3. The possibility of diplomatic and commercial repositioning

The conflict may also accelerate the efforts of the Persian Gulf economies to diversify their external relationships.

Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman have interests extending beyond military security. They seek investment, industrial diversification, technological modernization, financial integration and access to international markets.

American security relationships remain important to these countries. However, their economic strategies increasingly involve multiple international partners.

China's position as a major manufacturing market, infrastructure provider and purchaser of energy resources gives it significant opportunities to expand these relationships.

This does not mean that the Persian Gulf states will abandon American security arrangements or replace Washington with Beijing.

Rather, they may increasingly separate their security relationships from their commercial and industrial relationships.

Such diversification is consistent with the strategic behaviour of middle powers seeking to preserve their autonomy by avoiding excessive dependence on a single external partner.

The result may be a more complex international system in which the United States retains substantial security influence while China acquires additional economic and technological influence.

4. The erosion of leverage through repeated strategic overextension

A further consideration is the relationship between the exercise of power and the development of alternatives.

In a November 2026 article published in International Affairs, Ramkishen S. Rajan examines how economic coercion can gradually erode the strategic advantages associated with control over critical supply-chain and financial chokepoints.

His analysis suggests that repeated use of economic pressure encourages firms and governments to develop alternative suppliers, payment arrangements, production facilities and intermediary commercial networks.

Although Rajan examines economic statecraft rather than naval deployments, the broader analytical insight is relevant.

The exercise of power may generate incentives for other actors to reduce their exposure to that power.

This process can be observed in several domains.

Repeated sanctions encourage alternative financial arrangements. Export controls encourage domestic technological substitution and investment in alternative supply chains. Maritime insecurity encourages the development of alternative shipping routes, storage arrangements and energy suppliers.

Similarly, a prolonged military commitment can encourage allies and partners to reconsider the extent to which their security and commercial interests should depend on one external provider.

This does not mean that American power necessarily declines every time it is exercised. It means that the durability of strategic influence depends partly on whether its exercise strengthens or weakens the willingness of other countries to participate in the underlying institutional arrangements.

V. A Bayesian Game-Theoretic  Assessment of the Competing Strategies

1. The analytical framework

The comparison between the American geostrategic model and the Chinese geoeconomic model is best understood as a repeated strategic interaction under incomplete information.

The United States, China, the Persian Gulf economies, European countries and other middle powers do not possess complete information about one another's intentions, future policy commitments or tolerance for economic and military costs.

Their decisions depend on expectations concerning future behaviour.

For the United States, the principal strategic variables include the credibility of its security commitments, the sustainability of military expenditure, the readiness of its defence industrial base, the political acceptability of prolonged overseas deployments and the willingness of allies to share security responsibilities.

For China, the principal variables include the sustainability of industrial expansion, the ability to maintain access to external markets, energy security, technological independence, the international acceptance of Chinese standards and the willingness of other countries to participate in Chinese-supported economic networks.

For middle powers, the relevant variables include the economic benefits of cooperation, the credibility of security guarantees, the cost of dependence, the availability of alternative suppliers and the domestic political legitimacy of international partnerships.

The strategic outcome therefore depends not simply on the resources possessed by each major power, but on the expectations and decisions of the other participants.

2. The formation of strategic priors

The initial Bayesian assessment begins with two competing hypotheses.

Hypothesis A: Security-centred international leadership remains the more durable foundation of international interdependence.

Under this hypothesis, the American security architecture continues to provide the essential conditions for global commerce. Even if the costs of military operations increase, the United States retains a comparative advantage through its alliances, military technology, intelligence networks, financial institutions and ability to coordinate collective security arrangements.

Hypothesis B: Production-centred international leadership generates increasingly durable forms of interdependence.

Under this hypothesis, China's expanding industrial and technological position creates relationships that become embedded in the daily economic activities of participating countries. The accumulation of technical expertise, commercial familiarity, production knowledge and infrastructure increases the cost of disengagement and strengthens China's long-term international influence.

These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive.

Indeed, the most likely outcome is a mixed international architecture in which American security provision and Chinese economic integration coexist, although with increasing strategic competition over the rules and distribution of influence.

3. Updating the assessment through observable signals

The evidence available by November 16 provides several important signals.

The first is the continuing cost of American military operations. The CBO's US$38 billion estimate through August 1, together with the subsequent Pentagon estimate of US$43.6 billion through September 3, indicates that the conflict has imposed a substantial fiscal burden.

The second is the depletion of selected missile-defence inventories. The estimated five-year or longer replenishment period indicates that the opportunity costs may persist well beyond the immediate military operation.

The third is the damage to American forward logistics facilities in Bahrain. This demonstrates that concentrated military infrastructure can become a source of operational vulnerability.

The fourth is the OECD evidence of China's expanding position in global manufacturing. Its findings indicate that Chinese production has become increasingly embedded in the international economy.

