Introduction: The Confluence of Decline and Renewal
The trajectory of German defense policy now constitutes the most consequential departure from the post-war Zivilmacht (civilian power) paradigm in the history of the Federal Republic. What began as a rhetorical inflection following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has, by 2025, hardened into a structural transformation of Germany’s strategic posture, fiscal doctrine, and industrial priorities. The Zeitenwende is no longer a declaratory shift; it is an institutional reorientation that seeks to reconcile Germany’s economic centrality within Europe with its longstanding military underperformance and strategic reticence.
Yet this remilitarization is unfolding under conditions profoundly different from those that underpinned earlier phases of European integration or transatlantic reassurance. Germany is rebuilding military capacity at precisely the moment when the international system it aims to stabilize is undergoing a destabilizing transition. Scholars of international political economy and security studies increasingly converge on the assessment that the global order is moving from a unipolar system dominated by U.S. hegemony toward a contested, fragmentary multipolarity. Historically, such systemic transitions are associated not with equilibrium but with elevated risks of miscalculation, alliance strain, and major power conflict.
The paradox at the heart of the German Zeitenwende is therefore acute. Germany seeks to deter instability through accelerated militarization while operating within an international environment structurally prone to escalation. The views of Professor Sachs illuminates this dilemma through a game-theoretic and systemic lens: declining hegemonic powers, rising challengers, and strategically exposed middle powers interact in ways that systematically undermine cooperative equilibria. Under such conditions, rearmament can deter localized threats while simultaneously intensifying broader insecurity. Germany’s challenge is not merely to rearm, but to do so without reinforcing the very dynamics of strategic fragmentation it seeks to contain.
In this sense, the Zeitenwende is less a linear correction of past underinvestment than a high-risk adaptation to a disintegrating order. The success or failure of this project will hinge not only on matériel and manpower, but on whether Germany can align military renewal with credible strategic autonomy, alliance cohesion, and economic sustainability in an era of declining hegemonic coordination.
Procurement and the “Division 2025” Initiative: Ambition Confronts Reality
At the operational core of Germany’s strategic pivot lies the Division 2025 initiative—an emblematic effort to provide NATO with a fully equipped, combat-ready formation capable of sustained high-intensity, peer-to-peer conflict. The program is designed not only as a force-generation milestone but as a signal of Germany’s intent to transition from a security consumer to a security provider within the Alliance.
However, by early 2025, the gap between ambition and execution had become increasingly visible. Despite unprecedented funding commitments, the Bundeswehr still lacked a single fully combat-ready division. Senior figures within Germany’s defense industrial base bluntly acknowledged that, in its existing state, Germany could credibly defend Augsburg but not Munich or Berlin. This operational fragility has left the country structurally dependent on approximately 38,500 U.S. Army personnel stationed on German territory—an arrangement that underscores the persistent asymmetry between Germany’s economic weight and its military readiness.
In response, the Ministry of Defense abandoned the long-standing doctrine of “dynamic availability,” under which units rotated shared equipment, and shifted toward full capitalization of formations. The scale of this procurement acceleration is historically unprecedented. Between 2023 and 2025, Germany approved 255 major procurement projects valued at €188.4 billion, compared with 215 projects totaling €109 billion over the entire 2015–2022 period. The inflection point came in 2025 alone, when the Bundestag authorized 103 major procurement projects worth €83 billion, followed by an additional €52 billion covering 29 contracts approved in December.
Flagship acquisitions illustrate both strategic intent and structural constraint. The procurement of F-35A Lightning II aircraft for NATO nuclear-sharing roles replaces the aging Tornado fleet and anchors Germany firmly within the U.S.-centric fifth-generation airpower ecosystem. On land, the long-term vision centers on the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), while immediate operational gaps are addressed through expanded procurement of Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks and additional Joint Strike Missiles. In air and missile defense, the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) integrates Arrow-3 exo-atmospheric interceptors—at a cost of approximately €3 billion—alongside IRIS-T SLM systems to construct a layered continental shield.
