Stalin, Trotsky, and the Fate of the Russian Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of Revolutionary Leadership and State Formation

Abstract

This studyexamines the political struggle between Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky during the formative years of the Soviet state (1917-1940), analyzing how their conflict shaped twentieth-century communism and established patterns of authoritarian governance that remain relevant today. Through comparative analysis of their ideological positions, political strategies, and institutional methods, this paper evaluates why Stalin prevailed in the succession struggle, how his policies transformed Soviet society, and what lessons this historical episode offers for understanding contemporary authoritarian systems and geopolitical competition.

 

Introduction: Why This History Matters Now

The Stalin-Trotsky conflict has acquired renewed relevance in the twenty-first century as authoritarian governance models challenge liberal democratic assumptions about political development. Contemporary Russia's rehabilitation of Stalin's historical reputation, China's centralized party-state system, and the global resurgence of strongman politics all invite reconsideration of how revolutionary movements consolidate power and how charismatic versus institutional authority shapes political outcomes.

Three specific contemporary concerns make this historical analysis particularly pertinent:

First, the nature of succession in authoritarian systems. The question of how power transfers within single-party states remains unresolved in several major powers. Understanding how Stalin outmaneuvered his rivals through institutional control rather than ideological legitimacy illuminates current succession dynamics in states where formal mechanisms exist but informal power networks dominate.

Second, the tension between nationalist consolidation and internationalist ambition. Stalin's "socialism in one country" versus Trotsky's "permanent revolution" represented fundamentally different approaches to state power and international relations. This debate prefigures contemporary tensions between nationalist assertiveness and global ideological projects, visible in current great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia.

Third, the relationship between rapid modernization and political repression. Stalin's industrialization campaign achieved material transformation at enormous human cost, raising questions about development pathways that remain contested in contemporary debates about authoritarian versus democratic routes to modernization. China's economic rise under one-party rule has revived arguments that authoritarian systems may achieve rapid development more efficiently than democratic ones—arguments that require historical perspective to evaluate properly.

This study approaches the Stalin-Trotsky conflict not as a morality tale but as a case study in political consolidation, examining how revolutionary movements transform into stable governing systems and what factors determine which leaders and which ideologies prevail in succession struggles.

Part I: Theoretical Framework and Historical Context

1.1 Analytical Approach

This analysis employs three complementary frameworks to understand the Stalin-Trotsky conflict:

Institutional analysis examines how control over organizational structures—party appointments, administrative positions, information flows—created power asymmetries that favored certain actors over others regardless of their ideological positions or personal qualities.

Ideological analysis considers how competing visions of socialism's goals and methods shaped political alliances and policy choices, recognizing that ideas both constrained and enabled particular strategies.

Biographical analysis acknowledges that individual characteristics, psychological traits, and personal histories influenced how these leaders approached political struggle, though without reducing complex historical processes to personality conflicts.

1.2 The Revolutionary Context: Russia 1917-1924

The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 created unprecedented challenges. Unlike previous revolutions, which had replaced one elite with another within existing state structures, the Bolsheviks sought to dismantle the old order entirely and construct a new socialist society. This project required:

• Creating new institutions of governance from the remnants of a collapsed empire
• Fighting a multi-front civil war against both domestic opponents and foreign intervention
• Managing economic collapse and widespread famine
• Maintaining ideological coherence while adapting to practical necessities
• Establishing legitimacy for a regime that lacked historical precedent

These challenges shaped the political environment in which Stalin and Trotsky competed. The premium placed on organizational effectiveness, the normalization of violence as a political tool, the centralization of decision-making authority, and the suppression of alternative power centers all emerged from the revolutionary period itself, preceding Stalin's consolidation of personal dictatorship.

Part II: Comparative Biography and Political Formation

2.1 Origins and Early Development

Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) was born Lev Davidovich Bronstein to a relatively prosperous Jewish farming family in southern Ukraine. His family's modest means enabled educational opportunities rare for the time and place. He demonstrated intellectual precocity early, mastering European languages and engaging with Marxist theory while still a teenager. His revolutionary activities led to arrest and Siberian exile by age nineteen, beginning a pattern of imprisonment, escape, and exile that would characterize his early career.

Trotsky's formative years were spent in European exile among international socialist circles in Vienna, Paris, and London. This cosmopolitan experience shaped his worldview profoundly. He developed relationships with leading European Marxists, absorbed diverse theoretical perspectives, and crafted his distinctive contribution to revolutionary theory: the doctrine of "permanent revolution." This concept, developed following the 1905 Russian Revolution, argued that in backward countries like Russia, the bourgeois democratic revolution would necessarily transform into a socialist revolution, and that socialism could only survive through continuous international revolutionary upheaval.

Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) was born Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili in Gori, Georgia, to an impoverished cobbler father and a washerwoman mother. His childhood was marked by poverty, his father's alcoholism and violence, and the rigid environment of Orthodox religious education. His mother's determination secured his admission to the Tiflis Theological Seminary, where he encountered both Georgian nationalism and Marxist revolutionary literature.

Stalin's revolutionary apprenticeship occurred not in European cafés but in the underground networks of the Caucasus. He engaged in clandestine organizing, bank robberies to fund Bolshevik operations, and repeated cycles of arrest and escape. This experience fostered particular skills: secrecy, organizational discipline, an understanding of how to manipulate individuals through appeals to self-interest, and comfort with violence as a practical tool. His repeated deportations to Siberia, unlike Trotsky's, never led to extended European exile or intellectual engagement with international socialism.

2.2 Revolutionary Roles and Emerging Differences (1917-1922)

The October Revolution brought both men to prominence in characteristically different roles:

Trotsky's Contributions:

• Organized the Military Revolutionary Committee that executed the seizure of power in Petrograd
• Created and led the Red Army, transforming revolutionary militias into a disciplined five-million-man fighting force
• Served as the public face of Bolshevik military success through dramatic front-line appearances
• Functioned as the regime's leading orator and international spokesman

Stalin's Contributions:

• Served as People's Commissar for Nationalities Affairs, managing the complex challenge of holding together the former empire's diverse peoples
• Held key administrative positions coordinating logistics, supplies, and internal security
• Built networks of personal loyalists through careful appointment of lower-level officials
• Occupied less visible but strategically important roles in party administration

By 1922, when Lenin suffered his first debilitating stroke, these different revolutionary paths had produced distinct political profiles. Trotsky enjoyed enormous prestige as the architect of Red Army victory and was widely regarded as Lenin's intellectual peer. Stalin occupied the seemingly mundane position of General Secretary but controlled the party's administrative apparatus and personnel decisions.

Part III: The Succession Struggle (1922-1929)

3.1 The Institutional Advantage

The General Secretary position, created in April 1922, initially appeared to be an administrative role focused on organizational matters rather than policy leadership. Stalin transformed it into the central node of political power through systematic exploitation of its functions:

Personnel Control: As General Secretary, Stalin controlled appointments throughout the party apparatus. This allowed him to place loyalists in key positions at regional and local levels, building a network of officials who owed their careers to him personally rather than to revolutionary prestige or ideological merit.

Information Management: Stalin controlled the flow of information within the party bureaucracy. He determined what reports reached which officials, shaped the framing of policy debates, and managed the documentary record of party decisions.

Institutional Memory: Stalin mastered the details of party organization, membership, and procedures. This knowledge gave him advantages in bureaucratic maneuvering that more theoretically-oriented leaders lacked.

The "Lenin Enrollment" of 1924 exemplified Stalin's strategic use of institutional power. Following Lenin's death, the party admitted hundreds of thousands of new members, many from working-class backgrounds with limited political education. These new members diluted the influence of Old Bolsheviks and created a constituency more responsive to organizational authority than ideological debate.

3.2 The Ideological Contest

The succession struggle occurred within a context of genuine policy debates about the Soviet Union's future direction:

Permanent Revolution vs. Socialism in One Country:

Trotsky argued that socialism could not survive in an isolated, economically backward country surrounded by hostile capitalist powers. True security required spreading revolution to advanced industrial nations, particularly Germany. This position had strong theoretical credentials within classical Marxism but seemed impractical given the failure of revolutionary movements in Europe.

Stalin championed "socialism in one country," arguing that the Soviet Union could build socialism independently of international developments. This position resonated with war-weary populations seeking stability and with party officials whose privileges depended on the existing Soviet state rather than hypothetical international revolution.

Industrialization and Economic Policy:

Throughout the 1920s, debates raged over the pace and method of industrialization. The Left Opposition, including Trotsky, advocated rapid industrialization financed through pressuring the peasantry. The Right, led by Bukharin, favored gradual development maintaining market mechanisms for agriculture. Stalin initially allied with the Right against the Left, then abruptly adopted super-industrialization policies more radical than the Left Opposition had proposed, catching all factions off-balance.

Party Democracy and Bureaucratization:

Trotsky increasingly criticized the party's bureaucratic degeneration, arguing that Stalin's apparatus had replaced collective leadership with administrative command. This critique had merit but came too late and from a compromised position—Trotsky himself had supported the suppression of internal party democracy during the Civil War and the 1921 ban on factions.

