POLICY BRIEFING PAPER
Prepared for the 52nd G7 Summit, Évian-les-Bains
The Emerging Fault Lines in the 2026 CUSMA Review:Dairy Supply Management, Digital Sovereignty,and the Future of Canada–United States Economic Relations
June 2026
AbstractAs the July 1, 2026 formal review of the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) approaches, the bilateral relationship between Ottawa and Washington has reached an inflection point not witnessed since the original NAFTA negotiations of the early 1990s. What was designed as a six-year procedural assessment under Article 34.7 of CUSMA has been transformed, under the pressure of the second Trump administration's assertive trade posture, into a high-stakes renegotiation that simultaneously addresses dairy market access, digital content regulation, automotive rules of origin, and the broader architecture of North American economic governance.
This paper provides a comprehensive analytical examination of the two issues that have emerged as the principal focal points of American pressure on Canada: the country's dairy supply management system and its evolving framework for regulating digital platforms and streaming services. Drawing upon official government sources, legislative records, institutional analyses from the Bank of Canada, the C.D. Howe Institute, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and verified reporting as of June 2026, the paper situates these disputes within the broader context of Canada's approach to national economic sovereignty under conditions of structural asymmetry. It concludes that the resolution of these tensions will determine not only the fate of CUSMA but the degree to which middle powers can sustain distinctive national institutions within deeply integrated continental markets.
I. Introduction: A Procedural Review Transformed
Under Article 34.7 of CUSMA, the three signatory parties — Canada, the United States, and Mexico — are required to commence a joint review of the agreement on the sixth anniversary of its entry into force, which falls on July 1, 2026. The review mechanism was originally conceived as an instrument for institutional maintenance: an opportunity to assess whether the agreement continued to serve the economic interests of all parties and, where appropriate, to recommend technical amendments before consenting to a sixteen-year extension. In the absence of consensus to extend, the agreement does not automatically lapse; rather, the parties enter a regime of annual reviews that could persist until the agreement's automatic termination date of July 1, 2036, unless a common decision is reached earlier.
The political context surrounding the 2026 review bears no resemblance to the relatively calm institutional environment its architects envisioned. USTR Jamieson Greer formally signalled to the United States Congress by June 1, 2026 — the statutory deadline for reporting the administration's intent — that Washington intends to use the review as a vehicle for extracting significant structural concessions from both Canada and Mexico. Greer has conditioned renewal not on a mutual assessment of the agreement's performance but upon Canada satisfying a list of approximately thirty discrete issues identified by Washington, encompassing dairy market access, digital content levies, automotive rules of origin, and what the administration describes as the exploitation of North American supply chains by non-market economies, principally China.
Canada's response has been calibrated and assertive in equal measure. On June 2, 2026, Canada-U.S. Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc formally notified his American and Mexican counterparts of Canada's desire to renew CUSMA for the full sixteen-year term, accompanied by Chief Trade Negotiator Janice Charette for a substantive meeting with Greer at the Canadian Embassy in Washington. Prime Minister Mark Carney, while expressing a desire for agreement, acknowledged that Washington's distinct bilateral agendas with both Canada and Mexico had produced a "bifurcated discussion," and that the resolution of sectoral tariff disputes — which Canada regards as violations of the existing agreement — would be indispensable to any comprehensive settlement.
Critically, Canada and the United States had not yet entered formal CUSMA negotiations as of mid-June 2026. The United States had concluded a first bilateral round of talks with Mexico and scheduled additional rounds in June and July, while Greer cited Canada's maintenance of retaliatory tariffs on certain American goods as an impediment to direct negotiations. This asymmetry reflects the depth of the bilateral rupture and the degree to which the CUSMA review has become entangled with the broader tariff conflict that has dominated Canada–U.S. relations since early 2025.
This paper examines the two issues that have most fundamentally structured the Canadian dimension of the CUSMA review: dairy supply management, which represents the perennial fault line in bilateral agricultural trade, and digital governance, which has emerged as the defining new battleground. Together, they illuminate the deeper philosophical divide between Canadian and American conceptions of economic integration, and raise fundamental questions about the sustainability of national policy autonomy within asymmetric continental markets.