Yet even as procurement volumes surge, structural bottlenecks persist. Personnel shortages have emerged as the most binding constraint. Parliamentary approval to expand the Bundeswehr from roughly 180,000 troops to 260,000 by 2035 already implies a historically ambitious recruitment and retention effort. NATO planning assumptions, however, demand force levels approaching 395,000 personnel—an increase of more than 80% from current strength. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius’ warning that NATO must be prepared for possible Russian conflict “as early as next year” starkly exposes the tension between strategic urgency and Germany’s slow-moving institutional capacity.
The result is a rearmament effort that is financially credible but operationally fragile: capital-intensive, procurement-heavy, and constrained by demographic realities, industrial lead times, and administrative inertia. Division 2025 thus functions less as an achieved capability than as a stress test of Germany’s ability to convert fiscal power into usable military force.
Comparative R&D Investment: Narrowing the Innovation Gap
Beyond force generation, the Zeitenwende aspires to reposition Germany within the technological hierarchy of modern warfare. Historically, Germany lagged behind its peers in defense research and development, privileging incremental modernization over disruptive innovation. By 2025, however, Berlin had moved decisively to narrow this gap.
In absolute terms, Germany’s defense R&D spending reached approximately €1.4 billion, approaching France’s €1.6 billion annual investment. When accounting for joint Franco-German programs, the two countries together now account for roughly 74% of total EU defense R&D expenditure. On the surface, this convergence suggests a maturing European defense innovation core.
Yet deeper structural disparities remain. Germany continues to allocate only around 0.05% of GDP to defense R&D—half of France’s relative commitment and a fraction of the United States’ $145 billion Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget. In proportional terms, the U.S. devotes approximately 16% of its defense spending to innovation, compared with roughly 4% across the EU. This asymmetry translates directly into capability gaps in AI-enabled command systems, autonomous platforms, hypersonics, and integrated sensor networks.
Berlin has sought to compensate by concentrating resources in select domains. AI research hubs in Oberbayern and quantum technology partnerships—often deeper with the UK than with France—reflect an attempt to leapfrog rather than catch up incrementally. Nonetheless, innovation ecosystems cannot be scaled overnight, particularly in the absence of a unified European industrial strategy.
The fragmentation of Europe’s defense industrial base remains a central liability. Europe fields three distinct fourth-generation-plus combat aircraft—the Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale, and Gripen—while the United States converges on a single fifth-generation platform, the F-35, with planned production of 3,556 units. This duplication dilutes economies of scale, fragments R&D investment, and locks Europe into parallel modernization cycles. The inefficiency is not merely economic; it is strategic, undermining interoperability and slowing adaptation at precisely the moment when technological acceleration defines battlefield advantage.
Germany’s R&D surge thus represents progress within constraint: a narrowing gap that nevertheless preserves transatlantic dependence and exposes the limits of national innovation strategies in a fragmented continental system.
Fiscal Revolution: The Death of Orthodoxy
Perhaps the most consequential dimension of the Zeitenwende lies not in weapons systems but in fiscal doctrine. Germany’s remilitarization has precipitated a fundamental rupture with the economic orthodoxy that defined the post-2009 era. In early 2025, Berlin enacted a landmark constitutional amendment to the Schuldenbremse (debt brake), exempting defense spending above 1% of GDP from standard borrowing constraints. Together with a €500 billion fund earmarked for defense and infrastructure, this move effectively marked the end of the “black zero” paradigm.
Under current projections, Germany aims to raise defense spending to 3% of GDP by 2027 and 3.5% thereafter, with the defense budget rising from €86 billion in 2025 to €108.2 billion in 2026. This reallocation of fiscal space reflects a recalibration of threat perception: military security is now treated as a precondition for economic stability rather than a discretionary expenditure.
The shift has significant European ramifications. Germany’s trajectory strains the logic of the EU Stability and Growth Pact, even under the European Commission’s “ReArm Europe” framework, which permits limited flexibility—up to 1.5% of GDP above a baseline—for defense spending between 2025 and 2028. Berlin’s projected outlays risk exceeding these parameters, forcing a broader reckoning over whether the EU’s fiscal architecture can accommodate sustained defense investment.