3.3 The Coalition Strategy

Stalin's mastery of factional politics enabled him to isolate rivals systematically through shifting alliances:

Phase One (1923-1925): Alliance with Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky

• Exploited Trotsky's illness and absences from key meetings
• Portrayed Trotsky as an ambitious Bonaparte threatening collective leadership
• Mobilized party sentiment against perceived intellectual arrogance
• Suppressed Lenin's Testament criticizing Stalin

Phase Two (1925-1927): Alliance with Bukharin and the Right against the "United Opposition" of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev

• Depicted the Opposition as factionalists violating party unity
• Used control over party media to limit Opposition access to members
• Employed administrative measures including expulsions from party positions
• Culminated in Trotsky's expulsion from the party in November 1927

Phase Three (1928-1929): Turn against the Right and elimination of Bukharin

• Adopted radical industrialization and collectivization policies
• Isolated Bukharin's "Right deviation" as insufficiently revolutionary
• Consolidated personal control over policy-making

This sequence demonstrated Stalin's tactical flexibility and willingness to abandon allies once they had served their purpose. Each faction he aligned with was eventually destroyed.

3.4 Lenin's Testament and Its Suppression

Lenin's final political act—his Testament dictated in December 1922 and January 1923—directly addressed the succession question. The document assessed the strengths and weaknesses of leading Bolsheviks, with particular attention to Stalin and Trotsky:

On Stalin: "Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary General, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution." Lenin subsequently added: "Stalin is too rude and this defect, although quite tolerable in our midst and in dealings among us Communists, becomes intolerable in a Secretary General. That is why I suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post."

On Trotsky: "Personally perhaps the most capable man in the present C.C. but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work."

The Testament was read to the Central Committee in May 1924 but not published or widely disseminated. Stalin offered to resign in a theatrical gesture, but the committee, dominated by his appointees and allies, urged him to remain. Trotsky, surprisingly, did not press the issue, later explaining that he sought to preserve party unity. This crucial moment exemplified Trotsky's political weakness—his reluctance to engage in the factional struggle that the situation required.

Part IV: Stalin's Transformation of Soviet Society

4.1 The Industrial Revolution from Above

Once Stalin consolidated power by 1929, he implemented policies of social transformation unprecedented in their scope and pace. The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) and Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) aimed to industrialize the Soviet Union within a decade, transforming it from a predominantly agrarian society into an industrial power.

Quantitative Achievements:

• Industrial output increased substantially, with particularly dramatic growth in heavy industry
• Coal production rose from 35 million tons (1928) to 128 million tons (1937)
• Steel production increased from 4 million tons (1928) to 18 million tons (1937)
• New industrial centers emerged in previously undeveloped regions
• Massive infrastructure projects: Moscow Metro, Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, Magnitogorsk steel complex

Methods Employed:

• Central planning with ambitious targets that often bore little relation to existing capacity
• Mobilization of labor through a combination of enthusiasm, coercion, and imprisonment
• Crash programs for technical education creating new engineering cadres
• Technology transfer from Western firms despite ideological hostility to capitalism
• Integration of forced labor camps (Gulag) into the economic system

4.2 Collectivization and Rural Transformation

Agricultural collectivization accompanied industrialization, forcibly reorganizing peasant farming into collective (kolkhoz) and state (sovkhoz) farms. This policy served multiple purposes: extracting resources from agriculture to finance industrialization, establishing political control over the countryside, and eliminating the peasantry as an independent social class.

Implementation:

• Rapid collectivization began in 1929-1930, far faster than any previous plan had envisioned
• "Dekulakization" targeted supposedly wealthy peasants for arrest, execution, or deportation
• Resistance met with extreme violence, including mass executions and deportations
• Requisition policies prioritized urban and industrial needs over rural consumption

Consequences:

• Catastrophic famine, particularly severe in Ukraine (Holodomor), Kazakhstan, and the North Caucasus
• Death toll from famine, violence, and deportation estimated between 5-8 million people
• Destruction of traditional agricultural knowledge and practices
• Long-term reduction in agricultural productivity relative to pre-collectivization levels
• Establishment of permanent state control over rural populations

4.3 The Great Terror (1936-1938)

The Great Terror represented the culmination of Stalinist political violence, exceeding even the brutality of collectivization. While political repression had been endemic since the Civil War, the Terror was distinguished by its systematic nature, its penetration of all social groups including the party elite, and its seemingly arbitrary targeting.

The Moscow Show Trials:

Three major public trials showcased the regime's ideological theater:

• First Moscow Trial (August 1936): Zinoviev, Kamenev, and fourteen others
• Second Moscow Trial (January 1937): Karl Radek, Grigory Sokolnikov, and fifteen others
• Third Moscow Trial (March 1938): Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and nineteen others

These trials followed similar patterns: elaborate charges of espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy with foreign powers; detailed confessions extracted through torture, threats to families, or promises of leniency; and inevitable death sentences. The proceedings convinced many Western observers of the defendants' guilt, demonstrating the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda methods.

The Broader Campaign:

Beyond the show trials, terror swept through all levels of Soviet society:

• The Red Army: three of five marshals, thirteen of fifteen army commanders, approximately 30,000 officers arrested or executed
• The party apparatus: estimates suggest 600,000 to 700,000 party members arrested
• Intellectuals, engineers, scientists: arrests of technical specialists accused of "wrecking"
• Ordinary citizens: denunciations, quotas for arrests, and sweeping categories of "enemies"

Functional Analysis:

The Terror served multiple functions beyond simple consolidation of Stalin's personal power:

• Eliminated any possibility of organized opposition or alternative leadership
• Created an atmosphere of fear that made dissent psychologically impossible
• Provided scapegoats for economic difficulties and policy failures
• Supplied labor for the expanding Gulag system
• Renewed the revolutionary fervor and sense of embattlement that justified extreme measures
• Established Stalin's personal authority as absolute and unchallengeable

4.4 The Scientific and Technical Legacy

Soviet scientific and technological achievements during and after the Stalin era present a significant paradox. The same system that imprisoned and executed scientists and engineers also mobilized resources for scientific advancement on a massive scale.

Educational Expansion:

• Dramatic increase in technical education and literacy programs
• Establishment of specialized research institutes and academies
• Training of scientists and engineers from working-class backgrounds previously excluded from higher education

Research Priorities:

• Heavy emphasis on military-relevant technologies
• Nuclear weapons program begun in 1943, achieving first test in 1949
• Rocket and space technology leading to Sputnik (1957) and Gagarin's flight (1961)
• Theoretical physics, mathematics, and chemistry receiving substantial state support

The Sharashka System:

A peculiar feature of Stalinist science was the sharashka—special NKVD prisons where arrested scientists and engineers continued research under guard. Notable examples included:

• Sergei Korolev (rocketry) imprisoned 1938-1944, later led Soviet space program
• Andrei Tupolev (aircraft design) imprisoned 1937-1944, later designed Soviet strategic bombers
• Lev Landau (theoretical physics) imprisoned 1938-1939, later won Nobel Prize

This system embodied Soviet contradictions: the state simultaneously destroyed and depended upon technical expertise, persecuted and promoted scientific achievement.

Part V: Trotsky in Exile and the Continuation of Ideological Struggle

5.1 Exile as Political Strategy

Stalin's decision to exile rather than immediately execute Trotsky reflected several calculations:

Domestic Considerations: In 1929, executing a founder of the Red Army and hero of the Revolution would have seemed excessive to many party members. Exile appeared moderate, even merciful, compared to the violence of collectivization being unleashed simultaneously.

International Factors: The Soviet Union sought diplomatic recognition and trade relationships with Western powers. Executing a prominent international figure might complicate these efforts.

Psychological Warfare: Exile promised to render Trotsky impotent while preserving him as a useful enemy whose supposed machinations could be blamed for domestic problems.

These calculations proved partially correct. Exile did isolate Trotsky from direct influence on Soviet politics. However, it also freed him to conduct sustained critique of Stalinist policies without the constraints of party discipline.

5.2 Intellectual Production in Exile

Trotsky's exile years (1929-1940) produced substantial written output:

Historical Works:

• History of the Russian Revolution (1930-1932): A masterwork combining participant account with historical analysis
• My Life (1930): Autobiography defending his revolutionary record
• The Stalin School of Falsification (1932): Documenting how Stalin rewrote revolutionary history

Political Analysis:

• The Revolution Betrayed (1936): Comprehensive critique of Soviet bureaucratization
• The Permanent Revolution (1930): Full elaboration of his theoretical alternative to Stalin
• Regular articles in the Bulletin of the Opposition analyzing Soviet developments

Contemporary Engagement:

• Analysis of fascism's rise, particularly in Germany
• Critique of Communist International policies and Popular Front strategy
• Warnings about Stalin's purges and their implications for Soviet defense

These works established Trotsky as Stalin's primary ideological opponent and preserved an alternative Marxist tradition critical of Soviet authoritarianism.

5.3 Organizational Efforts: The Fourth International

In 1938, Trotsky founded the Fourth International as an alternative to Stalin's Communist International (Comintern). This organization aimed to unite revolutionary socialists committed to Trotsky's analysis and opposed to Stalinism.

Founding Principles:

• Opposition to Stalinist bureaucracy and national conservatism
• Commitment to permanent revolution and international socialism
• Defense of workers' democracy and party pluralism
• Rejection of Popular Front alliances with bourgeois parties

Practical Limitations:

• Membership remained small, numbering in the thousands rather than millions
• National sections faced persecution from both fascist regimes and Stalinist communists
• Internal divisions over theory and tactics
• Inability to influence major historical events or attract mass working-class support

The Fourth International's marginality confirmed Stalin's political judgment: Trotsky's ideas, however sophisticated, could not compete with Stalin's control over state resources and established communist parties.

