Executive Summary
By late November 2025, the Ukraine conflict—now in its fourth calendar year—has reached a precarious diplomatic inflection point. Although the frontlines remain largely static after two summers of attritional warfare, the underlying geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically. The widening transatlantic rift over the Trump administration's 28-point peace proposal has exposed deep structural divergences in American and European strategic cultures, threat perceptions, and visions for the future of European security.
This article liberal internationalist study analyzes these increasingly explicit divergences, situating them within broader debates about global order, the erosion of Western unity, and the implications for Europe's long-term security architecture. Particular attention is paid to the domestic political pressures shaping American strategy, Europe's accelerating shift toward strategic autonomy, and the economic and geopolitical calculations influencing both sides of the Atlantic.
From an offensive realist perspective, these divergences are neither surprising nor unprecedented. As Mearsheimer argues, great powers inevitably prioritize their own security interests over abstract principles or alliance solidarity when core interests conflict. The current impasse represents a textbook case of competing security imperatives: Europe faces an immediate territorial threat from Russia, while the United States seeks to redirect resources toward containing China. What appears as diplomatic disagreement is actually the structural logic of great power competition asserting itself over the idealistic veneer of Western unity.
Introduction
The diplomatic impasse surrounding the Ukraine peace negotiations cannot be understood solely through the lens of disagreements over territorial concessions, force caps, or the legal status of occupied regions. Rather, it reflects a deeper rupture in the transatlantic relationship—one rooted in fundamentally different interpretations of threat, responsibility, and the principles underpinning the post-1945 security order.
For Europe, Russia represents a proximate and existential danger whose military, hybrid, and political operations continue to destabilize the continent. European governments—especially those in Central and Eastern Europe—view the Ukraine war as part of a longer continuum of Russian revanchism, necessitating long-term deterrence, collective defense, and the preservation of norms prohibiting territorial conquest.
For the Trump administration, by contrast, Ukraine is increasingly framed as a strategic diversion preventing the United States from concentrating resources on the Indo-Pacific and the escalating contest with China. The administration's insistence on a rapid settlement—even one that risks undermining Ukraine's sovereignty—reflects this prioritization. The fact that senior administration figures continue to characterize the conflict as a "European war" rather than a challenge to the global rules-based order further illustrates the philosophical distance between Washington and its European partners.
The Root Cause Debate: Mearsheimer's analysis offers a fundamentally different framework for understanding this divergence. He contends that Western policy elites have systematically misdiagnosed the conflict by focusing on Putin's alleged imperial ambitions rather than addressing what he identifies as the root cause: NATO expansion. From this perspective, the 2008 Bucharest summit declaration that Ukraine would eventually join NATO represented an existential threat to Russia—comparable to Russia forming a military alliance with Mexico and placing missiles along the Rio Grande. Mearsheimer argues that Putin's 2022 invasion was a preventive war designed to stop Ukraine from becoming a de facto NATO member, not an attempt to rebuild the Soviet Empire. This interpretation directly challenges the European narrative of unprovoked aggression and raises uncomfortable questions about Western responsibility for creating the conditions that led to war.
It is logical and reasonable to assume that this divergence will persist irrespective of the immediate outcome of the peace negotiations. European debates over autonomous nuclear deterrence, defense industrial expansion, and the establishment of a unified EU military command—accelerated by the 2025 Riga Security Compact and France's expanded nuclear-sharing consultations—signal an emerging consensus: the postwar European security system must be constructed on a more self-reliant foundation. Whether these developments ultimately strengthen the transatlantic alliance through more balanced burden-sharing or precipitate a gradual strategic decoupling remains one of the defining questions for 21st-century international relations.
The Evolution of the Peace Initiative
Origins and Development
The Trump administration's 28-point peace plan emerged from a highly unconventional diplomatic process involving US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, during meetings that excluded Ukraine, European allies, and even senior US national security officials. The plan was drafted with significant involvement from Jared Kushner following private consultations with Dmitriev and Ukrainian National Security Adviser Rustem Umerov.
Although the administration publicly claimed that the proposal reflected input from both parties, the weight of available evidence—including congressional testimony, leaked diplomatic cables, and European assessments—indicates that the original framework disproportionately incorporated Russian preferences. Secretary of State Marco Rubio's off-record characterization of the plan as resembling a "Russian wish list," despite later public denials, reinforced European suspicions about the plan's origins and intent.