This German U-turn has already catalyzed debate over “productive debt”—borrowing that enhances long-term security and growth potential. Goldman Sachs economists estimate that Germany’s fiscal pivot could lift GDP growth to 0.2% in 2025, 1.5% in 2026, and 2% in 2027, while easing pressure on the European Central Bank to push rates below neutral. Defense spending thus emerges not merely as a security instrument but as a macroeconomic stabilizer in an otherwise stagnating economy.
Diplomatic Complexity: Germany and the Trump Peace Initiative
The intersection of Germany’s remilitarization with transatlantic diplomacy has become increasingly fraught, particularly in relation to Ukraine. Contrary to claims of obstructionism, Germany’s posture is better understood as one of strategic refinement rather than resistance. While Washington prioritizes rapid conflict termination under the logic of transactional burden-sharing, Berlin emphasizes the durability of any post-war order.
The Berlin talks involving President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff, and Chancellor Friedrich Merz crystallized this approach. Zelenskyy described the emerging framework as “a very workable version” of a peace plan, while underscoring that “every single detail matters” to avoid rewarding aggression. European leaders committed to supporting U.S.-led efforts while insisting that security guarantees, sovereignty, and economic reconstruction are integral to wider Euro-Atlantic stability.
German officials have been explicit in their concern that peace arrangements lacking credible enforcement mechanisms would generate strategic vacuums. Chancellor Merz noted that the U.S. proposals presented in Berlin contained “considerable” legal and material guarantees, while emphasizing that territorial questions remain central. Germany has spearheaded discussions on European-led multinational monitoring forces—an initiative designed to satisfy American demands for burden-sharing while preserving European agency.
These efforts unfold amid visible strain. France, Germany, and the UK jointly advanced a 28-point counterproposal aimed at moderating provisions perceived as excessively favorable to Russia. A senior European diplomat characterized the negotiations as “endlessly frustrating,” highlighting the pressure placed on Ukraine and its supporters to engage with demands “impossible for Ukraine to accept.”
Professor Sachs’ systemic analysis provides a sobering interpretive frame. In declining hegemonic systems, he argues, dominant powers “refuse to die,” substituting escalation and coercion for managed transition. The peace process reflects this pathology. U.S. national security strategy increasingly abandons multilateral coordination in favor of explicit national interest maximization, treating allies’ resources and strategic geography as instruments rather than partners. Germany’s insistence on “strategic refinement” thus reflects classic middle-power hedging behavior under hegemonic uncertainty: an effort to reconcile alliance dependence with autonomy, deterrence with restraint, and rearmament with order preservation.
The Polish Partnership: Pragmatism Over Revisionism
Speculation regarding latent German ambitions to revise post-war borders or reclaim former Prussian territories (Ostgebiete) remains firmly within the realm of historical revisionism rather than contemporary policy reality. The 1990 German–Polish Border Treaty irrevocably codified the Oder–Neisse line as Germany’s eastern frontier, a settlement reinforced by subsequent EU and NATO integration. In strategic terms, any revival of territorial revisionism would be not only politically impossible but fundamentally incompatible with Germany’s post-1990 constitutional identity and alliance commitments.
In contrast, the contemporary German–Polish relationship has evolved into one of Europe’s most consequential bilateral security partnerships. Far from latent rivalry, the organizing principle of this relationship is shared vulnerability—particularly regarding the defense of Poland, the Baltic states, and the Suwałki Gap, NATO’s most exposed land corridor linking the Baltic region to the rest of the Alliance. German remilitarization is therefore not oriented eastward as revisionism, but eastward as reinforcement: a structural recognition that Polish sovereignty is inseparable from German security.