5.4 Personal Tragedy and Isolation

Exile brought not only political isolation but personal catastrophe. Stalin's reach extended far beyond Soviet borders:

Family Losses:

• Daughter Zinaida: Suicide in Berlin (1933)
• Daughter Nina: Died in Moscow (1928)
• Son Sergei: Arrested and executed in USSR (1937)
• Son Leon Sedov: Died in Paris under suspicious circumstances (1938)
• Former wives and their family members: Arrested, imprisoned, or executed

These losses transformed Trotsky's final years into a personal tragedy entwined with political defeat. The systematic elimination of his family served both as revenge and as a demonstration of Stalin's absolute power.

Part VI: The Final Assassination

6.1 NKVD Operations Against Trotsky

Soviet intelligence devoted substantial resources to eliminating Trotsky. The operations involved:

Infiltration: Agents penetrated Trotsky's organization through various routes. Mark Zborowski infiltrated Trotsky's secretariat in Paris, providing intelligence on activities, correspondence, and plans. His information may have facilitated Leon Sedov's death.

First Assassination Attempt (May 24, 1940): Led by Mexican muralist and Stalinist David Alfaro Siqueiros, approximately twenty men attacked Trotsky's compound. Despite firing hundreds of rounds into his bedroom, they failed to kill him. The attack's failure demonstrated both Stalin's determination and the operation's comparative crudeness.

The Mercader Operation: This sophisticated plan deployed Ramón Mercader, a Spanish communist and NKVD agent operating under false identities. Through a multi-year operation, Mercader:

• Cultivated a relationship with Sylvia Ageloff, an American Trotskyist volunteer
• Gained access to Trotsky's household through this connection
• Built trust through months of regular visits
• Positioned himself to strike when opportunity arose

6.2 August 20, 1940

The assassination followed a simple but effective plan. Mercader arrived at Trotsky's compound requesting feedback on an article. As Trotsky sat at his desk reading the document, Mercader struck him in the head with an ice axe concealed in his raincoat.

Trotsky's Final Hours:

Despite the devastating blow, Trotsky did not die immediately. He fought with his assassin, cried out for help, and retained consciousness long enough to prevent guards from killing Mercader. His last reported words included: "Tell our friends I am sure of the victory of the Fourth International" and instructions that the assassin must be made to talk.

Trotsky was rushed to hospital but died the following day, August 21, 1940, at age sixty. His funeral in Mexico City attracted approximately 300,000 people, demonstrating that while politically defeated, he retained symbolic power as a martyr to Stalinist tyranny.

6.3 Mercader's Fate and Soviet Celebration

Ramón Mercader maintained his cover identity during interrogation and trial, claiming to be "Jacques Mornard" acting from personal motives rather than Soviet direction. Mexican authorities sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment—the maximum possible for homicide in Mexico.

Upon his release in 1960, Mercader traveled to the Soviet Union via Cuba. There he received:

• Hero of the Soviet Union medal (secretly awarded)
• Substantial pension and residence privileges
• The satisfaction of having completed one of history's most significant political assassinations

The Soviet Union never officially acknowledged directing the assassination until archival revelations decades later.

Part VII: Comparative Analysis and Historical Judgment

7.1 Why Stalin Won: An Institutional Analysis

Stalin's victory can be attributed to several convergent factors:

Institutional Position: The General Secretary post provided control over appointments, information, and organizational procedures. In a one-party state where political competition occurred within party structures, this advantage proved decisive.

Strategic Patience: Stalin demonstrated willingness to wait for opportunities, building power incrementally rather than seeking dramatic confrontations. His methodical approach suited bureaucratic politics better than Trotsky's preference for ideological clarity and principled stands.

Coalition Building: Stalin's tactical flexibility enabled him to form temporary alliances with various factions, using each against the others before discarding them. His lack of commitment to particular policies (except maintaining power) paradoxically became an advantage.

Understanding of Psychology: Stalin demonstrated sophisticated understanding of human motivations—ambition, fear, self-interest, loyalty—and manipulated these effectively. His system of rewards and punishments created incentives for cooperation even among those who privately doubted or disliked him.

Control of Narrative: Stalin's management of Lenin's funeral, the suppression of Lenin's Testament, and the construction of a "Lenin cult" with himself as heir demonstrated his grasp of symbolic politics.

7.2 Why Trotsky Lost: A Political Analysis

Trotsky's defeat resulted from multiple weaknesses:

Political Naiveté: Despite his revolutionary experience, Trotsky proved surprisingly inept at factional maneuvering. He underestimated both Stalin personally and the importance of bureaucratic position relative to ideological prestige.

Ideological Rigidity: Trotsky's commitment to theoretical consistency prevented tactical flexibility. His unwillingness to compromise principles for political advantage proved self-defeating in an environment where survival required adaptability.

Arrogance and Isolation: Trotsky's intellectual brilliance and awareness of his own achievements created distance from potential allies. Many Old Bolsheviks resented his perceived superiority, reducing their willingness to support him against Stalin.

Timing and Health: Trotsky's illness caused crucial absences during key moments, including Lenin's funeral. These absences, partly due to genuine health problems and partly to Stalin's manipulation of information, damaged his political position.

Misjudgment of the Historical Moment: Trotsky believed revolutionary ideals and historical forces would ultimately prevail over bureaucratic manipulation. This belief, while morally admirable, proved politically fatal in the 1920s Soviet context.

7.3 The Question of Alternatives

Could Soviet history have unfolded differently under Trotsky's leadership? This counterfactual question admits no definitive answer but merits consideration:

Arguments for Significant Difference:

• Trotsky's commitment to party democracy might have preserved internal debate mechanisms
• His internationalism might have prevented Stalin's nationalist turn and alliance with Hitler (1939-1941)
• His intellectual sophistication might have avoided some of the cruder aspects of Stalinist ideology
• The scale of political terror might have been reduced, as Trotsky lacked Stalin's paranoid psychology
• Soviet cultural and intellectual life might have retained more vitality and openness

Arguments for Limited Difference:

• Trotsky's own Civil War record included summary executions, hostage-taking, and ruthless repression
• He supported the 1921 ban on factions and suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion
• His commitment to rapid industrialization might have produced similar collectivization horrors
• One-party dictatorship's internal logic pushes toward authoritarianism regardless of leadership
• The objective conditions—backwardness, isolation, external threats—would have constrained any leader

Synthesis:

The most balanced view acknowledges that while some differences were likely, the fundamental structures of Soviet authoritarianism emerged from the Bolshevik seizure of power itself rather than Stalin's personal characteristics. The ban on factions, the party's monopoly on power, the use of terror, and the prioritization of industrialization all predated Stalin's dictatorship. Stalin perhaps took these tendencies to unprecedented extremes, but he did not invent them. A Soviet Union led by Trotsky would likely still have been authoritarian, but the specific forms and intensity of repression might have differed significantly.

7.4 Ideological Legacies

History has rendered complex judgments on the competing ideologies:

Stalin's "Socialism in One Country":

Successes:

• Achieved rapid industrialization and military power
• Provided ideological justification for Soviet state priorities
• Proved practically effective in building a stable regime
• Demonstrated that socialism (of some form) could survive without immediate world revolution

Failures:

• Created a nationalist, conservative form of communism at odds with Marx's internationalism
• Justified isolationism and suspicion of foreign communist parties
• Enabled the Hitler-Stalin Pact and subsequent territorial expansion
• Ultimately proved unsustainable, as the Soviet model collapsed in 1991

Trotsky's "Permanent Revolution":

Strengths:

• Remained true to Marxist internationalist principles
• Correctly identified bureaucratization as a fundamental problem
• Preserved space for critical analysis of Soviet development
• Influenced later leftist movements seeking alternatives to Stalinism

Weaknesses:

• Proved impractical in the historical circumstances of the 1920s-1930s
• Failed to attract mass support or achieve political success anywhere
• Underestimated nationalism's power and appeal
• Could not answer the practical question of how socialism survives isolation

Both ideologies were ultimately superseded by historical developments neither could have anticipated. The Soviet collapse vindicated neither position completely.

Part VIII: Contemporary Relevance and Lessons

8.1 Authoritarian Succession Dynamics

The Stalin-Trotsky struggle illuminates patterns visible in contemporary authoritarian systems:

Institutional vs. Charismatic Authority: Modern authoritarian regimes face similar tensions between personal prestige and institutional control. Leaders who achieve power through revolutionary credentials or charismatic appeal must still construct institutional mechanisms to maintain authority. Contemporary examples include:

• Post-revolutionary Iran's evolution from Khomeini's charismatic leadership to institutionalized clerical rule
• China's transition from Mao's personality cult to collective leadership and now Xi Jinping's re-personalization of power
• Russia's path from Soviet collapse through oligarchic chaos to Putin's centralized authority

The Succession Problem: Authoritarian systems lack legitimate mechanisms for peaceful leadership transition. The Stalin-Trotsky conflict demonstrates how succession struggles can fundamentally reshape regimes. Current authoritarian states face similar uncertainties:

• China's succession mechanisms remain unclear beyond Xi Jinping's tenure
• Russia's post-Putin future is fundamentally uncertain despite formal constitutional provisions
• North Korea's dynastic succession model represents one solution but requires specific conditions

Information Control: Stalin's manipulation of party communications, his control over what members knew and when they knew it, prefigures modern authoritarian information management through internet controls, propaganda systems, and surveillance networks.