Realist Assessment of the Negotiation Process: From Mearsheimer's perspective, the Trump administration's approach—while diplomatically unconventional—reflects a more realistic understanding of how conflicts between great powers are actually resolved. He argues that "in international politics, when you're dealing with great powers and questions of war and peace, realism has to take precedence over our feelings about what's fair." The exclusion of European voices and the bilateral focus on US-Russia accommodation is not a diplomatic failure but rather an acknowledgment that Ukraine's fate will ultimately be determined by great power bargaining, not by Ukrainian preferences or European moral objections. This process, however distasteful to liberal internationalists, mirrors historical precedents where smaller states' sovereignty was negotiated by larger powers—from the Congress of Vienna to Yalta.
Key Provisions of the Initial Plan
The initial 28-point proposal required Ukraine to:
- permanently renounce NATO membership;
- accept US recognition of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as Russian territory;
- withdraw from parts of Donetsk it still controlled;
- accept a demilitarized zone along revised contact lines;
- cap its military at sharply reduced levels;
- refrain from hosting NATO forces or participating in joint air-defense architectures.
These provisions represented a radical departure from long-standing US policy, effectively legitimizing territorial conquest and leaving Ukraine structurally vulnerable to future coercion. The plan also proposed a Russian "security oversight mechanism" for reconstruction funds—an element widely interpreted as granting Moscow leverage over Ukraine's internal political economy.
Mearsheimer on Territorial Concessions and Neutrality: Mearsheimer views these provisions not as capitulation but as unavoidable recognition of military and geopolitical realities. He argues that territorial concessions, while emotionally painful and seemingly unjust, are necessary because "Ukraine cannot retake this territory by force. Not without a level of Western military support that would risk direct confrontation with Russia." For Russia, holding Crimea and parts of Donbass represents core security interests—Crimea contains Russia's critical Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol, and the land bridge provides strategic depth. For Ukraine, "these territories are important but not existential. Ukraine can survive and potentially thrive as a state even without them."
On neutrality, Mearsheimer is unequivocal: Ukraine must become "genuinely neutral like Austria during the Cold War or Switzerland today. No NATO membership, no Western security guarantees, no foreign troops on Ukrainian soil." He acknowledges this is "not fair" and "absolutely not" just, "but it's realistic." The alternative—security guarantees as a NATO substitute—he dismisses as "NATO membership by another name," which Russia will never accept. This represents perhaps the sharpest divergence between realist and liberal internationalist approaches: Mearsheimer prioritizes stable settlement over justice, while European policymakers view justice (territorial integrity, sovereignty) as preconditions for stability.
Diplomatic Evolution
Following intense pushback from European governments, NATO leadership, and Ukraine, a revised 19-point plan emerged after October–November 2025 consultations in Geneva. Ukrainian negotiators confirmed that key restrictions—including the 600,000-troop cap and broad war-crimes amnesty—were removed. The new draft also softened language on NATO deployments and provided for internationally supervised referenda in disputed regions, though Kyiv continues to reject referenda under occupation.
It is logical and reasonable to assume that these revisions were driven by the administration's recognition that the original proposal was diplomatically untenable and risked fracturing NATO. Still, even after revisions, the plan remains far closer to Russia's preferred terms than to Ukraine's publicly stated positions.
The Missed Opportunity of 2022: Mearsheimer emphasizes that the current negotiations occur under far worse conditions than were available earlier in the conflict. He points to the March-April 2022 Istanbul negotiations, where "the parties came close to an agreement. Ukraine would accept neutrality. Russia would withdraw from most occupied territories and there would be some kind of international security guarantee structure." Since that deal collapsed, "we've had two more years of war. Tens of thousands more dead, entire cities reduced to rubble, Ukraine's economy devastated, and the military situation has actually gotten worse for Ukraine, not better." The territories Russia might have returned in 2022 are now deeply integrated into Russia with hundreds of thousands of Russian settlers. This analysis suggests that the Trump administration's urgency to reach settlement, however imperfect, may prevent an even worse outcome if fighting continues into 2026 and beyond.
Recent Developments: Political Instability in Kyiv
The peace negotiation process faces additional complications following dramatic political upheaval within the Ukrainian government. In late November 2025, anti-corruption investigators raided the home and office of Andriy Yermak, Ukraine's chief of staff and top negotiator. Within hours of the raid, Yermak submitted his resignation, marking what President Zelenskyy characterized as "a reboot of the office of the President of Ukraine."