Any rigorous analysis of the 2026 CUSMA review must begin with the structural realities that frame every negotiating exchange. Canada and the United States share one of the most deeply integrated bilateral economic relationships in the world. Approximately three-quarters of Canadian goods exports flow to the American market, while highly integrated supply chains in automotive manufacturing, energy, critical minerals, and services bind the two economies at a level that renders genuine economic decoupling not merely difficult but practically inconceivable on any reasonable policy horizon. Trilateral trade in goods and services under CUSMA reached approximately USD 1.9 trillion in 2024, and the CUSMA market collectively accounts for roughly 30 percent of global GDP.
This structural asymmetry is the foundational condition of Canadian trade diplomacy. Canada engages with the CUSMA review not from a position of symmetric bargaining power but from the recognition that the costs of agreement failure are distributed unequally — and predominantly borne by the smaller party. The Bank of Canada's January 2026 Monetary Policy Report identified the CUSMA review outcome as one of the most significant risks to the economic outlook, noting that a clean renewal would preserve the certainty that Canadian exporters require, while significant renegotiation could raise trade costs and disrupt integrated supply chains whose vulnerability has already been exposed by the tariff conflicts of 2025.
The tariff dimension deserves particular attention because it has both complicated and shaped the review process in ways not anticipated by the agreement's designers. Beginning in early 2025, the Trump administration imposed a series of unilateral tariffs on Canadian goods — including steel, aluminum, automobiles, and lumber — which Prime Minister Carney characterized as violations of CUSMA's core commitments. Canada responded with three phases of retaliatory tariffs, culminating in 25 percent surcharges on non-CUSMA-compliant American automobiles and selected consumer goods. In August 2025, Canada strategically lifted retaliatory tariffs on CUSMA-compliant American imports while maintaining elevated tariffs on non-compliant goods, a calibrated gesture designed to signal cooperative intent while preserving negotiating leverage.
As of June 2026, Greer publicly cited Canada's remaining retaliatory tariffs as a "problem" for negotiations, effectively conditioning the initiation of formal CUSMA talks upon their removal. Canada's position — that tariff relief and CUSMA renewal are necessarily linked rather than sequentially separable — reflects a coherent strategic logic: accepting tariffs as a permanent feature of the bilateral landscape, as Greer has repeatedly suggested, would fundamentally undermine the agreement's foundational premise. The result is a diplomatic deadlock in which the preconditions for negotiation are themselves contested.
A. The Institutional Architecture of Supply Management
Canada's dairy supply management system, established in the early 1970s and institutionally refined over five decades, operates through three interlocking pillars: production quotas administered by the Canadian Dairy Commission that calibrate supply to estimated domestic consumption; administered pricing mechanisms that establish stable returns for producers; and high tariffs on imports exceeding predetermined tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) — tariffs that, in over-quota volumes, routinely exceed 200 percent ad valorem. Dairy, poultry, and eggs are the three supply-managed commodity sectors in Canadian agriculture, generating farm-gate sales of approximately CAD 13 billion annually in recent years and sustaining more than 100,000 direct jobs in production and processing.
Proponents of supply management advance several grounds for its maintenance. The system stabilizes rural incomes by insulating Canadian producers from the price volatility of international commodity markets — volatility that is itself partially a function of the agricultural subsidies offered by the United States and European Union, which distort international price signals. By ensuring predictable returns, supply management has encouraged continuous investment in agricultural productivity and maintained the viability of family-scale farming operations in provinces such as Quebec and Ontario where the political economy of rural agriculture intersects deeply with questions of cultural and social identity.
Critics, including American agricultural organizations and some Canadian economists, counter that supply management inflates domestic consumer prices — estimates commonly place the annual household cost at several hundred dollars — and constitutes a structural barrier to agricultural competition that is inconsistent with the spirit of trade liberalization that animates agreements such as CUSMA. The Canadian Agri-Food Trade Alliance and similar organizations have argued that supply management imposes costs on internationally competitive Canadian agricultural exporters by reducing the goodwill available for market access negotiations with trading partners who might otherwise grant expanded access to Canadian beef, pork, and grain.
B. The TRQ Dispute: Anatomy of a Persistent Conflict
Although the original CUSMA negotiations secured American acceptance of the supply management system's continued existence in exchange for modest tariff-rate quota concessions for American dairy products across fourteen commodity categories, the manner of TRQ administration has generated a sequence of legal disputes that continue to define the bilateral agricultural relationship.