This reorientation has taken tangible operational form. In April 2025, Germany formally activated the 45th Panzer Brigade in Lithuania, marking the first permanent forward deployment of a full German brigade abroad since the Second World War. Once fully operational, the brigade is expected to approach 5,000 personnel equipped with Leopard 2 variants and integrated support units, embedding Germany directly into NATO’s forward defense posture. Complementing this, Berlin committed engineering and logistics units for deployment to Poland beginning in April 2026 for a two-year mission supporting Poland’s East Shield defensive network—a multi-billion-dollar fortification system spanning roughly 700 kilometers along Poland’s borders with Russia and Belarus.
Air and air-defense integration has similarly intensified. Germany has deployed Eurofighter aircraft and Bundeswehr personnel to Malbork air base as part of NATO’s enhanced air policing mission, responding to persistent airspace violations and probing activity along Poland’s northeastern frontier. These deployments are not symbolic; they represent a doctrinal shift toward forward defense, deterrence by denial, and rapid escalation control at the point of contact rather than reliance on rear-area reinforcement.
Institutionally, the consolidation of joint German–Polish defense mechanisms has accelerated. By late 2025, standing bilateral defense coordination structures had been institutionalized, complemented by Polish–Lithuanian ministerial frameworks that integrate German planning into regional defense architectures. The strategic logic is explicit: NATO’s contemporary doctrine seeks to prevent territorial loss outright, particularly in the Suwałki Gap, by imposing prohibitive costs on any aggressor during the opening phase of conflict, thereby buying time for alliance-wide mobilization.
In this context, Germany’s eastern deployments represent not a departure from restraint but its transformation—from post-war abstention to post-unipolar responsibility.
Structural Forces and the Path Dependency of Decline
Professor Sachs’ analytical framework, while deliberately provocative, offers a structural diagnosis that conventional policy analysis often avoids. His argument is not that war is inevitable, but that systemic pressures increasingly narrow the space for stable equilibrium. Several interlocking dynamics are central.
Hegemonic Overextension and the Refusal of Decline.
Historical experience suggests that dominant powers rarely manage decline gracefully. Sachs argues that hegemonic systems tend to resist relative loss of power through coercion, escalation, and institutional rigidity rather than negotiated transition. In contemporary terms, American strategic documents increasingly frame global engagement in explicitly competitive and instrumental terms. Alliances are no longer treated primarily as collective security arrangements but as force multipliers for U.S. objectives, generating unease among partners whose autonomy becomes conditional.Maritime–Continental Rivalry and Eurasian Integration.
Drawing on Mackinder’s Heartland thesis, Sachs situates U.S. grand strategy within a longer tradition of maritime powers seeking to prevent Eurasian consolidation. While the claim that “maximal chaos” is a deliberate objective risks oversimplification, it is analytically defensible to argue that Washington’s strategy prioritizes preventing rival powers—particularly China—from integrating continental resources, supply chains, and energy corridors. Competition over critical minerals, logistics chokepoints, and trade routes increasingly defines this rivalry, with maritime leverage playing a central role.
Alliance Compression and Strategic Convergence Among Non-Western Powers.
Sanctions regimes, financial weaponization, and security pressure have had the unintended effect of accelerating coordination among states previously divided by ideology or history. The gradual convergence of BRICS economies, Iran’s deepening integration into Eurasian trade networks, and expanded non-dollar settlement mechanisms reflect this dynamic. Sachs’ contention is not that such convergence is monolithic or stable, but that Western pressure is catalyzing precisely the continental alignment it seeks to prevent.
Domestic Strain and Externalization of Conflict.
Sachs’ analysis of domestic decline borrows heavily from Spenglerian civilizational theory. While some indicators are contestable, others are empirically observable: demographic contraction, political polarization, declining trust in institutions, and growing reluctance among populations to bear the costs of prolonged external conflict. In such contexts, external crises often function as temporary instruments of internal cohesion—though rarely with durable success.
The Illusion of Escalation Control.
Perhaps the most analytically grounded of Sachs’ warnings concerns escalation. Modern conflicts are consistently launched under assumptions of containment and proportionality, only to expand beyond initial objectives. The belief that limited troop deployments, peacekeeping forces, or calibrated strikes can be cleanly bounded has repeatedly proven false. European debates over selective intervention in Ukraine illustrate this risk: tactical initiatives are often pursued without credible models for escalation termination.