The timing of Yermak's departure carries significant implications for Ukraine's negotiating posture. Over the previous three and a half years, Zelenskyy's cabinet had experienced considerable turnover, but Yermak's resignation represents the loss of the administration's second-most powerful figure and its primary diplomatic interlocutor with Western allies and Russia. President Zelenskyy acknowledged the sensitivity of the transition, stating he was "grateful to Andrei for always representing Ukraine's position in the negotiation track exactly as it should be" while announcing consultations to identify a successor.
The political ramifications extend beyond personnel changes. European allies had consistently emphasized the need for vigilance regarding corruption, and the investigation into Ukraine's chief negotiator threatens to undermine international confidence at a critical diplomatic juncture. The departure creates what analysts describe as a credibility gap: changing key negotiators this deep into the negotiation process raises questions about continuity and commitment, particularly as revised peace proposals circulate among the parties.
From a strategic perspective, the development presents both vulnerabilities and opportunities for Moscow. Russian officials have already questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government, with Putin arguing they cannot sign agreements with Kyiv because Ukraine hasn't held recent elections. The corruption investigation and subsequent resignation provide additional rhetorical ammunition for those seeking to delegitimize Ukraine's negotiating position.
However, the entirety of Ukraine's negotiation team was not solely composed of Yermak, and other officials can continue the work. The ultimate strategic decisions remain with President Zelenskyy. Nevertheless, the incident removes a buffer between Zelenskyy and external scrutiny—should the corruption investigation expand, it could potentially place President Zelenskyy closer to the firing line.
This internal political crisis compounds the already formidable challenges facing Ukrainian diplomacy. As Steve Witkoff, President Trump's envoy, prepares to travel to Moscow to present proposals that Vladimir Putin has already indicated he will reject, Ukraine must simultaneously manage domestic political turbulence, European alliance coordination, and American pressure for territorial concessions. The convergence of these pressures at a single moment illustrates the precarious position of the Zelenskyy administration as it attempts to navigate between military necessity, political survival, and the preservation of Ukrainian sovereignty.
Implications for the Analytical Framework
This development reinforces several themes central to this analysis. First, it demonstrates the domestic political fragility that constrains Ukraine's diplomatic flexibility—Zelenskyy must manage not only external pressures from Russia and the United States but also internal legitimacy challenges. Second, it provides concrete evidence for Mearsheimer's characterization of Ukraine as lacking full agency in determining its fate; the corruption investigation and resulting political instability may force diplomatic concessions independent of strategic calculations. Third, it underscores European concerns about governance and the sustainability of long-term commitments to Ukrainian reconstruction and security guarantees if internal political instability persists.
The Fundamental Geopolitical Divergence
Competing Threat Assessments
The US–European divide rests on irreconcilable assessments of Russia's ambitions, the nature of global order, and the long-term strategic environment.
The European Perspective
For Europe—especially Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and increasingly Germany—Russia constitutes an immediate and existential threat. The lessons of 2014 and 2022 remain central: Russian aggression advances when unopposed, and territorial concessions invite—not deter—future escalation.
European governments argue that:
- downsizing Ukraine's military would create structural vulnerability;
- legitimizing territorial changes by force would dismantle core principles of European security;
- any settlement that leaves Russia with strategic momentum risks destabilizing the Baltic, Nordic, and Black Sea regions;
- the Kremlin's military-industrial mobilization and deepening partnership with Iran and North Korea (including continued missile transfers documented through late 2025) demonstrate long-term revisionist intent.
European military intelligence assessments released in autumn 2025 warn that Russia's defense production has surpassed pre-2022 levels and that Moscow could regenerate offensive capacity against Ukraine within 18–24 months if sanctions erosion continues. These evaluations reinforce European skepticism toward a premature settlement.
The weight of available evidence clearly indicates that European opposition to the peace plan is not a matter of diplomatic style, but of core national security interests—rooted in geography, historical experience, and direct exposure to Russian power.
Challenging the Imperial Narrative: Mearsheimer directly contests the European interpretation of Russian motivations. While acknowledging that "Putin's speeches and writings do suggest a revanchist element, a desire to restore Russian influence over territories that were once part of the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire," he argues that this misses the crucial point: "the immediate cause of this war was NATO expansion. And the immediate path to peace requires addressing that root cause."