In January 2022, a CUSMA dispute settlement panel ruled that Canada's practice of allocating between 85 and 100 percent of dairy TRQs exclusively to domestic processors — to the systematic exclusion of retailers, distributors, and other industry participants — violated Canada's obligations under the agreement. The panel's reasoning was straightforward: processors with significant domestic production interests have little commercial incentive to import American consumer-oriented dairy products that compete directly with their own output. The net effect was that market access promised under CUSMA existed primarily in formal terms while remaining commercially inert.
Canada revised its TRQ allocation methodology, abolishing exclusive processor pools and adopting a market share-based approach while introducing new conditions requiring importers to be "active" participants in the dairy industry. The United States, unconvinced that these modifications created genuine commercial opportunities, initiated a second dispute settlement proceeding in 2023. In a decision that settled one round of the conflict while guaranteeing the next, the panel ruled in Canada's favour, finding that the revised framework technically satisfied Canada's CUSMA obligations. American dairy organizations, led by the National Milk Producers Federation, argued that Canada had effectively met the letter of its commitments while preserving their substance — channelling quota access toward domestic actors while precluding meaningful American penetration of the consumer market.
A parallel track of conflict has emerged around Canadian dairy protein exports. The United States International Trade Commission initiated an inquiry into whether Canadian producers have circumvented CUSMA's export caps by blending or relabeling surplus dairy proteins — particularly non-fat solids — to avoid classification as restricted exports. Ottawa's response emphasizes Canada's negligible share of global dairy protein markets, but the American dairy lobby has framed the dispute less as a question of trade volumes than of precedent: permitting Canadian practices to go unchallenged would, in their assessment, undermine American leverage as the 2026 review approaches.
C. Bill C-202: Legislating the Red Line
The most significant legislative development in the dairy dimension of the CUSMA review is the passage and Royal Assent of Bill C-202 on June 26, 2025. This legislation — the successor to Bill C-282, which died in the Senate when Parliament was prorogued in January 2025 following Prime Minister Trudeau's resignation — amends the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act to prohibit Canadian trade negotiators from committing, in any international trade agreement, to increases in TRQs for supply-managed products or to reductions in over-quota tariff rates for dairy, poultry, or eggs.
The political logic of Bill C-202 is comprehensible within the framework of Canadian domestic politics. Canadian dairy producers have absorbed successive rounds of market access concessions in the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and CUSMA itself. Each concession was made over industry objections and with promises of producer compensation. The legislation represents an attempt to institutionalize what Canadian negotiators have described verbally as a red line, converting a policy commitment into a legal constraint.
From Washington's perspective, the legislation constitutes a structural impediment to the resolution of the market access dispute. USTR Greer cited dairy access as one of the conditions that Washington attached to CUSMA renewal as early as December 2025. The legislation effectively removes from the table the category of concession that Washington most desires, forcing American negotiators to either accept Canada's position or condition CUSMA renewal on Canadian constitutional and statutory changes that Ottawa could not politically deliver.
The strategic tension that Bill C-202 has introduced into the review is precisely captured by analysts at the C.D. Howe Institute, who noted that while the agreement will not automatically dissolve in 2026 if consensus fails, the failure to resolve dairy and other disputes would set the architecture for CUSMA's potential termination in 2036, while the American option of six-month withdrawal notification creates a constant background risk that the legislation appears to discount.
A. From the Digital Services Tax to the Streaming Levy
While dairy represents the historical continuity of Canada–U.S. trade conflict, digital governance has emerged as the most consequential new battleground — and one whose contours are shifting in real time as the CUSMA review approaches. The digital dispute has evolved through two distinct phases, each reflecting the broader tension between Canadian cultural sovereignty and American commercial interests in the digital economy.
The first phase centred on Canada's Digital Services Tax (DST), a three percent levy on revenues generated by large multinational technology platforms from Canadian users — an instrument specifically designed to capture tax revenue from American firms including major search engines, social media platforms, and digital marketplaces whose Canadian revenues had previously escaped domestic taxation. The Trump administration characterized the DST as a discriminatory measure targeting American companies and threatened retaliatory trade measures. After prolonged bilateral tension, Canada repealed the DST in early 2026 as part of broader negotiations to stabilize the Canada–U.S. relationship in advance of the CUSMA review. The repeal bought goodwill but did not resolve the underlying conflict; it shifted the dispute from taxation to regulation.