The fifth is the evidence of asymmetric dependence. The fact that all 79 partner economies examined in the OECD assessment depended more heavily on Chinese manufacturing value-added than China depended on their respective contributions suggests that China's growing influence is accompanied by structural bargaining advantages.

The sixth is the continued disruption of Hormuz shipping as of November 16. The low recorded number of commercial transits demonstrates that the restoration of maritime confidence remains a significant challenge.

Taken together, these signals strengthen the hypothesis that China's productive and commercial networks are generating increasingly durable international influence, while the American security architecture is facing rising costs associated with maintaining its traditional role.

However, the evidence does not justify concluding that the United States has lost its position as the principal provider of global maritime security.

4. Strategic scenarios through 2032

Scenario One: The continuation of American security primacy with Chinese economic expansion.

This scenario assumes that the United States retains its military superiority and gradually replenishes its munitions inventories while continuing to provide maritime security and alliance protection.

China simultaneously expands its position in global manufacturing, infrastructure and technological systems.

The resulting international economy remains highly interconnected, but its security and productive architectures become increasingly differentiated.

This is a plausible baseline scenario because neither power has a compelling economic or strategic incentive to assume the full costs of replacing the other.

Scenario Two: Accelerated Chinese geoeconomic influence and growing strategic hedging.

Under this scenario, prolonged American military commitments, fiscal pressures and domestic political constraints encourage additional countries to diversify their external relationships.

China benefits from its established industrial networks, infrastructure capabilities and expanding commercial relationships.

The Persian Gulf states, ASEAN economies, African countries and selected Latin American economies pursue more diversified arrangements, seeking to preserve access to American markets and security relationships while expanding commercial and industrial ties with China.

The resulting order is not necessarily dominated by Beijing, but China's influence becomes more deeply embedded in the productive organization of participating economies.

Scenario Three: A fragmented international economy characterized by competing technological and security systems.

In this scenario, geopolitical rivalry produces increasing restrictions on technology transfers, capital movements, industrial cooperation and international trade.

The United States and China develop more distinct production and technological ecosystems.

Middle powers face growing pressure to align with one system or the other.

Although this outcome may reduce certain strategic vulnerabilities, it would also sacrifice important economies of scale, reduce international knowledge exchange and increase the costs of technological development.

Scenario Four: A negotiated strategic equilibrium based on selective interdependence.

This scenario assumes that the major powers recognize the costs of comprehensive confrontation and seek to establish more predictable arrangements governing trade, technology, energy security and maritime access.

The United States retains its principal security commitments, while China continues to participate in international production networks.

G7 economies and middle powers develop mechanisms for diversified sourcing, transparent investment, reciprocal market access and technological cooperation.

This scenario would preserve the benefits of economic interdependence while reducing the vulnerabilities associated with excessive concentration.

5. Comparative Bayesian judgment

The evidence supports a distinction between the relative durability of economic relationships and the relative importance of security guarantees.

China's manufacturing integration creates more continuous opportunities for technical learning, commercial familiarity, organizational adaptation and productive cooperation.

American security arrangements create institutional and technological relationships of their own, but their broader economic effects are more indirect and depend on the extent to which defence cooperation produces civilian industrial participation.

Accordingly, if the criterion is the creation of broad-based productive expertise and repeated commercial interaction, the Chinese geoeconomic model currently has the stronger structural advantage.

If the criterion is the provision of maritime security, deterrence and protection against military coercion, the United States retains a decisive comparative advantage.

The two advantages should not be confused.

The central strategic issue is that the economic influence generated through industrial participation may become increasingly durable even when the military power supporting the international security environment remains concentrated elsewhere.

VI. The Implications for the G7: Aligning Security Leadership With Constructive Interdependence

1. Moving beyond the conventional security-versus-trade distinction

The G7 should reconsider the traditional assumption that international leadership can be maintained principally through military superiority, financial influence and diplomatic coordination.

These instruments remain important, but they do not necessarily generate the productive capabilities required for long-term economic resilience.

The strategic challenge is to develop a model of international cooperation that combines the strengths of American security provision with the capability-generating advantages of industrial and technological partnerships.

This requires a broader understanding of national security.

Energy security, technological security, industrial capacity, logistics, skilled employment, infrastructure and the resilience of financial systems are increasingly interconnected.

The security of a maritime corridor is important, but so is the ability of participating economies to maintain alternative energy supplies, develop domestic storage facilities, improve industrial efficiency and manage supply-chain disruptions.

Similarly, military alliances may provide strategic reassurance, but their long-term credibility can be strengthened when participating countries also possess the industrial capacity to contribute meaningfully to collective security.

The G7 should therefore move from a predominantly protective conception of international leadership towards a more comprehensive model of productive and institutional cooperation.