He contends that European threat assessments confuse symptoms with causes. Russia's military mobilization and territorial annexations are responses to perceived NATO encroachment, not evidence of innate expansionism. Mearsheimer cites Russia's actual military operations and diplomatic positions as being "consistently focused on preventing NATO expansion and securing Russia's strategic position, not on conquering all of Ukraine." This interpretation suggests that European fears of further Russian aggression are overblown—if NATO expansion is halted and Ukraine's neutrality is guaranteed, Russia's security concerns would be addressed and further conflict would be unnecessary.
However, Mearsheimer acknowledges a significant vulnerability in his own analysis: "my approach focuses almost entirely on great power competition and security interests. And in doing so, it tends to treat smaller states like Ukraine as objects rather than agents, pieces to be moved around the board by great powers." He admits that "Ukrainians have agency. They have preferences. They've chosen repeatedly to align with the West rather than with Russia. You can't just dismiss that as NATO manipulation or Western propaganda." This self-critique reveals the tension between structural realism and the lived experience of nations caught between great powers—a tension this liberal internationalist analysis addresses through its focus on European sovereignty concerns.
The American Calculus
The Trump administration's strategic logic centers on the urgency of reallocating military, financial, and industrial capacity toward countering China. Senior officials—including National Security Advisor Kash Patel—have repeatedly stated that "Ukraine is a distraction from the primary theater." The administration's 2025 National Defense Priorities Memorandum codified this hierarchy, identifying China as the dominant threat and limiting US commitments to European security beyond nuclear deterrence and basic intelligence cooperation.
Nevertheless, analysts across the US defense establishment caution that abrupt disengagement from Europe risks:
- destabilizing the continent and creating future crises that draw the US back at higher cost;
- undermining deterrence credibility in Asia by signaling inconsistency;
- accelerating Russian–Chinese–Iranian trilateral coordination, already visible through joint naval patrols in the Mediterranean and the 2025 Arctic exercises.
The weight of available evidence clearly suggests that the administration's focus on short-term disengagement overlooks the long-term structural consequences for global order and US strategic flexibility.
Mearsheimer's Qualified Support for Reorientation: Mearsheimer acknowledges understanding "the Trump administration's logic, even if I don't agree with all of their conclusions. The United States is not all powerful. We cannot solve every problem or defend every threatened country. We need to prioritize our commitments and our resources. And there's a strong argument that containing China should be America's top priority with everything else, including Ukraine, being secondary."
However, he identifies a critical flaw in the administration's approach: "It assumes that a peace settlement imposed on Ukraine will actually be stable and durable. I have serious doubts about that." A settlement leaving Ukraine "weak, partially occupied, and without credible security guarantees creates conditions for future conflict. Russia may decide in five or 10 years that it wants more territory, that it wants to finish the job of subordinating Ukraine to Russian influence." This represents Mearsheimer's central concern: "the Trump plan has a fundamental weakness. It tries to end the war without creating the conditions for lasting peace. It's a ceasefire agreement, not a peace settlement."
This analysis bridges European and American concerns: Europe fears immediate Russian resurgence; Mearsheimer shares that fear but locates its source in inadequate settlement design rather than innate Russian expansionism. Both perspectives suggest the current peace plan may fail to achieve its stated objective of ending the conflict permanently.
Divergent Visions of Global Order
European Commitment to Liberal Internationalism
European leaders insist that any peace arrangement must adhere to core principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the prohibition of conquest. The EU, NATO, and OSCE each reiterated in October–November 2025 that their institutions cannot be compelled to recognize territorial changes imposed by force. European policymakers view these principles not as abstractions but as preconditions for continental stability.
To accept Russia's annexations—or to compel Ukraine to accept them—would undermine the foundational norms of the post-1945 European security order. European governments therefore argue that the 28-point plan, even in its revised form, risks institutionalizing instability rather than resolving the conflict.
The Realist Critique of Normative Order: Mearsheimer explicitly rejects the European framework: "If we accept territorial changes through force, we're setting a terrible precedent. We're telling aggressive powers that they can take what they want. But that's not how international politics works. Territorial changes through force have been a constant throughout human history. What matters isn't the abstract principle. What matters is whether we create a stable settlement that prevents future wars."
He invokes historical precedent: "The peace that ended World War II involved massive territorial changes. Poland lost territory to the Soviet Union and gained territory from Germany. Millions of people were displaced. Was it just? No. But it created a framework that prevented World War III for decades. That's the kind of cold-blooded calculation we need to make."