8.2 Modernization and Repression

Stalin's industrialization campaign poses uncomfortable questions about development pathways:

The Authoritarian Modernization Argument:

Some analysts argue that authoritarian systems can achieve rapid development more efficiently than democratic ones because they can:

• Mobilize resources without electoral constraints
• Implement unpopular but necessary reforms
• Maintain stability during disruptive transitions
• Plan long-term without political business cycles

China's economic rise since 1978 has renewed these arguments, with some observers suggesting that authoritarian capitalism may be more effective than democratic alternatives for developing countries.

Counterarguments:

• Development can occur through democratic means, as demonstrated by postwar Japan, South Korea (after democratization), Taiwan, and others
• Authoritarian development often creates inefficiencies through lack of information feedback and accountability
• The human costs of authoritarian modernization create moral problems regardless of economic outcomes
• Long-term sustainability requires institutional flexibility that authoritarianism inhibits

The Stalin Case:

Soviet industrialization under Stalin provides ambiguous evidence:

• Yes, rapid industrial growth occurred
• Yes, the Soviet Union became a military superpower
• But: human costs were catastrophic
• But: long-term efficiency problems accumulated
• But: the system ultimately collapsed, suggesting its developmental model was unsustainable

The key lesson may be that while authoritarian systems can achieve rapid quantitative growth in specific sectors, they struggle with the quality, efficiency, and sustainability challenges that determine long-term success.

8.3 Great Power Competition and Ideological Struggle

The Stalin-Trotsky conflict's international dimension resonates with contemporary geopolitical competition:

Competing Models of Governance:

Just as "socialism in one country" versus "permanent revolution" represented competing visions of communism's global future, today's great power competition involves competing models:

• Liberal democratic capitalism (United States and allies)
• Authoritarian state capitalism (China)
• Authoritarian nationalism (Russia)
• Various hybrid and alternative models

Ideological Competition:

While today's ideological divisions seem less sharp than Cold War communism versus capitalism, genuine differences exist regarding:

• The role of state versus market in economic organization
• Individual rights versus collective goals and social stability
• Democratic accountability versus technocratic efficiency
• Universal values versus civilizational particularism

The Role of Power:

Stalin's victory over Trotsky owed more to power accumulation than ideological persuasion. Similarly, contemporary international competition may be determined less by which system is morally superior or theoretically sound than by which powers successfully mobilize resources, maintain internal cohesion, and project influence effectively.

8.4 The Danger of Ideological Certainty

Both Stalin and Trotsky exemplified the dangers of ideological certainty combined with political power:

Trotsky's Certainty: His belief in the scientific inevitability of permanent revolution and his confidence that history would vindicate his position led to political passivity at crucial moments. He assumed that being right theoretically would translate into political victory.

Stalin's Cynicism: While less ideologically rigid, Stalin's willingness to instrumentalize ideology—adopting any theoretical position that served his power interests—created a system where truth became whatever served state purposes. This produced its own pathologies: pseudoscience (Lysenkoism), historical falsification, and the subordination of all knowledge to political requirements.

Contemporary Parallels:

Modern ideological conflicts exhibit similar patterns:

• Religious fundamentalism that subordinates human welfare to doctrinal purity
• Market fundamentalism that treats economic theory as natural law regardless of social consequences
• Nationalist ideologies that justify repression in the name of collective identity
• Technological utopianism that assumes innovation automatically produces progress

The Stalin-Trotsky conflict suggests that political systems require mechanisms to challenge ideological certainty, admit error, and adapt to changing circumstances—mechanisms that authoritarian systems systematically lack.

Part IX: Methodological Reflections and Historical Debates

9.1 The Totalitarian Model

Early Cold War scholarship interpreted Stalinism through the "totalitarian" framework, emphasizing:

• Complete state control over all aspects of social life
• Ideological monopoly and the requirement of active belief
• Terror as a systematic tool of governance
• The personality cult and the leader's decisive role

This model illuminated important features of Stalinist rule but faced criticism for:

• Overstating the regime's coherence and effectiveness
• Underestimating spaces of negotiation and resistance
• Drawing overly simple parallels between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
• Treating ideology as mere propaganda rather than examining its internal logic

9.2 Revisionist Perspectives

From the 1970s onward, revisionist historians challenged totalitarian interpretations by emphasizing:

• Social history from below rather than elite politics
• The regime's responsiveness to popular pressures and social forces
• Ideological commitment rather than cynicism among party members
• Institutional complexity and factional conflicts within the system

Revisionism corrected totalitarian oversimplifications but sometimes minimized the terror's centrality and the extent of coercion in Soviet society.

9.3 Post-Soviet Archival Research

The opening of Soviet archives after 1991 enabled more nuanced analysis:

• Documentation of terror's scale exceeded previous estimates
• Evidence of Stalin's personal involvement in specific repression decisions
• Revelations about the NKVD's operations against Trotsky
• Material demonstrating both ideological commitment and cynical manipulation

Current scholarship synthesizes insights from multiple approaches, recognizing:

• The system's genuine ideological dimensions alongside instrumental use of ideology
• The interplay between state initiatives and social responses
• The centrality of violence while acknowledging spaces of agency
• Stalin's personal role while recognizing structural factors

9.4 Comparative Analysis: Stalin and Other Dictators

Comparing Stalin with other twentieth-century dictators illuminates distinctive and common features:

Stalin vs. Hitler:

• Both employed terror systematically and created totalizing ideological systems
• Hitler's ideology was fundamentally racial-biological; Stalin's was ostensibly class-based
• Nazi genocide targeted groups for extermination; Stalinist terror was more diffuse and changeable
• Stalin achieved longer tenure and survived to die naturally

Stalin vs. Mao:

• Both led communist revolutions and implemented forced modernization
• Mao's Cultural Revolution was more chaotic; Stalinism more bureaucratically systematic
• Mao actively mobilized masses against the party apparatus; Stalin used the apparatus for control
• Death tolls comparable (though Mao's higher in absolute numbers)

Stalin vs. Mussolini:

• Mussolini's fascism was less totalizing and less murderous
• Italian fascism retained significant institutional pluralism (monarchy, church)
• Mussolini lacked Stalin's systematic approach to eliminating opposition
• Fascist Italy was ultimately a junior partner to Nazi Germany; the USSR became a superpower

These comparisons suggest that while Stalin shared characteristics with other dictators, the combination of ideological ambition, institutional control, willingness to accept mass casualties, and strategic patience was distinctive.

Part X: Conclusion

10.1 Summary of Findings

This analysis has examined the Stalin-Trotsky conflict through multiple lenses: institutional, ideological, biographical, and comparative. Several conclusions emerge:

On the Succession Struggle:

Stalin's victory resulted primarily from institutional control rather than ideological superiority or personal charisma. His position as General Secretary provided decisive advantages in a system where political competition occurred within party structures. Trotsky's revolutionary prestige and intellectual brilliance proved insufficient against systematic bureaucratic power.

On Policy Outcomes:

Stalin's industrialization policies achieved quantitative modernization at catastrophic human cost. The Soviet Union became an industrial and military superpower, but the methods employed—forced collectivization, mass terror, the Gulag system—created profound moral problems and long-term inefficiencies. Whether alternative paths existed remains contested, but the human toll of the chosen path is undeniable.

On Ideological Competition:

Neither Stalin's "socialism in one country" nor Trotsky's "permanent revolution" proved fully successful. Stalin's approach enabled Soviet survival and expansion but created a rigid, ultimately unsustainable system. Trotsky's internationalism maintained theoretical coherence but failed practically and attracted limited support. Both ideologies were ultimately superseded by historical developments neither predicted.

On Historical Significance:

The conflict shaped twentieth-century history profoundly, determining:

• The character of Soviet governance for decades
• The model exported to Eastern Europe, China, and other communist states
• The trajectory of international communism and the Cold War
• Debates about revolution, dictatorship, and modernization that continue today

10.2 Contemporary Relevance

The Stalin-Trotsky conflict offers several lessons for understanding contemporary politics:

First, succession in authoritarian systems remains fundamentally problematic. Without legitimate mechanisms for leadership transition, succession crises can reshape entire systems. The institutional versus charismatic authority tension that the Stalin-Trotsky conflict exemplified persists in contemporary authoritarian regimes.

Second, the relationship between modernization and political systems remains contested. Stalin's industrialization through authoritarianism continues to influence debates about development pathways, particularly given China's economic rise under one-party rule. However, the Soviet system's ultimate collapse suggests that authoritarian modernization faces sustainability challenges.

Third, ideological competition between governance models continues, though in different forms. Contemporary great power competition involves competing visions of political organization, economic management, and social values, echoing earlier ideological struggles.

Fourth, the subordination of truth to political power remains a danger. Stalin's willingness to rewrite history, suppress inconvenient facts, and instrumentalize ideology for power purposes prefigures contemporary concerns about authoritarian information control and the politicization of knowledge.

Fifth, the role of institutions versus individuals in shaping historical outcomes remains central to political analysis. The Stalin-Trotsky conflict demonstrates that institutional position can trump personal qualities, but also that individual choices matter—Stalin's patient accumulation of power was not inevitable.

10.3 Limitations and Future Research

This analysis has examined the Stalin-Trotsky conflict within specific parameters, but important questions remain:

Gender and Social Dimensions: This study has focused primarily on elite male politics. Future research might examine how gender operated within Soviet power structures and how women's experiences of collectivization, terror, and industrialization differed from dominant narratives.