2. Developing a G7 framework for capability-generating partnerships

A more effective G7 strategy should prioritize partnerships that create measurable domestic capabilities in participating countries.

This requires moving beyond the conventional measurement of international cooperation through investment volumes, trade agreements and infrastructure expenditure.

Projects should also be evaluated according to their contribution to domestic engineering capacity, technical education, research and development, local supplier development, industrial management and technological adaptation.

For example, a G7-supported energy partnership should not be evaluated exclusively according to the amount of electricity generated or the value of equipment exported.

It should also be evaluated according to whether domestic institutions acquire the capacity to manage electricity networks, maintain advanced equipment, integrate renewable energy, develop storage technologies and train qualified engineers.

The same principle should apply to transportation infrastructure, telecommunications, semiconductor production, critical minerals and advanced manufacturing.

The objective should be to transform international investment from a capital-transfer mechanism into a process of cumulative capability development.

3. Reconsidering the organization of defence industrial cooperation

The Hormuz conflict demonstrates the importance of expanding the industrial foundations of collective security.

The G7 and its security partners should develop more effective arrangements for the joint production and replenishment of essential defence materials.

This includes missile-defence interceptors, radar systems, precision components, electronic warfare systems, maintenance equipment and logistics infrastructure.

The objective should not be to duplicate every stage of production in every participating country.

Rather, the G7 should identify complementary industrial capabilities and develop arrangements through which participating economies can specialize while maintaining reliable access to essential components.

Such arrangements would reduce the pressure on individual national inventories and improve the collective capacity to respond to simultaneous strategic contingencies.

They would also create opportunities for technical training, industrial research, joint procurement and the development of specialized manufacturing expertise.

The lesson of Hormuz is that a security architecture cannot remain sustainable if its operational requirements repeatedly exceed the capacity of its supporting industrial system.

4. Strengthening energy resilience and maritime cooperation

The G7 should also reconsider its approach to the protection of strategic maritime corridors.

The experience of Hormuz demonstrates that naval superiority alone cannot guarantee the immediate restoration of commercial shipping.

A comprehensive maritime security strategy requires cooperation among naval forces, commercial shipping companies, port authorities, insurance institutions, energy producers, logistics operators and international organizations.

The G7 should promote more effective arrangements for maritime information-sharing, emergency logistics, commercial risk assessment, energy storage and alternative transportation routes.

It should also strengthen cooperation with the Persian Gulf countries and other energy-producing economies to improve the resilience of global energy markets.

An important objective should be to reduce the economic consequences of temporary maritime disruptions without creating additional geopolitical fragmentation.

Energy diversification, improved storage capacity, alternative supply arrangements and more resilient electricity systems can reduce the extent to which a regional conflict generates worldwide economic instability.

5. Rebuilding the productive foundations of international economic leadership

One of the most important lessons of China's economic development is that industrial competitiveness is not created through isolated investment decisions.

It develops through the interaction of education, infrastructure, research, financial institutions, technological learning, industrial policy and access to markets.

The G7 should therefore develop a more coordinated approach to industrial development.

Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States possess complementary strengths in energy, advanced manufacturing, engineering, finance, aerospace, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and scientific research.

The challenge is to organize these capabilities into more effective international production networks.

Canada, for example, possesses significant opportunities in critical minerals, energy, electricity, advanced materials, artificial intelligence research and industrial innovation. However, the economic value of these resources depends on the development of domestic processing, engineering, manufacturing and research capabilities.

Simply exporting raw materials does not generate the same degree of productive expertise as participating in the subsequent stages of industrial transformation.

The G7 should therefore encourage partnerships that allow smaller and middle-sized economies to participate in higher-value stages of international production.

This would help prevent the emergence of a global division of labour in which some economies remain principally suppliers of commodities while others retain control over advanced manufacturing, technology and commercial standards.

6. Preserving the agency of middle powers

The international economic system should not require countries to choose between American security relationships and Chinese commercial opportunities.

Many middle powers have legitimate interests in maintaining cooperation with both.

Their economic development depends on access to multiple markets, diversified investment sources, technological cooperation and predictable international rules.

A strategy that forces these countries into exclusive geopolitical alignments could weaken the very economic networks that contribute to global prosperity.

The G7 should therefore recognize the importance of institutional transparency, reciprocal market access, fair competition and the domestic agency of its international partners.

This does not mean disregarding national-security concerns or accepting economic practices that undermine competition.

It means distinguishing between legitimate security safeguards and unnecessarily restrictive policies that prevent beneficial commercial cooperation.

The objective should be to develop an international system in which countries can diversify their economic relationships without becoming exposed to coercive dependence.

7. Introducing a capability-based assessment of international partnerships

The G7 should consider adopting a capability-based framework for evaluating major international investment and cooperation agreements.

Such an assessment would examine six dimensions.

First, the extent to which a project develops domestic technical expertise and qualified personnel.