This represents a fundamental philosophical divide: European policymakers argue that stable order requires consistent adherence to sovereignty norms; Mearsheimer argues that stable order requires accommodating great power security interests, regardless of moral principles. The former prioritizes legitimacy and rules; the latter prioritizes power balances and strategic stability. These worldviews are not merely different but mutually incompatible—they cannot both be correct simultaneously.
The American Transactional Turn
The Trump administration's approach evidences a decisive philosophical shift: from America as architect and guarantor of international order toward America as a narrowly self-interested power engaged in selective transactional arrangements. Democracy, sovereignty, and rule-of-law commitments now play diminished roles in policy calculations, replaced by cost-benefit analyses centered on domestic economic performance, energy priorities, and great-power competition.
This worldview sees alliances not as enduring security communities but as negotiable partnerships. It is logical and reasonable to assume that this approach—combined with US–EU trade frictions over energy, tariffs, and defense subsidies—has accelerated European consideration of long-term strategic autonomy.
Alignment and Divergence with Realism: The Trump administration's transactional approach superficially resembles Mearsheimer's realism but differs in critical respects. Both reject liberal internationalist norms in favor of interest-based calculations. However, Mearsheimer emphasizes creating durable strategic settlements that prevent future wars, while the Trump approach prioritizes short-term disengagement without adequate attention to stability conditions.
Mearsheimer's critique of sanctions-based deterrence illustrates this difference: "The Trump administration's answer seems to be, we'll deter Russia by threatening to reinstate sanctions and cut off economic cooperation if they violate the agreement, but sanctions haven't deterred Russia so far. Why would they work better in the future?" This suggests that authentic realism requires more sophisticated planning than the administration's current approach provides—crude transactionalism is not equivalent to strategic realism.
European Response and the Consolidation of Strategic Autonomy
Defense Spending Surge
Europe's defense posture has transformed more profoundly in the past three years than in any period since the end of the Cold War. Russia's ongoing assault on Ukraine—combined with intensifying uncertainty over the long-term reliability of American security commitments—has catalyzed an unprecedented surge in European defense expenditure. By the end of 2024, EU member states collectively allocated €343 billion to defense, marking the tenth consecutive annual increase. Current projections indicate that this total will reach approximately €381 billion in 2025, pushing aggregate spending to roughly 2.1 percent of EU GDP, the highest sustained level in modern EU history.
NATO, responding both to Russian revisionism and transatlantic political shifts, is now expected to adopt a two-tier spending benchmark for 2030: 3.5% of GDP for core defense capabilities and an additional 1.5% for broader security functions, including cyber, critical infrastructure protection, and advanced industrial capacity. If implemented, this framework would require European NATO members to collectively invest nearly €900 billion in additional defense resources by the end of the decade. The cumulative pattern—visible in national budgets, procurement plans, and force-generation requirements—provides overwhelming evidence that Europe is entering a historically significant rearmament cycle driven not only by Russia's aggression but also by doubts about the durability of American guarantees.
The End of Strategic Dependence: Mearsheimer's analysis anticipated this development: "European leaders are caught in an impossible position. On the one hand, they know that abandoning Ukraine or accepting a Russian imposed peace would be catastrophic for European security... On the other hand, Europe lacks the military capability to defend Ukraine without American support. European armies have been run down after decades of peace dividend spending cuts."
He identifies this as the consequence of structural dependence: "The uncomfortable truth is that Europe has been freeloading on American security guarantees for decades now. When push comes to shove, they're discovering that they can't defend their own interests without Washington. And Washington under Trump or potentially under future administrations is less and less willing to carry that burden."
From a realist perspective, Europe's rearmament represents the natural correction of an unsustainable imbalance. Great powers cannot indefinitely subsidize the defense of wealthy allies who refuse to provide for their own security. Europe's current trajectory—toward strategic autonomy and increased defense capacity—is not a crisis but a necessary adjustment to geopolitical reality. The only question is whether this adjustment occurs rapidly enough to deter Russian adventurism in the interim period.
Institutional Initiatives
Institutionally, the European Union has begun to translate political rhetoric on strategic autonomy into concrete financial and industrial mechanisms. The European Commission's launch of the €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan facility represents the most ambitious defense-industrial financing initiative in EU history. By design, SAFE directs procurement toward European manufacturers and explicitly excludes U.S. defense companies—an unmistakable signal of Brussels' intent to strengthen internal industrial capacity and reduce structural dependence on American supply chains.