Regional Variations: The Soviet Union was a multi-ethnic empire. How did the Stalin-Trotsky conflict play out differently in non-Russian regions? How did nationality policy intersect with succession politics?

Cultural and Intellectual History: This analysis has emphasized political and economic dimensions. Deeper examination of how the conflict shaped Soviet culture, science, and intellectual life would enrich understanding.

Comparative Communist Studies: Systematic comparison with other communist revolutions—Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban, Yugoslav—might illuminate which features of Soviet development were distinctive and which were common to communist state formation.

Long-term Consequences: The Soviet collapse occurred fifty years after Stalin's death and fifty-one years after Trotsky's assassination. Tracing causal connections from 1920s-1930s developments to 1991 requires careful analysis of intervening factors.

10.4 Final Reflections

The struggle between Stalin and Trotsky was both a personal rivalry and a contest between different visions of revolutionary politics. It posed fundamental questions about power, ideology, and historical change that remain unresolved:

• Can revolutionary movements achieve their emancipatory goals, or do the means required for seizing power corrupt those goals?
• What determines success in political struggles—ideas, institutions, personal qualities, historical circumstances, or some combination?
• How should modernization be achieved in backward countries—gradually or rapidly, democratically or authoritatively?
• What is the relationship between individual agency and structural forces in shaping historical outcomes?

These questions admit no simple answers. The Stalin-Trotsky conflict demonstrates the complexity of historical causation and the difficulty of disentangling individual choices from institutional constraints and structural conditions.

What is clear is that Stalin's victory and Trotsky's defeat shaped the twentieth century profoundly. Stalin built a superpower through methods that killed millions and created a system that eventually collapsed under its own contradictions. Trotsky preserved an alternative vision of socialism but remained politically marginal and was ultimately murdered by the regime he had helped create.

The tragedy of the conflict lies not only in its human costs but in its demonstration that revolutionary ideals can be betrayed by the very movements that claim to embody them. Both men began as committed revolutionaries seeking human emancipation through socialism. Their conflict produced neither emancipation nor socialism in any form Marx would have recognized, but rather a bureaucratic dictatorship that achieved industrial modernization at the price of unprecedented state violence.

The enduring lesson is not that revolutions inevitably produce tyranny—history contains counterexamples—but that revolutionary transformation creates dangerous opportunities for the accumulation of power without accountability. The structures established to achieve revolutionary goals can become instruments of oppression. The emergency measures of revolutionary crisis can become permanent features of governance. The willingness to use violence against class enemies can expand to include anyone deemed politically unreliable.

Stalin and Trotsky both contributed to creating the conditions that made Stalinist dictatorship possible, though Stalin bears vastly greater responsibility for the specific forms and intensity of Soviet repression. Understanding how their conflict unfolded, why Stalin triumphed, and what consequences followed remains essential for grappling with questions about power, ideology, and political transformation that continue to shape our world.

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Author's Note: This analysis has attempted to maintain scholarly objectivity while acknowledging that complete neutrality regarding events involving mass violence and political murder is neither possible nor desirable. The goal has been fair assessment of both historical actors and their legacies, recognizing achievements while neither minimizing crimes nor treating inevitable what was contingent.

Has the Age of Identity Replaced the Post-War Age of Ideology in the Western World?

Challenges, Tensions, and Strategic Implications

Introduction: From Ideological Order to Identity Fracture

For much of the twentieth century, Western political life was structured by a relatively stable ideological architecture. Liberal democracy, social democracy, and various forms of conservatism operated within a shared epistemic framework rooted in Enlightenment rationalism, economic modernity, and the nation-state. Even during moments of intense conflict—fascism versus liberalism, capitalism versus communism—the antagonists shared a belief that history progressed through identifiable ideological projects capable of universal application.

That architecture has now fractured.

The early twenty-first century is witnessing not merely political polarization, but a deeper transformation in the grammar of politics itself. Ideology, once anchored in coherent economic doctrines and institutional visions, has increasingly been displaced by identity—a mode of political organization grounded in cultural belonging, historical grievance, and symbolic recognition rather than programmatic coherence. This shift does not simply represent a new phase of political contestation; it marks a structural reordering of how legitimacy, power, and collective meaning are produced in Western societies.

This paper argues that the West has entered a post-ideological but not post-political era—one in which identity functions as the primary medium of political mobilization, reshaping domestic governance, international alignment, and the strategic behavior of states. The consequences of this transformation are profound, and they increasingly define the operating environment confronting the G7. Recent empirical evidence from 2024-2025 confirms the deepening and acceleration of these trends, revealing a democratic order under unprecedented strain.

I. The Post-War Ideological Settlement: Coherence, Constraint, and Consensus

The post-1945 Western order rested on a delicate synthesis of ideological commitments. Liberal democracy provided political legitimacy; Keynesian economics underwrote social stability; and multilateral institutions managed interstate competition. Ideology served not merely as belief but as structure—a shared grammar that constrained political imagination and made conflict intelligible.

Even ideological opposition was systemically stabilizing. Social democracy and Christian democracy contested distribution without rejecting capitalism; communism, though antagonistic, offered a coherent alternative system against which liberalism could define itself. Political struggle occurred within bounded ideological universes, reinforcing the idea that history had direction and that political progress was cumulative.

This architecture began to erode in the 1970s. Economic stagnation, deindustrialization, and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system undermined the material foundations of post-war compromise. The neoliberal turn that followed—often mischaracterized as an ideology—was in fact a technocratic response to crisis, prioritizing efficiency, market rationality, and depoliticization. Politics increasingly became managerial; ideology thinned into governance.

The paradox, however, was that the erosion of ideology did not depoliticize society. It merely displaced conflict into other registers. As recent scholarship from the Quarterly Journal of Economics demonstrates, since 2010 the political systems of advanced democracies have undergone momentous change: economic conflict over redistribution has weakened substantially, while conflict over cultural issues such as immigration, race, and abortion has intensified dramatically.

II. The Structural Conditions for the Rise of Identity

The rise of identity politics cannot be understood as a cultural aberration or generational pathology. It is a structural response to four converging transformations, whose effects have become more pronounced and empirically documented in recent years.

1. Economic Disembedding and Social Fragmentation

Globalization and financialization severed the link between national economic performance and individual material security. As class-based solidarities eroded, individuals increasingly sought meaning and protection through ascriptive identities—ethnic, racial, religious, or cultural. Identity became a substitute for the solidarities once provided by labor institutions, welfare states, and mass parties.

Research from Bocconi University analyzing data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study reveals that in the United States, the share of citizens identifying with "low-trust" ideologies increased from 30% in the late 1980s to 50% by the mid-2000s, with this "disappearing center" phenomenon now evident across multiple Western democracies. Questions related to trust in institutions have emerged as central to defining citizens' ideological positions, beyond the traditional left-right axis.

2. The Hollowing of Political Representation

As political parties converged around technocratic governance, ideological choice narrowed. Voters experienced a growing disconnect between electoral participation and substantive influence. Identity politics filled this vacuum by offering moral clarity and emotional resonance where policy debate appeared technocratic, opaque, or predetermined.

The most comprehensive analysis of political trust to date, published in the British Journal of Political Science in early 2025, examined 3,377 surveys covering 143 countries between 1958 and 2019, representing over five million respondents. The findings are stark: trust in parliament declined by approximately nine percentage points from 1990 to 2019 across democracies globally. Trust in parliament is declining in 36 democracies, including Argentina, Brazil, France, Italy, Spain, South Korea, Australia, and the United States, and has risen in only six countries. Critically, while trust in representative institutions declined, trust in non-representative institutions such as police rose by 13 points, pointing to a specific crisis of confidence in elected representatives rather than state institutions generally.

3. The Media and Algorithmic Amplification of Difference

Digital platforms transformed identity from a social attribute into a political weapon. Algorithms reward emotional intensity, grievance, and moral absolutism. Identity narratives—simpler, more visceral, and more polarizing—outperform complex policy discourse in attention economies, reinforcing fragmentation.

Recent research on climate polarization, published in Politics and Governance in 2025, reveals how algorithmic systems favor sensationalism over nuance, deepening divides between opposing political factions. This "techno-affective polarization" exacerbates political debates beyond healthy disagreement into increasingly binary "us versus them" antagonisms. Studies across multiple democracies show that populist leaders have effectively weaponized social media platforms, with figures like Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro fundamentally altering news cycles through inflammatory content that treats the media as part of an insider establishment.

4. The Crisis of Universalism

Post-war liberalism assumed that universal rights and rational deliberation would gradually dissolve parochial identities. Instead, globalization exposed the uneven distribution of its benefits, delegitimizing universalist claims and elevating demands for recognition over redistribution. The result has been a re-politicization of identity as the primary currency of justice.

A 2025 study published in Frontiers in Political Science argues that Western democratic systems now face an "antinomian" challenge—irresolvable contradictions between universalist principles and particular expressions of popular will. The liberal focus on freedom, individual rights, and rule of law must coexist with republican emphases on equality, collective will, and civic virtue, yet the balance between these poles has become increasingly unstable as identity conflicts intensify.

III. Identity as the New Political Grammar

Crucially, identity politics does not merely coexist with ideology; it reconfigures it. Where ideology sought to explain how society should be organized, identity politics asks who belongs, who speaks, and whose suffering counts. It transforms politics from a contest over material arrangements into a struggle over symbolic hierarchy and moral legitimacy.