B. The CRTC Decision of May 21, 2026: A Tripling of Obligations
The second and more consequential phase of the digital dispute centres on the regulatory framework established under Canada's Online Streaming Act (formerly Bill C-11), which extended Canada's longstanding broadcasting regulatory mandate to digital and online platforms. On May 21, 2026, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) issued a landmark decision under the Online Streaming Act that has substantially escalated tensions with the United States in the weeks immediately preceding the CUSMA review.
The CRTC's May 2026 ruling requires all streaming services and broadcasters with annual Canadian broadcasting revenues exceeding CAD 25 million to contribute 15 percent of those revenues to Canadian content and related broadcasting objectives — tripling the 5 percent interim contribution requirement the Commission had established in 2024, which major streamers including Apple and Amazon were already challenging in court. The 15 percent rate, according to analysis by Professor Michael Geist of the University of Ottawa, places Canada among the most costly operating jurisdictions in the world for streaming services, with direct implications for consumer subscription pricing, which observers estimate may increase by CAD 1.50 to CAD 4.00 monthly per standard plan.
A further dimension of the ruling has drawn particular American criticism: a significant portion of mandated expenditures must fund productions in which Canadian entities retain majority intellectual property ownership. The Motion Picture Association, whose members include the major Hollywood studios and streaming platforms, characterized the ruling as imposing "unprecedented, unnecessary, and discriminatory investment obligations on American streaming services operating in Canada," and called upon the U.S. government to challenge the framework within the CUSMA review process. The Streaming Innovation Alliance simultaneously wrote to the chair of the House Ways and Means Committee urging Congress to treat the Online Streaming Act as a U.S. trade priority.
The decision's domestic political reception has been divided. Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre condemned the CRTC ruling as a "Netflix tax" that would harm Canadian consumers and invited U.S. retaliation, demanding that Prime Minister Carney exercise ministerial direction to overrule the Commission. The Carney government, having left the rate-setting determination to the CRTC as an arm's-length regulator, declined to intervene — a position that reflects the government's constitutional approach to regulatory independence but that has created a politically awkward juxtaposition: Canada simultaneously pursuing tariff relief from the United States while a Canadian regulatory body triples the financial obligations imposed on American streaming platforms.
C. Legal and Trade Dimensions of the Streaming Framework
The legal vulnerabilities of the CRTC's framework under CUSMA are substantive and have been identified by multiple authoritative analysts. The Agreement's provisions on performance requirements, specifically Chapter 14 governing investment, prohibit conditions on market access that require foreign investors to establish or maintain domestic partnerships or transfer intellectual property as a condition of conducting business. The majority Canadian ownership requirements embedded in the CRTC's mandated expenditure categories may be challenged as performance requirements inconsistent with Chapter 14 obligations.
Separately, the Online Streaming Act's differential treatment of Canadian and foreign platforms — reducing the contribution obligations of domestic broadcasters while elevating those of foreign streaming services — creates a pattern of asymmetric regulatory burden that may implicate CUSMA's national treatment and most-favoured-nation commitments under Chapter 15 covering cross-border trade in services. The net effect identified by analysts such as Geist is that Canadian broadcasters effectively receive a rate reduction funded by their foreign competitors, creating a subsidy dynamic disguised as content regulation.
As of mid-June 2026, analysts monitoring the USTR's posture have noted the possibility of a formal Section 301 investigation of the Online Streaming Act as a retaliatory instrument. Should such an investigation be initiated, historical precedent suggests that retaliatory tariffs would fall disproportionately on Canadian agricultural exports, lumber, and aluminum — sectors already under tariff pressure — creating a cascading dynamic in which digital regulation generates agricultural consequences.
While dairy and digital issues have defined the public face of the Canada–U.S. CUSMA dispute, a third set of issues — automotive rules of origin and the prevention of non-market economy transshipment — has emerged as a critical component of American demands that deserves separate analytical attention, particularly given its implications for Canada's largest manufacturing sector.