In parallel, the EU activated national "escape clauses" within its fiscal governance framework, permitting member states to increase defense spending by up to 1.5% of GDP for four years without violating Stability and Growth Pact thresholds. More than half of EU members have signaled intent to use this mechanism, and twelve have already filed formal notifications. These combined actions indicate not an episodic response to crisis but a broader strategic pivot toward European self-reliance in defense planning, industrial policy, and capability development.
Nuclear Deterrence Discussions
Europe's shifting nuclear debate underscores the magnitude of this reorientation. French President Emmanuel Macron has reiterated France's willingness to extend aspects of its nuclear deterrent to European partners under defined political and strategic conditions. Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz—breaking with decades of political reticence—has publicly endorsed opening structured consultations with both France and the United Kingdom regarding the future of European nuclear burden-sharing and contingency planning.
While no formal commitments have yet been made, the balance of probabilities indicates that European leaders increasingly recognize the necessity of credible, partially autonomous deterrence architectures should U.S. extended nuclear guarantees become more conditional. Debates that were once taboo—joint nuclear doctrine, French-German coordination, dual-key arrangements, and EU-level strategic planning—have now entered mainstream policy discourse.
The Bleak European Future: Mearsheimer's assessment of Europe's trajectory is notably pessimistic: "This is what I meant when I said Europe faces a bleak future. If this peace settlement goes through in something like its current form, Europe will face a resurgent Russia that has proven it can change borders by force while lacking the military means to prevent it from doing so again. Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states will all be more vulnerable. The EU will be weakened and the transatlantic alliance that has been the cornerstone of Western security will be fundamentally damaged."
However, his analysis also suggests that European strategic autonomy—if successfully implemented—could partially mitigate this bleakness. A Europe capable of defending itself would no longer be hostage to American domestic politics or vulnerable to Russian coercion. The question is whether Europe can develop credible military capacity rapidly enough, and whether it possesses the political unity necessary to deploy that capacity effectively. Mearsheimer's framework suggests skepticism on both counts, but acknowledges that strategic circumstances may force Europe to overcome historical divisions.
Implications and Future Trajectories
Immediate Diplomatic Outlook
Ukraine has signaled conditional willingness to continue refining the latest iteration of the peace proposal, with President Zelenskyy preparing for an expected visit to Washington before the end of November. Although the Thanksgiving deadline initially imposed by President Trump has been relaxed, the U.S. administration is still seeking momentum toward an agreement.
However, significant divergences remain between Ukrainian, European, and Russian positions. Despite modifications to the original draft, Russia continues to demand additional territorial concessions that Kyiv rejects, and Europe remains firmly opposed to legitimizing unilateral territorial revisionism. The available evidence suggests that talks will continue but without imminent prospects of bridging the core sovereignty issues at stake.
Scenario Analysis: Mearsheimer outlines several potential trajectories, the most likely being continued diplomatic stalemate: "Scenario one, the peace plan collapses. Russia rejects the revised proposal because it still includes security guarantees or other provisions Moscow finds unacceptable. Ukraine rejects it because the territorial concessions are too painful without meaningful protection."
In this scenario, fighting would continue into 2026, with "more maximalist positions harden on both sides. Russia may decide it can take more territory. Ukraine may decide it can never accept any compromise and we'll have missed another opportunity." This analysis suggests urgency without optimism—the window for settlement exists but may close rapidly, and the alternatives to settlement are uniformly worse than any achievable agreement.
Long-Term Strategic Consequences
The controversy surrounding the peace plan has accelerated—and in some cases crystallized—European debates about long-term strategic autonomy. Europe's defense expenditure has risen 17% in real terms, part of a broader global upswing driven primarily by Russia's war of attrition in Ukraine and widespread concerns over U.S. strategic retrenchment.
It is logical and reasonable to assume that regardless of the ultimate trajectory of the ongoing negotiations, Europe's long-term security strategy will emphasize continental self-reliance. This will require not only higher and more consistent military spending, but also sustained investment in resilience: energy diversification, advanced industrial capacity, cyber defense, intelligence sharing, and coordinated diplomatic initiatives. Europe is gradually acknowledging that military strength must be embedded in a wider architecture of economic security and political coherence.
The Tragedy of Predictable Disaster: Mearsheimer emphasizes that current circumstances were both foreseeable and avoidable: "The tragedy of this situation is that it was so predictable and so avoidable, but we're past that now. We can't go back to 2008 or 2014 and make different choices. We can only deal with where we are today and try to find the best path forward from here."