This transformation has several consequences, now extensively documented:

Moralization of Politics

Disagreement becomes moral transgression. Opponents are not wrong but illegitimate, ignorant, or malicious. Research on affective polarization published in 2024-2025 reveals a troubling trend: while citizens may not be more ideologically polarized than before in most Western democracies, contemporary polarization is increasingly characterized by a disproportionate weight of out-group dislike. Analysis of 143 elections across 12 Western democracies since the 1960s shows a generalized decline in out-party evaluations and a growing prevalence of "out-party hate" versus "in-party love" over time. In several countries, citizens now express stronger negative attitudes toward opposing parties than positive attitudes toward their own.

Erosion of Universalism

Rights are increasingly framed as contingent upon identity rather than inherent in shared humanity. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's 2025 update notes that populist movements paradoxically constitute their own form of identity politics, construing "true citizens" narrowly and exclusively, often marked by white supremacism, misogyny, and homophobia. Judith Butler's 2024 book "Who's Afraid of Gender?" examines how feminist and anti-racist interventions are portrayed by populist movements as dangerous to the nation, family, and tradition—revealing how universalist progressive claims are reframed as particularist identity impositions.

Fragmentation of the Public Sphere

Political discourse fractures into parallel moral communities with incompatible premises. A 2025 study on climate policy polarization found that disagreements on climate-relevant matters have become increasingly tied to party support across 36 countries from 1993 to 2020. This alignment of policy positions with partisan identity makes it progressively harder to build broad-based political support for climate reform or other collective challenges. The research reveals that growing partisan polarization is not explained by changes in linkage to economic ideology or levels of general societal disagreement, but rather by the intensifying connection between policy positions and partisan identity itself.

Instrumentalization by Elites

Identity becomes a tool for elite mobilization, distraction, or legitimation in the absence of credible economic narratives. A 2025 article in International Affairs examining populist foreign policy notes that while populist leaders deploy confrontational rhetoric around identity and sovereignty, there often exists a significant gap between discourse and actual policy implementation. This "bark versus bite" phenomenon suggests that identity mobilization serves primarily as a political strategy rather than reflecting substantive policy commitments.

Importantly, this is not confined to the political left. Nationalist and civilizational discourses on the right similarly mobilize identity—often in reactionary or exclusionary forms—revealing that identity politics is not a partisan deviation but a systemic condition. Research on nationalist populism published in 2024 shows how leaders like Modi, Bolsonaro, and Orbán have positioned themselves as defenders of national identity against cultural imperialism, using crisis narratives and fear to mobilize support while restricting civil liberties in the name of "saving" the nation.

IV. The Deepening Crisis: Empirical Evidence from 2024-2025

Recent data reveals the acceleration and intensification of identity-driven political fragmentation:

The Disappearing Political Center

Research from the Economic Journal analyzing World Values Survey data through 2024 identifies a "disappearing center" across Western democracies. In the United States, citizens identifying with centrist ideologies declined dramatically while those holding "low-trust" anti-establishment positions increased from 30% to 50%. Similar trends, though less pronounced, appear across European countries. This ideological fragmentation correlates with declining trust in institutions, creating conditions where populist alternatives become increasingly attractive.

Affective Polarization Becomes Structural

Multiple studies from 2024-2025 document that affective polarization—defined as the gap between positive feelings toward one's own party and negative feelings toward opposing parties—has become structurally embedded. While the United States leads in intensity, the phenomenon has spread across Western democracies. Research published in Public Opinion Quarterly in 2025 analyzing 143 elections across 12 democracies reveals that contemporary polarization is increasingly driven by out-group hostility rather than in-group loyalty. This shift from ideological disagreement to emotional antagonism has profound implications for democratic stability.

Climate Change as Identity Battleground

Climate policy has emerged as a case study in how identity supersedes ideology. Research published in multiple journals through 2025 demonstrates that climate change has become one of the most polarized political issues globally, with political identity now predicting climate attitudes more strongly than scientific literacy, personal experience with climate impacts, or economic considerations. Studies show that when political identity is made salient, individuals' climate beliefs shift to align with partisan positions—a phenomenon called "identity-protective cognition."

Significantly, analysis of U.S. presidential campaign rhetoric from 2016-2020 reveals that both Republican and Democratic candidates framed climate change primarily through nationalist rhetoric, dividing over which position better strengthened American national identity and power. This embedding of climate debate within struggles over national identity exemplifies "nationalist polarization"—where elites draw from competing conceptions of national identity to drive polarization over policy problems.

Democratic Backsliding and Trust Erosion

The Democracy Index 2025 reports continued global democratic deterioration, with civil liberties, electoral integrity, and public trust weakening across all major regions. The OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, conducted in late 2023 with nearly 60,000 responses across 30 countries, found that 44% of people had low or no trust in national government compared to 39% with high or moderately high trust. Only around 40% believe government can balance intergenerational interests, regulate emerging technologies appropriately, or reduce greenhouse gas emissions effectively.

V. Geopolitical Consequences: The Strategic Cost of Fragmentation

At the international level, the identity turn weakens the West's capacity for coherent action in ways now clearly observable:

Undermining Strategic Consistency

Domestic identity conflicts increasingly constrain foreign policy as leaders calibrate external commitments to internal cultural battles. The European Council on Foreign Relations' 2025 analysis of populist influence on European foreign policy reveals significant divergence among G7 and EU members. Following European parliamentary elections in June 2024, radical-right groups became the third and fourth-largest in the EU legislature. The tilt away from mainstream politics is reshaping foreign policy, with countries divided over issues like Russia policy, China engagement, and climate commitments based primarily on domestic identity politics rather than strategic interests.

Eroding Normative Authority

When Western societies appear internally fragmented and morally incoherent, their claims to universal values ring hollow abroad. Authoritarian powers exploit this contradiction, portraying liberal democracy as hypocritical, unstable, and culturally imperial. Research on populism's international effects notes that democratic societies show more resilience than previously thought, yet their internal divisions provide authoritarian regimes with powerful propaganda material.

Hampering Collective Action

The G7 faces structural challenges—climate change, technological competition, demographic decline—that require long-term coordination. Identity-driven politics, however, incentivizes short-term symbolic victories over durable policy coalitions. The persistent polarization around climate policy exemplifies this dynamic: despite overwhelming scientific consensus and mounting evidence of climate impacts, policy action remains constrained by identity-based divisions that have intensified over the past decade.

VI. The Populist-Nationalist Synthesis

Perhaps the most significant development is the successful fusion of populist anti-elite rhetoric with nationalist identity appeals. Research published in Studies in Comparative International Development analyzes this "nationalist populism" as an amplifying force that exacerbates both positive and negative consequences of populism. Those beyond nationalist-populist boundaries face heightened hostility and discrimination, while those within benefit from enhanced opportunities—creating starkly polarized societies.

The 2025 thesis on "Populism and Western Democracies" documents how populist leaders across the West employ similar structural characteristics:

Crisis Narratives: Leaders like Bolsonaro, Modi, and Trump depict their nations as under existential threat from crime, corruption, immigration, or cultural decay. These narratives evoke fear and anger, creating conditions where extreme policies become acceptable.

Direct Communication: Social media platforms enable populist leaders to bypass traditional media filters, creating direct relationships with supporters while demonizing mainstream journalism as part of corrupt establishments.

Identity-Based Mobilization: Populists mobilize support not through detailed policy platforms but through appeals to threatened national, racial, or cultural identities. The Alternative for Germany (AfD), National Rally in France, and similar movements gain support primarily by channeling fears about cultural change and national identity loss.

Institutional Ambivalence: While rhetorically attacking "elites" and institutions, populist leaders often govern pragmatically, revealing gaps between discourse and policy. This pragmatism allows them to maintain power while sustaining anti-establishment postures.

VII. Beyond Identity: Toward a Post-Fragmentation Political Synthesis

The critical question is not whether identity politics will disappear—it will not—but whether it can be integrated into a broader political synthesis capable of sustaining democratic governance. Evidence from 2024-2025 suggests this integration faces severe obstacles but remains theoretically possible.

Such a synthesis would require:

Repoliticizing the Economic Sphere

Reconnecting political legitimacy to material outcomes—wages, housing, security—rather than moral signaling alone. Recent research confirms that economic grievances persist beneath identity conflicts. Studies linking distrust and populism show that negative economic outcomes correlate with both populist voting and institutional distrust. However, contemporary identity politics often obscures rather than addresses these material concerns. A genuine repoliticization would require political entrepreneurs to articulate economic visions that transcend identity divides while acknowledging identity-based inequalities.

Reconstructing Universalism Without Homogeneity

Articulating civic identities that are inclusive without being empty; pluralistic without dissolving into relativism. The 2025 Frontiers in Political Science article on democratic antinomies offers a framework: recognizing that democracies inherently contain irresolvable tensions between universal principles and particular expressions. Rather than seeking to eliminate these tensions, successful democracies balance them through "antinomic" arrangements that allow competing principles to coexist. This suggests universalism must be reconstructed not as cultural homogenization but as institutional frameworks accommodating diversity while maintaining democratic coherence.

Reasserting Institutional Mediation

Strengthening institutions that can translate social conflict into negotiated outcomes rather than performative antagonism. Research on political trust published through 2025 emphasizes that while trust in representative institutions has declined, trust in implementing institutions like police and civil service has remained stable or increased. This suggests citizens distinguish between political contestation and state capacity. Rebuilding trust requires not depoliticization but better institutional performance—responsive governance that demonstrates competence on issues citizens prioritize.