Second, whether it strengthens local enterprises and creates opportunities for domestic suppliers.

Third, whether it improves the recipient country's ability to manage, maintain and adapt the resulting infrastructure or technology.

Fourth, whether it provides meaningful access to research, technological knowledge and innovation.

Fifth, whether the relationship creates reciprocal commercial opportunities rather than merely increasing dependence on one supplier or market.

Sixth, whether it preserves sufficient institutional and economic autonomy for the participating country to negotiate, diversify and make independent strategic decisions.

This framework would enable the G7 to distinguish between investment that creates genuine development capabilities and investment that primarily establishes long-term commercial dependence.

It would also provide a more meaningful basis for comparing American, Chinese, European, Japanese and other international development partnerships.

VII. Concluding  Assessment: The Future of International Leadership


The financial and logistical burden of maintaining the American naval presence in the Strait of Hormuz illustrates a broader transformation in the economics of international power.

The United States continues to possess extraordinary military capabilities and an extensive alliance network. Its role in maintaining maritime security remains important to the international economic system.

However, the 2026 conflict has demonstrated that the exercise of military power can generate substantial financial costs, consume strategically important resources and expose vulnerabilities in the industrial and logistical systems supporting overseas commitments.

The consequences extend beyond the immediate theatre of operations.

The depletion of missile-defence inventories, the damage to forward logistics facilities and the diversion of military resources create opportunity costs that may influence American strategic planning for several years.

China, meanwhile, is expanding its influence through a different mechanism.

Its manufacturing capabilities, technological development, industrial ecosystems, infrastructure investment and integration into international production networks have created relationships that extend deeply into the everyday economic activities of numerous countries.

The OECD's November 2026 findings provide substantial evidence of this transformation.

China's increasing share of global manufacturing value-added and its emergence as a leading supplier across a growing proportion of international production relationships demonstrate that its economic influence is becoming structurally embedded.

The most important distinction concerns the nature of the relationships being created.

Military alliances can generate trust, institutional familiarity, technological cooperation and security expertise. Their importance should not be underestimated.

However, production networks can generate a more continuous process of commercial interaction, technical learning, managerial experience and institutional adaptation across a much broader range of economic participants.

When these relationships create domestic expertise and productive capacity, they can become self-reinforcing.

They create incentives for enterprises to continue cooperating, for educational institutions to develop relevant skills, for governments to improve regulatory systems and for domestic suppliers to participate in increasingly sophisticated production activities.

This is the principal reason why China's geoeconomic strategy has the potential to generate more organic forms of interdependence.

Yet this conclusion requires an important qualification.

An economic relationship is not necessarily organic simply because it is extensive or difficult to abandon. If one country controls critical technology, dominates the supply of essential components, restricts market access or retains exclusive managerial authority, the resulting relationship may be highly asymmetric.

The OECD evidence of China's supplier dominance demonstrates precisely why this distinction matters.

Similarly, the United States should not underestimate the economic and technological relationships generated by its security alliances. Military interoperability, defence research, intelligence-sharing and industrial cooperation can create considerable institutional and technical expertise.

The question is how to extend these benefits beyond the defence establishment and into the wider productive economy.

The central issue is therefore not whether the world needs the American policeman or the Chinese market-maker. It is whether international leadership should be measured primarily by the capacity to protect the existing economic order or by the capacity to help participating economies develop the productive, technological and institutional capabilities required to sustain it.

For the G7, the answer should be a combination of both.

American maritime security remains important because international production and trade cannot function effectively in an environment of persistent military insecurity.

But military protection alone cannot provide the industrial expertise, technological knowledge, managerial capacity and productive opportunities necessary for long-term economic development.

Equally, Chinese manufacturing and infrastructure investment can expand international productive capacity, but they cannot independently guarantee maritime security, political stability or balanced economic relationships.

The most sustainable international order would combine credible security guarantees with open markets, reciprocal industrial cooperation, technological learning and meaningful domestic agency.

It would also recognize that the strategic value of international cooperation is not exhausted by the amount of money invested, the number of military facilities maintained or the volume of goods exchanged.

Its deeper value lies in the knowledge, expertise, institutional competence and productive relationships accumulated by the participating societies.

The United States has historically exercised international leadership through its ability to protect the strategic foundations of the global economy.

China is increasingly exercising international influence through its ability to participate in, organize and reshape the productive foundations of that economy.

The next phase of international competition will therefore be determined not simply by which country possesses more military resources or exports more manufactured goods, but by which system can create the most resilient combination of security, technological advancement, productive capacity, institutional familiarity and reciprocal economic opportunity.

For the G7, the strategic lesson of Hormuz is clear: the sustainability of international leadership requires more than the capacity to defend global commerce. It requires the capacity to strengthen the productive capabilities of the societies that depend upon it.


 

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