This perspective reframes the analysis: rather than debating who bears moral responsibility for the war, policymakers must focus on damage limitation and preventing escalation. From this view, European strategic autonomy emerges not as a desirable goal but as an unfortunate necessity—the consequence of failed Western statecraft that ignored basic principles of great power politics and created a crisis that now forces Europe to provide for its own defense.
The Future of Transatlantic Relations
The balance of probabilities suggests that the worldview driving the Trump administration's approach to the Ukraine conflict—transactional diplomacy, emphasis on burden-sharing, and strategic deprioritization of Europe relative to Asia—reflects a durable current within American politics rather than a temporary aberration. Even if future administrations adopt different tones or tactics, European policymakers increasingly recognize that U.S. commitments may become more variable, more conditional, and less automatic over time.
Consequently, Europe's strategic autonomy initiatives represent not merely episodic adjustments but a fundamental reorientation of the continent's security philosophy. The debate is no longer whether Europe needs greater self-reliance, but how far and how quickly it must move to ensure that its vital interests are not contingent on the shifting priorities of American domestic politics.
The Stress Test of Great Power Competition: Mearsheimer frames the current crisis as revealing the true nature of alliances: "The people making decisions about Ukraine right now in Washington, in Brussels, in Moscow, in Kyiv are all operating under enormous stress with imperfect information and facing impossible choices. They're trying to navigate between different dangers. Escalation, surrender, endless war, betrayed allies."
His analysis suggests that the transatlantic alliance was sustainable only during the unipolar moment when American dominance was unchallenged and threats were manageable. As great power competition returns—with China rising and Russia reasserting itself regionally—the structural tensions within NATO become unavoidable. America cannot simultaneously contain China, deter Russia, and subsidize European defense. Europe cannot simultaneously maintain its social model, increase defense spending, and preserve fiscal discipline. These competing imperatives will strain the alliance regardless of diplomatic efforts to maintain unity.
Analytical Synthesis: Evaluating the General Vector
The integration of Mearsheimer's realist perspective with this study's liberal internationalist analysis reveals several critical tensions and convergences:
Areas of Convergence
1. Recognition of Strategic Instability: Both perspectives agree that the current peace proposal, in its various iterations, fails to create conditions for durable stability. This study emphasizes the risk of legitimizing territorial conquest; Mearsheimer emphasizes the inadequacy of security guarantees. Despite different reasoning, both conclude the settlement is fundamentally flawed.
2. European Vulnerability: Both analyses acknowledge Europe's current military weakness and dependence on American security commitments. The liberal internationalist analysis documents European rearmament as a response; Mearsheimer characterizes it as overdue correction of unsustainable free-riding. Both recognize that Europe faces a dangerous transition period.
3. Transatlantic Divergence as Structural: Both perspectives treat US-European disagreement not as a communication failure but as the product of incompatible strategic positions. Geography, threat proximity, and competing priorities create divergences that diplomatic rhetoric cannot bridge.
Areas of Fundamental Conflict
1. Root Cause Attribution: The liberal internationalist analysis treats Russian aggression as the primary driver of instability, requiring deterrence and containment. Mearsheimer treats NATO expansion as the primary driver, requiring accommodation of Russian security interests. These interpretations lead to incompatible policy prescriptions.
2. Role of Norms in Security: The liberal internationalist analysis argues that stable order requires consistent application of sovereignty and territorial integrity principles. Mearsheimer argues that stable order requires power balances that accommodate great power security interests, regardless of moral principles. One prioritizes legitimacy; the other prioritizes equilibrium.
3. Ukrainian Agency: The liberal internationalist analysis implicitly treats Ukraine as a sovereign actor whose preferences matter independently. Mearsheimer explicitly—and self-critically—acknowledges that his framework treats Ukraine as an object in great power competition rather than an agent with legitimate interests.
The General Vector: Toward Multipolarity and Fragmentation
When synthesized, these perspectives point toward a consistent general trajectory:
1. End of Liberal Hegemonic Order: Both analyses, despite different normative commitments, describe the dissolution of the post-Cold War liberal international order characterized by American primacy, universal norms, and the expansion of democratic institutions. This order is being replaced by a more competitive, multipolar system where power politics reassert primacy over normative consensus.