The challenge is formidable: a 2025 article in the Journal of European Public Policy examining protest movements notes that while "critical citizens" who combine democratic values with skepticism toward authorities can drive democratic advancement, declining trust can also signal fundamental disconnection between citizens and democratic institutions. The key distinction lies in whether distrust motivates engagement or withdrawal.

Reframing Identity as a Dimension, Not a Totality

Identity must be acknowledged without becoming the exclusive lens through which political life is interpreted. Research on breaking climate polarization published in 2024 proposes the acronym "BREAK" (Balance, Reactance, Essence of the problem, Adherence to ingroup norms, Knowledge) as a framework for understanding and addressing identity-based political divisions. This approach recognizes that identity concerns are legitimate but need not determine positions on all issues. Interventions that leverage superordinate identities (national, human, generational) can reduce polarization without denying particular identities.

Studies on climate interventions across 60 countries reveal a crucial finding: while political polarization of climate beliefs is substantial globally (with liberals believing and supporting climate policy more than conservatives), this "conceptual-behavioral polarization incongruence" results from conservatives acting despite not believing rather than liberals not acting on beliefs. This suggests identity and behavior can be partially decoupled through appropriate framings and interventions.

VIII. The Challenge of Affective Polarization

Perhaps the most insidious aspect of the identity turn is the rise of affective polarization—the transformation of political disagreement into personal hostility. Research published through 2025 reveals this phenomenon's depth and implications:

A meta-analysis of 143 elections across 12 Western democracies since the 1960s shows that while overall polarization levels have not uniformly increased, the character of polarization has fundamentally changed. Contemporary polarization is increasingly characterized by out-party hatred rather than in-party love. In many countries, citizens now express stronger negative feelings toward opposing parties than positive feelings toward their own—a concerning asymmetry that indicates politics has become primarily about opposing the enemy rather than supporting a vision.

Research distinguishes three forms of polarization, each requiring different interventions:

Opinion Polarization: Actual disagreement on policy positions. While significant, this remains within normal democratic bounds and is often overestimated.

Perceived Polarization: How different people think their views are from opposing groups. Studies consistently show this exceeds actual disagreement, suggesting significant misperception.

Affective Polarization: When disagreement transforms into judgments that opponents are "not good citizens" or "not good people." This form most threatens democratic functioning by making compromise appear morally unacceptable.

The 2025 literature emphasizes that affective polarization has distinct sociopolitical implications. When politics becomes primarily about expressing hostility toward out-groups rather than supporting in-group positions, democratic institutions struggle to translate preferences into compromises. Electoral losers increasingly view defeats not as temporary setbacks but as existential threats, undermining losers' consent—a cornerstone of democratic stability.

IX. International Dimensions: G7 and Global Order

The identity turn's implications extend beyond domestic politics to reshape international relations. Analysis from International Affairs' September 2024 special section on global populism reveals several patterns:

Foreign Policy Inconsistency: Populist governments often display gaps between confrontational rhetoric and pragmatic policy. Despite deep criticism of the international order, many populist parties prove "more bark than bite" in foreign policy. However, this inconsistency itself creates uncertainty that undermines alliances and multilateral cooperation.

Liberal Order Contestation: Populist movements actively work to hollow out the liberal international order from within, promoting illiberal alternatives. While democratic societies show resilience, the proliferation of identity-based populist movements across G7 countries fragments Western cohesion on critical issues.

Authoritarian Learning: Research shows authoritarian regimes have learned to exploit Western identity conflicts, using propaganda to portray liberal democracy as hypocritical, unstable, and culturally imperialist. China's narrative of its authoritarian system providing stability contrasts with Western "chaos," while Russia amplifies Western identity conflicts through information warfare.

Multilateral Paralysis: The European Council on Foreign Relations' June 2025 report projects scenarios where G7 cohesion continues eroding through 2029. With populist parties holding or influencing power across multiple G7 members, collective action on climate, technology governance, and security policy becomes increasingly difficult. Identity-based domestic politics prevents leaders from making commitments that might appear to prioritize international cooperation over national identity assertion.

X. Case Study: Climate Change as Identity Proxy War

Climate policy provides the clearest example of how identity has displaced ideology. Multiple studies from 2024-2025 document that:

Identity Predicts Position: Political identity now predicts climate attitudes more strongly than scientific literacy, personal climate experience, economic interests, or stated values. When partisan identity is made salient experimentally, individuals' climate beliefs shift to align with partisan positions—evidence of identity-protective cognition overriding other considerations.

Nationalist Framing Dominates: Analysis of U.S. presidential campaign rhetoric reveals both parties frame climate primarily through nationalist identity. Republicans emphasize energy independence and American sovereignty; Democrats emphasize American leadership and innovation. Both make climate about what strengthens American identity rather than about global collective action or intergenerational justice.

Interventions Show Limited Success: Large-scale experiments testing climate interventions across 60 countries find three interventions boost climate beliefs across ideological spectrum (emphasizing collective action, writing to future generations, and writing from future self). However, no tested intervention significantly increased actual climate behavior among self-identified conservatives, though some increased liberals' actions. This "conceptual-behavioral incongruence" suggests identity shapes stated beliefs more than behaviors.

Polarization Increasingly Structural: Longitudinal analysis across 36 countries from 1993-2020 shows growing partisan polarization on climate attitudes. This results not from increasing societal disagreement generally but from climate positions becoming increasingly tied to party support—a structural embedding of climate as partisan identity marker.

The implications are sobering: as climate change intensifies and requires coordinated international action, identity politics makes such coordination progressively harder. The issue becomes not "what does science say?" but "what does accepting this say about who I am?"

Conclusion: The End of an Era, Not the End of Politics

The age of ideology has not vanished; it has been disassembled and reconfigured. What we are witnessing is not a post-ideological world, but a post-coherent one—where ideological fragments circulate without an integrating framework. Evidence from 2024-2025 reveals this fragmentation has intensified and become structurally embedded across Western democracies.

The danger for Western societies lies not in identity itself, but in the absence of a unifying political project capable of integrating diversity into a shared vision of the future. Without such a project, identity hardens into faction, politics into spectacle, and governance into paralysis.

Several findings from recent research warrant emphasis:

Trust Collapse is Specific: While trust in representative institutions (parliaments, parties, governments) has declined dramatically across 36 democracies, trust in implementing institutions (police, civil service, courts) remains stable or has increased. This suggests the crisis is not of state capacity generally but of representative democracy specifically—citizens distinguish between governing competence and political responsiveness.

Affective Polarization is Asymmetric: Contemporary polarization is increasingly characterized by out-party hatred rather than in-party love. This asymmetry matters because politics organized around opposing enemies differs fundamentally from politics organized around supporting visions. The former makes compromise treasonous; the latter makes it prudent.

The Center Has Not Held: The "disappearing center" phenomenon documented across Western democracies reveals not merely polarization but collapse of the ideological middle ground that historically enabled democratic compromise. This leaves increasingly binary political landscapes where cross-partisan cooperation appears tantamount to betrayal.

Identity Transcends Left-Right: Both progressive identity politics (emphasizing recognition of marginalized groups) and reactionary identity politics (emphasizing preservation of traditional national identity) represent departures from traditional left-right economic cleavages. This suggests the identity turn is systemic rather than partisan—a fundamental transformation in how Western publics organize political conflict.

Institutions Matter: Despite widespread distrust of politicians, citizens in most Western democracies maintain strong support for democratic ideals. Research on the "critical citizen" suggests appropriately skeptical engagement with authority can strengthen rather than undermine democracy. The challenge is channeling distrust into democratic participation rather than authoritarian alternatives.

For the G7, the central strategic challenge of the coming decade is therefore not merely economic competition or geopolitical rivalry, but the reconstruction of political meaning itself: a renewal of democratic purpose capable of reconciling diversity with cohesion, and pluralism with common destiny.

Recent scholarship suggests several pathways forward:

Material Reconnection: Linking political legitimacy back to tangible economic outcomes rather than primarily symbolic recognition. This requires political entrepreneurs capable of articulating economic visions that transcend identity divisions while acknowledging identity-based inequalities.

Institutional Innovation: Developing democratic institutions better suited to pluralistic societies. This might include citizens' assemblies, deliberative forums, and other mechanisms that facilitate genuine engagement across divides rather than mere electoral competition between identity blocs.

Epistemic Reconstruction: Rebuilding shared epistemic foundations without imposing homogeneity. In an era of algorithmic amplification and information fragmentation, this requires new approaches to media, education, and public discourse that promote critical thinking while respecting plurality.

Geopolitical Coordination: Despite domestic fragmentation, G7 nations retain immense material and institutional power. Converting this potential into effective action requires recognizing that coordination must now navigate domestic identity politics rather than ignore them. This may require new forms of multilateralism more compatible with identity-conscious domestic politics.

Temporal Reframing: Some successful interventions (like writing to future generations) work by shifting temporal perspective beyond current identity conflicts. This suggests potential for transcendent framings that maintain identity recognition while subordinating it to longer-term collective imperatives.

The evidence accumulated through 2025 paints a sobering picture: Western democracies face not temporary political turbulence but fundamental transformation in how political life is organized. The post-war ideological settlement that structured Western politics for six decades has collapsed, and its replacement by identity-based politics creates dynamics that threaten democratic stability.

Yet the same evidence suggests democratic collapse is not inevitable. Countries like Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland buck global trends, maintaining or increasing institutional trust. Research on "critical citizens" shows that skepticism toward politicians need not entail rejection of democracy. Interventions leveraging superordinate identities can reduce polarization. The question is whether Western democracies can adapt their institutions and practices to accommodate identity pluralism while maintaining sufficient cohesion for collective action.