Germany’s Dilemma: Arming Within a Disintegrating Order
Germany’s Zeitenwende unfolds at the intersection of these structural pressures. The contradiction is not ideological but temporal: Germany rebuilds military capacity to preserve an order whose institutional foundations are eroding.
First, German rearmament accelerates precisely as American security guarantees become increasingly conditional. Recent U.S. strategic framing emphasizes transactional burden-sharing and national advantage, introducing uncertainty into long-term alliance planning. For Berlin, this creates a dual imperative: deepen NATO integration while hedging against strategic volatility.
Second, the Ukraine peace process exposes the limits of current arrangements. While claims of Ukrainian collapse must be treated cautiously, it is evident that sustaining the war indefinitely is politically and materially untenable. Germany’s advocacy for European-led security guarantees reflects an attempt to reconcile deterrence with realism—acknowledging that neither outright victory nor unconditional withdrawal offers stability.
Third, Germany confronts internal constraints. Expanding the Bundeswehr to 260,000—or even higher—presupposes social consent and institutional legitimacy. Surveys indicating ambivalence toward military service do not imply defeatism, but they do highlight the gap between strategic ambition and societal readiness. Rearmament without social anchoring risks becoming hollow.
Fourth, the fiscal revolution underpinning the Zeitenwende introduces long-term economic risk. While defense investment may stimulate growth in the short term, sustaining 3–3.5% of GDP in military spending alongside large-scale infrastructure investment will test Germany’s economic model, particularly if broader European stagnation persists.
The Multipolar Transition: Historical Parallels and Contemporary Risks
Sachs’ historical analogy to the pre-1914 period is not predictive but cautionary. Rising powers constrained by outdated institutional orders generate instability not because of intent alone, but because accommodation mechanisms lag structural change. Today, China’s economic weight, Russia’s exclusion from European security architecture, and America’s insistence on primacy recreate analogous tensions—albeit under nuclear conditions that amplify risk.
Potential flashpoints—from Latin America to the Middle East to Eastern Europe—are not isolated theaters but interconnected nodes. The defining feature of the current system is interdependence: escalation in one region rapidly propagates through energy markets, supply chains, and alliance commitments.
Germany’s remilitarization occurs within this environment. Deterrence remains necessary, but it is no longer sufficient.
Conclusion: The Tragic Paradox of Zeitenwende
German defense policy now operates along three consolidated axes:
Remilitarization and Innovation.
Germany has committed unprecedented resources to defense procurement and R&D, narrowing gaps with European peers while remaining structurally dependent on U.S. technological ecosystems. Implementation remains the critical bottleneck.
Transatlantic Mediation.
Berlin positions itself as a stabilizing intermediary—engaged with U.S. initiatives yet committed to European strategic sustainability. This role is increasingly difficult as alliance relations grow more transactional.
Eastern Stabilization.
Germany’s Polish–Baltic orientation represents a genuine strategic realignment, embedding German power within forward defense structures rather than symbolic reassurance.
The paradox is unavoidable: Germany arms itself at peacetime speed while the international order it seeks to defend fragments under systemic pressure. Military preparation may mitigate risk at the margins, but it cannot resolve structural contradictions rooted in hegemonic transition, institutional inertia, and societal fatigue.
As Sachs bluntly observes, the expectation that any agreement could restore the pre-2020 order is illusory. The Zeitenwende unfolds not as a return to stability, but as an adaptation to a world in which stability itself has become provisional.
Whether Germany’s rearmament ultimately proves prudential or tragically insufficient will depend less on procurement figures than on whether multipolar transition can be managed without catastrophe—a question history answers pessimistically, but policy must continue to confront nonetheless.
Germany arms itself while the order it seeks to defend disintegrates.
Whether this constitutes foresight or fatal entanglement may only be judged in retrospect—if the system allows for retrospection at all.