2. Regionalization of Security: Europe's turn toward strategic autonomy, documented extensively in the liberal internationalist analysis and anticipated in Mearsheimer's analysis, suggests a broader pattern: security provision is becoming increasingly regional rather than global. The American security umbrella is contracting, forcing regions to develop autonomous defense capacities.
3. Return of Tragedy in International Relations: Mearsheimer's framework emphasizes the tragic dimension of international politics—competent, well-intentioned leaders making rational decisions within their constraints nonetheless produce catastrophic outcomes. The liberal internationalist analysis' documentation of escalating tensions, despite no party desiring great power war, illustrates this tragedy. The general vector points toward a more dangerous international environment where miscalculation and unintended escalation become increasingly likely.
4. Primacy of Geography and Proximity: The US-European divergence reflects a fundamental truth: threat perception is shaped by geographic proximity. Europe cannot relocate away from Russia; America can redirect attention toward Asia. This geographic reality will continue driving transatlantic divergence regardless of diplomatic efforts or alliance management.
5. Instability During Transition: Both perspectives suggest the current period—characterized by declining American hegemony but not yet stabilized multipolarity—is particularly dangerous. Historical transitions between international orders have frequently produced great power wars. The inability to resolve the Ukraine conflict despite three years of effort illustrates the difficulty of managing this transition peacefully.
Implications for Policy
The synthesized analysis suggests several uncomfortable conclusions:
For Europe: Strategic autonomy is not optional but imperative. The question is whether Europe can develop credible military capacity and political unity before the next crisis. The current trajectory—increased spending but fragmented procurement and command structures—may prove inadequate.
For the United States: Attempting to maintain hegemonic commitments with declining relative power invites overextension. However, abrupt disengagement risks creating power vacuums that produce instability requiring future intervention at higher cost. There is no cost-free option.
For Ukraine: As the object of great power competition, Ukraine faces the prospect of settlement terms determined primarily by external actors regardless of Ukrainian preferences. This represents the darkest implication of realist analysis—small states caught between great powers rarely control their own fate.
For International Order: The conflict has demonstrated that neither normative appeals nor economic sanctions can prevent great powers from pursuing perceived vital security interests through military force. Future order will rest more heavily on deterrence and balance of power, less on shared norms and institutional constraints.
Conclusion
The widening divergence between American and European approaches to the Ukraine peace process reflects not a tactical disagreement but a deeper structural evolution in transatlantic relations. The available evidence indicates that Washington and European capitals increasingly operate under distinct threat perceptions, strategic priorities, and conceptions of international order. For Europe, Russia remains an immediate and existential challenger whose defeat and containment require sustained military, economic, and political commitment. For the current U.S. administration, Ukraine represents an obstacle to reorienting strategic focus toward China, justifying rapid settlement even at the expense of European security concerns and Ukrainian sovereignty.
Mearsheimer's realist critique adds a third dimension: both American and European approaches fail because they refuse to address the root cause—NATO expansion—that created the conditions for conflict. From this perspective, sustainable peace requires acknowledging Russian security interests through Ukrainian neutrality and territorial accommodation, however distasteful to liberal sensibilities. The choice is between justice and peace; international politics rarely permits both simultaneously.
This divergence has catalyzed the most significant debate over Europe's security future in decades. Rising defense budgets, the emergence of EU-level financing instruments, expanded nuclear deterrence discussions, and the institutionalization of autonomous defense capabilities all signal recognition that the continent cannot assume long-term American guardianship as a fixed strategic constant. Whether these developments ultimately produce a more balanced transatlantic partnership—anchored in equitable burden-sharing and shared strategic purpose—or lead to a gradual strategic decoupling remains uncertain.
What is clear, however, is that Europe is entering a transformative era. The choices made in the coming years will shape not only the architecture of European security, but the future of the liberal international order itself. Mearsheimer's framework suggests an even darker conclusion: the liberal international order may already be irretrievably lost, replaced by a competitive multipolar system where security depends on power balances rather than shared norms. If this assessment proves correct, the current debate over Ukraine peace terms represents not a temporary crisis but the permanent condition of 21st-century international relations—tragic, unstable, and resistant to diplomatic resolution.
The general vector points unmistakably toward fragmentation, competition, and the return of great power rivalry as the organizing principle of international politics. How skillfully leaders navigate this transition will determine whether the coming decades resemble the managed competition of the Cold War or the catastrophic miscalculations of the early 20th century.