If that challenge is not met, the West may retain power—but lose the capacity to know what it is for. The transition from ideology to identity represents not just political change but epistemological transformation: from politics organized around competing visions of social organization to politics organized around competing assertions of belonging and recognition. Whether this transformation ultimately strengthens democracy by including previously marginalized voices or destroys it by fragmenting society beyond repair remains the defining question of our era.

What is certain is that answering this question requires more than political strategy—it demands philosophical clarity about what holds pluralistic democracies together when neither ideology nor identity can provide comprehensive integration. The post-war settlement offered one answer; we are now forced to find another. The urgency of this task, documented in study after study from 2024-2025, cannot be overstated. The operating environment for democratic governance has fundamentally changed, and the institutional adaptations required are only beginning to be understood.

References

Primary Academic Sources

Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2024). Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization. Review of Economics and Statistics, 106, 557–565.

Bonomi, G., Gennaioli, N., & Tabellini, G. (2021). Identity, Beliefs and Political Conflicts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 136(4), 2371–2411.

Butler, J. (2024). Who's Afraid of Gender? Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Caldwell, D., Cohen, G., & Vivyan, N. (2024). Long-Run Trends in Partisan Polarization of Climate Policy-Relevant Attitudes Across Countries. Environmental Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2024.2403957

Ferreira da Silva, F., Garzia, D., & Maye, S. (2025). In-Party Love, Out-Party Hate, and Affective Polarization in Twelve Established Democracies. Public Opinion Quarterly, 89(2), 459–491.

Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., Mason, L., McGrath, M. C., Nyhan, B., Rand, D. G., Skitka, L. J., Tucker, J. A., Van Bavel, J. J., Wang, C. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2020). Political Sectarianism in America. Science, 370(6516), 533–536.

Garzia, D., Ferreira da Silva, F., & Maye, S. (2023). Affective Polarization in Comparative and Longitudinal Perspective. Public Opinion Quarterly, 87(2), 219–231.

Gidron, N., Adams, J., & Horne, W. (2020). American Affective Polarization in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press.

Hornsey, M. J., Harris, E. A., & Fielding, K. S. (2018). Relationships among Conspiratorial Beliefs, Conservatism and Climate Scepticism Across Nations. Nature Climate Change, 8(7), 614–620.

Langsæther, P. E., Svarstad, T. K., & Arnesen, S. (2024). The Differential Impact of Climate Interventions Along the Political Divide in 60 Countries. Nature Communications, 15, Article 4294.

Lelkes, Y., & Westwood, S. J. (2024). Persistent Polarization: The Unexpected Durability of Political Animosity Around US Elections. Science Advances, 10(36), eadm9198.

Mason, L. (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. University of Chicago Press.

McCoy, J., & Somer, M. (2019). Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political Science, 681(1), 234–271.

Torcal, M., & Magalhães, P. C. (2022). Will, Representation, and Inclusion in Post-Pandemic Democracy. Frontiers in Political Science, 4, Article 978758.

Valgarðsson, V., Jennings, W., Stoker, G., Bunting, H., Devine, D., McKay, L., & Klassen, A. (2025). A Crisis of Political Trust? Global Trends in Institutional Trust from 1958 to 2019. British Journal of Political Science, 55, Article e15. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123424000498

Van Bavel, J. J., & Packer, D. J. (2021). The Power of Us: Harnessing Our Shared Identities to Improve Performance, Increase Cooperation, and Promote Social Harmony. Little, Brown Spark.

Wagner, M. (2021). Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems. Electoral Studies, 69, Article 102199.

Reports and Policy Documents

European Council on Foreign Relations. (2025). European Foreign Policy After the 2024 Elections: Scenarios for 2029. ECFR Policy Brief.

OECD. (2024). Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions: 2024 Results. OECD Public Governance Reviews. Paris: OECD Publishing.

The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2025). Democracy Index 2024: Age of Conflict. The Economist.

World Happiness Report. (2025). Algan, Y., & Renault, T. Trusting Others: How Unhappiness and Social Distrust Explain Populism. In World Happiness Report 2025. Sustainable Development Solutions Network.

Additional Academic Articles

Algan, Y., Guriev, S., Papaioannou, E., & Passari, E. (2017). The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2017(2), 309–400.

Bergquist, M., Nilsson, A., & Schultz, P. W. (2019). A Meta-Analysis of Field-Experiments Using Social Norms to Promote Pro-Environmental Behaviors. Global Environmental Change, 59, Article 101941.

Druckman, J. N., & Levendusky, M. S. (2019). What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Polarization? Public Opinion Quarterly, 83(1), 114–122.

Gidron, N., Sheffer, L., & Mor, G. (2020). Validating the Feeling Thermometer as a Measure of Partisan Affect in Multi-Party Systems. Electoral Studies, 68, Article 102209.

Guber, D. L. (2013). A Cooling Climate for Change? Party Polarization and the Politics of Global Warming. American Behavioral Scientist, 57(1), 93–115.

Hornsey, M. J., & Fielding, K. S. (2020). Understanding (and Reducing) Inaction on Climate Change. Social Issues and Policy Review, 14(1), 3–35.

Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 129–146.

Janssen, J. (2024). Breaking Free from Linear Assumptions: Unravelling the Relationship Between Affective Polarization and Democratic Support. European Journal of Political Research, 63(4), 1456–1476.

Kelemen, R. D. (2020). The European Union's Authoritarian Equilibrium. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(3), 481–499.

Kingzette, J., Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2021). How Affective Polarization Undermines Support for Democratic Norms. Public Opinion Quarterly, 85(2), 663–677.

McCright, A. M., & Dunlap, R. E. (2011). The Politicization of Climate Change and Polarization in the American Public's Views of Global Warming, 2001–2010. The Sociological Quarterly, 52(2), 155–194.

Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press.

Reiljan, A. (2020). 'Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines' (Also) in Europe: Affective Polarisation in European Party Systems. European Journal of Political Research, 59(2), 376–396.

Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press.

Climate and Environmental Politics

Bromley-Trujillo, R., & Poe, J. (2020). The Importance of Salience: Public Opinion and State Policy Action on Climate Change. Journal of Public Policy, 40(2), 280–304.

Drews, S., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2016). What Explains Public Support for Climate Policies? A Review of Empirical and Experimental Studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 855–876.

Funk, C., & Kennedy, B. (2020). How Americans See Climate Change and the Environment in 7 Charts. Pew Research Center.

Goldberg, M. H., van der Linden, S., Maibach, E., & Leiserowitz, A. (2019). Discussing Global Warming Leads to Greater Acceptance of Climate Science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(30), 14804–14805.

Hornsey, M. J., Harris, E. A., Bain, P. G., & Fielding, K. S. (2016). Meta-Analyses of the Determinants and Outcomes of Belief in Climate Change. Nature Climate Change, 6(6), 622–626.

Levi, S., Bagozzi, B., Bragança, A., Colby, B. K.,CSeveri, P., Franta, B., Niles, M. T., & Rudnick, J. (2025). As Countries Become More Affluent, Climate Change Attitudes Are More Politically Polarised. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 101, Article 102474.

Mildenberger, M., & Tingley, D. (2019). Beliefs About Climate Beliefs: The Importance of Second-Order Opinions for Climate Politics. British Journal of Political Science, 49(4), 1279–1307.

Poortinga, W., Whitmarsh, L., Steg, L., Böhm, G., & Fisher, S. (2019). Climate Change Perceptions and Their Individual-Level Determinants: A Cross-European Analysis. Global Environmental Change, 55, 25–35.

Smith, E. K., & Mayer, A. (2018). A Social Trap for the Climate? Collective Action, Trust and Climate Change Risk Perception in 35 Countries. Global Environmental Change, 49, 140–153.

International Relations and Populism

Art, D. (2011). Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Chryssogelos, A. (2024). Populism and Foreign Policy. International Affairs, 100(5), Special Section.

Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. (2018). National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. Pelican.

Kenny, P. D. (2020). 'The Enemy of the People': Populists and Press Freedom. Political Research Quarterly*, 73(2), 261–275.

Kyle, J., & Gultchin, L. (2018). Populists in Power Around the World. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.

Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. Verso.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown.

Mounk, Y. (2018). The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It. Harvard University Press.

Müller, J.-W. (2016). What Is Populism? University of Pennsylvania Press.

Rooduijn, M., van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., de Lange, S., Halikiopoulou, D., Lewis, P., Mudde, C., & Taggart, P. (2019). The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe. www.popu-list.org.

Verbeek, B., & Zaslove, A. (2016). Italy: A Case of Mutating Populism? Democratization, 23(2), 304–323.

Democratic Theory and Institutions

Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press.

Fishkin, J. S. (2018). Democracy When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our Politics Through Public Deliberation. Oxford University Press.

Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. MIT Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press.

Lijphart, A. (2012). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (2nd ed.). Yale University Press.

Przeworski, A. (2019). Crises of Democracy. Cambridge University Press.

Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press.

Data Sources

Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). (2020, 2022). CSES Module 5 Dataset. www.cses.org.

International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). (2022). ISSP Environment Module IV. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne.

Pew Research Center. (2024). Global Attitudes & Trends. www.pewresearch.org/global.

World Values Survey Association. (2024). World Values Survey Wave 7 (2017-2022). www.worldvaluessurvey.org.