The automotive sector represents the most deeply integrated component of the Canada–U.S. economic relationship. Canada exported approximately USD 29 billion in automotive parts to the United States in 2024, making it the largest single destination for American automotive components. The American content of vehicles manufactured in Canada increased from approximately 38 percent under NAFTA in 2019 to roughly 50 percent under CUSMA by 2024, reflecting the agreement's higher regional content requirements. Canadian industry analysts have argued that this trajectory demonstrates the existence of a workable path toward meeting American reshoring objectives without dismantling integrated North American production.
The Trump administration's concern, articulated by Greer in his June 2026 congressional communications, centres on two related problems. First, Washington seeks to tighten rules of origin requirements — potentially raising the North American content threshold for automotive goods — as a mechanism for reducing the penetration of Chinese-origin components into CUSMA-preferenced trade flows. Second, and relatedly, the administration has expressed concern about the use of Mexico as a production hub for Chinese-origin goods that then enter the United States under CUSMA's preferential tariff regime, effectively circumventing American trade restrictions on Chinese imports.
Canada's position on automotive rules of origin is complicated by the structure of its own retaliatory tariff framework: since April 2025, Canada has imposed a 25 percent surtax on non-CUSMA-compliant American automobiles while maintaining CUSMA-compliant automotive trade in a preferential lane. This bifurcation reflects a deliberate Canadian strategy of incentivizing CUSMA compliance while penalizing extraterritorial American tariff applications — a strategy that Greer has characterized as incompatible with the initiation of productive CUSMA negotiations.
Viewed collectively, the dairy, digital, and automotive disputes reveal a deeper structural conflict between Canadian and American approaches to economic governance that transcends the specific regulatory frameworks at issue. These disputes are not merely technical disagreements about trade rules; they reflect fundamentally different philosophical conceptions of the relationship between economic integration and national sovereignty.
The American position, consistent across administrations of both parties though articulated with unusual bluntness by the Trump administration, holds that trade agreements should maximize market access and competitive neutrality. From this perspective, supply management systems that restrict agricultural competition, streaming regulations that impose differential burdens on foreign firms, and content requirements that mandate intellectual property transfers are not legitimate exercises of national policy autonomy but market distortions that undermine the foundational premise of free trade. The demand for their elimination or substantial modification is, in Washington's framing, a demand for the consistent application of the principles that Canada itself endorsed when it signed CUSMA in 2020.
The Canadian position embeds a more complex understanding of the relationship between trade liberalization and state capacity. Canada's smaller population — approximately one-tenth of the American — its integrated geography, and its deep economic dependence on a single dominant partner have historically generated concerns about economic dependence and cultural absorption that inform Canadian trade policy across partisan lines. Successive Canadian governments of both Liberal and Conservative orientation have employed targeted state interventions to sustain industries deemed strategically significant or culturally essential. The dairy supply management system is the most durable institutional expression of this logic in the agricultural domain; the broadcasting and digital content regulatory framework represents its most contemporary expression in the cultural domain.
What distinguishes the current moment is the degree to which these longstanding Canadian policy instruments are being simultaneously contested within a single negotiating framework at a time when the bilateral relationship has been structurally destabilized by American tariff policy. Canada's challenge is to defend its domestic policy framework without appearing to obstruct the renewal of an agreement on whose continuation the Canadian economy depends more heavily than its American counterpart. The United States' challenge is to extract concessions meaningful enough to satisfy domestic agricultural and entertainment industry constituencies without terminating an agreement that, as CSIS analysts have noted, represents the backbone of North American competitiveness in a period of heightened global economic fragmentation.
The RBC Trade Zone analysis of April 2026 captured Ottawa's strategic calculus with precision: Canada's negotiating objective is to push decisions on priority files as close as possible to the 2026 American midterm elections without jeopardizing the agreement's overall survival. The arithmetic of American domestic politics — particularly the electoral vulnerability of agricultural states that depend on export market access and the manufacturing states whose workers are employed in CUSMA-integrated supply chains — provides Canada with a structural source of leverage that partially offsets its formal asymmetry. The question is whether that leverage is sufficient to preserve the instruments of national economic governance that Canadian policy across the political spectrum has consistently defined as non-negotiable.
The CSIS scenario analysis of April 2026 identified three negotiating pathways as most plausible in the current environment. The base case — a "painful extension" in which negotiations stretch into late 2026 or beyond, with partial resolution of the most contested issues — remains the most likely outcome, driven by the recognition of all parties that the costs of agreement failure, while asymmetrically distributed, are substantial for each. A second pathway — serial annual reviews without consensus extension — would preserve the agreement in formal terms while generating sustained investment uncertainty that would compound the economic disruption already created by tariff conflict. A third pathway — bilateral rather than trilateral resolution — would see Canada and the United States negotiate a framework agreement outside CUSMA's formal structure, potentially altering the agreement's trilateral character.
The significance of the outcome extends beyond the specific regulatory disputes at issue. If Washington succeeds in extracting substantial concessions on dairy supply management and digital content regulation, it would establish a precedent with implications for a wide range of domestic policy instruments that Canada — and other middle powers — employ to manage the social and cultural dimensions of economic integration. The elimination of supply management, or its substantive erosion, would represent not merely an agricultural policy change but the removal of a structural buffer between Canadian rural communities and international commodity market volatility. The modification of the CRTC's streaming framework under American pressure would raise fundamental questions about the capacity of smaller national broadcasting systems to sustain distinctively national cultural production in a digital environment dominated by American platforms.
Conversely, if Canada successfully defends its existing framework — or secures a negotiated settlement that preserves the essential architecture of supply management and digital content regulation while offering procedural modifications on TRQ administration and content expenditure accountability — it would reinforce the principle that CUSMA, like its NAFTA predecessor, accommodates legitimate exercises of national policy autonomy alongside the pursuit of expanded market access. This outcome would represent a significant multilateral precedent: it would affirm that the world's largest bilateral trade relationship can sustain a degree of national policy diversity that the American position has increasingly sought to eliminate.
The geopolitical dimension of the 2026 review deserves separate emphasis. The review is occurring at a moment of profound global economic fragmentation, in which the multilateral trade order centred on the World Trade Organization has been significantly weakened, in which major economies are actively pursuing industrial policy objectives that would have been characterized as trade-distorting in an earlier era, and in which the United States itself has departed substantially from the free-trade orthodoxy it previously championed. In this context, the CUSMA review is not merely a bilateral negotiation but a signal about the conditions under which the world's largest economy will engage with its closest economic partners — a signal that G7 governments and multilateral institutions will observe with close attention as they assess the future trajectory of North American economic governance.
The 2026 CUSMA review has evolved from a technical institutional assessment into a contest between competing conceptions of economic integration, national sovereignty, and the legitimate scope of state intervention in markets. Dairy supply management and digital content regulation have served as the proximate focal points of this contest, but the underlying stakes are considerably larger: they concern the degree to which Canada — and by extension other middle powers embedded within asymmetric economic partnerships — can sustain domestic policy instruments designed to buffer national communities from the full force of continental market competition.
The legislative consolidation of Bill C-202 and the CRTC's May 2026 streaming ruling have both sharpened the contours of Canada's position and complicated its negotiating flexibility at a moment when the bilateral relationship has been structurally disrupted by American tariff policy. The absence, as of mid-June 2026, of formal bilateral CUSMA negotiations between Canada and the United States — while the United States has already initiated formal talks with Mexico — reflects the depth of this disruption and the difficulty of resolving it within the statutory timeline.
For G7 policy advisors assessing the implications of the CUSMA review, several observations merit particular attention. First, the outcome of the review will establish precedents for the conditions under which the United States engages with trade agreements involving domestic policy measures that it characterizes as market distortions — precedents with implications for the entire architecture of American trade relationships. Second, the review illustrates the fragility of rules-based trade frameworks when a dominant party concludes that the rules no longer adequately serve its interests, and that unilateral pressure is an available substitute for multilateral dispute resolution. Third, and perhaps most significantly, the review poses a fundamental question about the limits of trade liberalization: whether the integration of national markets is compatible with the preservation of national institutions, or whether — as the American position implicitly asserts — deep economic integration ultimately requires convergence on a single set of market rules from which no domestic policy deviation is permitted.
The resolution of these questions will shape the future of North American economic integration — and, by extension, the broader balance between globalization and national sovereignty — for the decade that follows.
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